February 2021 chronology

This page is automatically generated: it will only be complete at the end of the month. All monthly updates are available here: Archive of monthly updates.

See February 2021 update for a thematic summary of these changes.

  • 27/02/21
    (0756)
    : Case (Medical treatment and children). Re X (A Child): Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust v X [2020] EWHC 1630 (Fam)Neither X, a 15-year-old Jehovah's Witness, nor her mother would consent to urgent treatment by way of blood transfusion, though neither would resist if the court ordered it. Noting that "the court, in suitable circumstances, has the jurisdiction to override the decisions and wishes of a Gillick competent child where it is in the child's best interests for it to do so", the blood transfusion was declared to be in her best interests.
  • 27/02/21
    (0744)
    : Case (Transfer of child to DOL in Scotland). London Borough of X v M and Y [2021] EWHC 440 (Fam)The English Court of Protection granted orders permitting the local authority (a) to place a child Y outside of the jurisdiction, in Scotland, pursuant to paragraph 19, Schedule 2, Children Act 1989; (b) to deprive Y of his liberty; and (c) to utilise the services of a secure transport company to transport Y to the proposed placement in Scotland, using reasonable force if necessary.
  • 26/02/21
    (2126)
    : Case (Death). University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust v NZ [2021] EWCOP 16NZ was receiving life-sustaining treatment by way of an extracorporeal membrane oxygenation machine (ECMO), a last-resort treatment which had increased by a third during the coronavirus pandemic. The clinical lead consultant for ECMO stated that rather than seeking to preserve her life he was now "prolonging her death", and signalled to the judge that further treatment would be professionally unethical. The judge stated that best interests "requires the broad canvas of NZ's life, circumstances and needs to be considered in their totality" (not just medical opinion, religious beliefs, or wishes and feelings) and that "a court will never seek to compel or encourage a medical professional to act in a way that he or she considers unethical", and concluded that the treatment was not in her best interests.
  • 18/02/21
    (2137)
    : Licence conditions. NOMS, 'Licence conditions, licences, and licence and supervision notices' (PSI 12/2015, updated 18/1/21) — "This Instruction updates the arrangements for the application of standard and additional licence conditions for offenders being released on licence following the creation of the National Probation Service and the Community Rehabilitation Companies. It also updates advice on the setting of conditions as well as updating the menu of additional conditions available, and adds the templates for licence and supervision notices to be used for offenders sentenced under the changes to be introduced under the Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014. It also includes a breakdown of who is responsible for approving additional conditions for each type of sentence. This instruction also introduces the new licence conditions for polygraph examinations for sex offenders."
  • 17/02/21
    (2331)
    : Case (Timing of CTO discharge). R (Gisagara) v Upper Tribunal [2021] EWHC 300 (Admin) [2021] EWHC 300 (Admin)The RC's evidence to the MHT was that the CTO criteria were met, and that a CTO was an "essential precondition" to discharge as otherwise the patient would not accept medication; she had granted s17 leave while the CTO was being arranged. When the MHT did not discharge him from s3, the patient argued that: (a) the discharge criteria mirror the admission criteria, s3(2)(c) requires detention, and the tribunal had failed to determine whether he was detained or merely liable to be detained; (b) the CTO criteria are incompatible with the detention criteria. In this application for permission to judicially review the Upper Tribunal's refusal of permission to appeal, the Administrative Court decided that: (a) in relation to the principle that the discharge criteria mirror the admission criteria, there was no conflict of authority (the Court of Appeal had repeatedly agreed with the House of Lords on this despite the CA decision to the contrary never having been overruled) so there was no important point of principle; (b) neither was there an arguable case. Permission was therefore refused.
  • 17/02/21
    (2255)
    : Case (Death following stroke). Sandwell and West Birmingham Hospitals NHS Trust v TW [2021] EWCOP 13(1) TW suffered catastrophic brain injury, arising from a stroke, which meant he lacked the capacity to decide whether to continue to receive life-sustaining treatment. (2) The continuation of ventilatory support and likely invasive treatment could no longer be reconciled with his best interests. (3) His three daughters wished to travel from Canada to be with him at the very end of his life and be present, if possible, when he died, a journey which owing to coronavirus restrictions would take over three weeks to arrange. The medical evidence was that the likely treatment "comes perilously close to, if not crossing, an ethical boundary" and the judge decided that any plan artificially to sustain his situation during this period would not be in his best interests.
  • 15/02/21
    (2207)
    : Mental health law journal. IJMHCL volume 26 (2020), pages 1-57 — This edition of the International Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law contains: (1) Editorial (Alex Ruck Keene); (2) Substituted Decision Making and Coercion: The Socially Accepted Problem in Psychiatric Practice and a CRPD-Based Response to Them (Giles Newton-Howes, Leah Kininmonth, Sarah Gordon); (3) Adult Incapacity Law: Visions for the Future Drawn from the Unfinished Story of a New Subject with a Long History (Adrian Ward); (4) Offenders with a Mental Impairment Under a 'Fusion Law': Non-Discrimination, Treatment, Public Protection (George Szmukler); (5) Book reviews (Alex Ruck Keene).
  • 14/02/21
    (2309)
    : Case (Return to country of origin). Re UR: Derby City Council v NHS Derby and Derbyshire CCG [2021] EWCOP 10It was in UR's best interests to return to live with and be cared for by her family in Poland, rather than remain in her care home in England. The judge discussed coronavirus issues, cross-border considerations and habitual residence, and set out a checklist for guidance in similar cases.
  • 14/02/21
    (1112)
    : Case (Capacity to marry). NB v MI [2021] EWHC 224 (Fam)The application for a declaration of non-recognition of a Muslim marriage pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court and the petition for nullity were unsuccessful: the wife had capacity (though maybe not wisdom) when she got married, so the marriage was valid under English law at its formation; even if the marriage had been voidable the judge would have refused to grant a non-recognition declaration as that would be contrary to statute; and the condition for granting leave out of time for the nullity petition was not satisfied. The judgment contains guidance on capacity to marry.
  • 14/02/21
    (1112)
    : Case (Capacity to consent to sex with husband, Capacity to consent to sexual activity, Capacity to marry, Declaration of non-marriage in English law, Overlap between different decisions, sex, Sexual exploitation, restrictions where adults have capacity, Social media and internet use, Social media and sexual relations). D County Council v LS [2010] EWHC 1544 (Fam) — "By this judgment, I set out my conclusions in relation to a range of capacity questions on issues relevant to Miss B’s life, including her capacity: (i) To litigate in these proceedings...; (ii) To manage her property and affairs...; (iii) To decide where she resides...; (iv) To decide on her package of care...; (v) To decide with whom she has contact...; (vi) To use the internet and communicate by social media; (specifically, it is agreed that the question is ‘whether Miss B has capacity to make a decision to use social media for the purposes of developing or maintaining connections with others’)...; (vii) To consent to sexual relations... It is clear that the information relevant to the decision in this area includes: (i) the sexual nature and character of the act of sexual intercourse, the mechanics of the act; (ii) the reasonably foreseeable consequences of sexual intercourse, namely pregnancy; (iii) the opportunity to say no; i.e. to choose whether or not to engage in it and the capacity to decide whether to give or withhold consent to sexual intercourse. (iv) that there are health risks involved, particularly the acquisition of sexually transmitted and transmissible infections; (v) that the risks of sexually transmitted infection can be reduced by the taking of precautions such as the use of a condom.", "I have reached the clear view that the issue of whether someone has capacity to engage in social media for the purposes of online ‘contact’ is distinct (and should be treated as such) from general consideration of other forms of direct or indirect contact. ... It is my judgment, having considered the submissions and proposals of the parties in this case and in Re B , that the ‘relevant information’ which P needs to be able to understand, retain, and use and weigh, is as follows: (i) Information and images (including videos) which you share on the internet or through social media could be shared more widely, including with people you don’t know , without you knowing or being able to stop it; (ii) It is possible to limit the sharing of personal information or images (and videos) by using ‘privacy and location settings’ on some internet and social media sites; [see paragraph below]; (iii) If you place material or images (including videos) on social media sites which are rude or offensive, or share those images, other people might be upset or offended; [see paragraph below]; (iv) Some people you meet or communicate with (‘talk to’) online, who you don’t otherwise know, may not be who they say they are (‘they may disguise, or lie about, themselves’); someone who calls themselves a ‘friend’ on social media may not be friendly; (v) Some people you meet or communicate with (‘talk to’) on the internet or through social media, who you don’t otherwise know, may pose a risk to you; they may lie to you, or exploit or take advantage of you sexually, financially, emotionally and/or physically; they may want to cause you harm; (vi) If you look at or share extremely rude or offensive images, messages or videos online you may get into trouble with the police, because you may have committed a crime; [see paragraph below]. With regard to the test above, I would like to add the following points to assist in its interpretation and application: ...", "There is also evidence that indicates that NB very much enjoys the status of marriage, is affectionate to her husband [AU] and, on occasion, initiates sexual relations. This appears consistent with Ms Wilson's observations as long ago as 1996. The primary issue before the Court is whether NB truly has the capacity to consent to sexual relations. ... Unfortunately, the case attracted a great deal of media coverage, this notwithstanding that no argument had been heard and no Judgment delivered. A great deal of the comment was sententious and, in some instances, irresponsible. It is considered, by the Official Solicitor and the applicant Local Authority, that the impact of that publicity frightened AU very considerably, leading him to believe that he was likely to be sent to prison. He has left the party's flat and disengaged with these proceedings. ... [Mr Bagchi for the OS] submits it is a 'general' or 'issue-specific' test rather than a partner-specific one. If Mr Bagchi is correct, the difficulty that presents in this case is that there is only one individual with whom it is really contemplated that NB is likely to have a sexual relationship i.e. her husband of 27 years. It seems entirely artificial therefore to be assessing her capacity in general terms when the reality is entirely specific. ... As I said on the last occasion, these issues are integral to the couple's basic human rights. There is a crucial social, ethical and moral principle in focus. It is important that the relevant test is not framed in such a restrictive way that it serves to discriminate against those with disabilities, in particular those with low intelligence or border line capacity. ... Mr Bagchi has accepted that if a person-specific test were applied here then the outcome, in terms of assessment of NB's capacity may be different. ... I do not necessarily consider that the applicable test in the Court of Protection necessarily excludes the 'person specific approach'. I am reserving my Judgment ...", "These complex and difficult proceedings in the Court of Protection concern a 37-year-old woman, hereafter referred to as M, who (as I have found, for reasons set out below) at present lacks capacity by virtue of a combination of psychotic illness and acquired brain injury. The parties to the proceedings are the applicant, M's father, hereafter referred to as AB; her aunt, hereafter referred to as HT; the local authority for the area where HT, and currently M, live, namely the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham; and a man hereafter referred to as MS, with whom M went through a religious ceremony of marriage in 2013. A dispute has arisen concerning a number of issues about her past, present and future which has necessitated a lengthy and unusual fact-finding hearing. This judgment sets out my conclusions on the disputed matters of fact, together with an analysis as to her capacity, and orders made following my findings.", After a circuit judge endorsed a care plan which led to the repeated sexual exploitation by strangers of a young woman with autism and significant learning disabilities (who had capacity to consent to sexual relations but lacked capacity to make decisions on her contact with men), Hayden J provided guidance that 'where issues arise that may necessitate restrictions in areas where adults have capacity, these should be heard by a High Court Judge in the Court of Protection'., If the complainant consented to sexual activity against her inclination because she was frightened of the defendant, even if her fear was irrational and caused by her mental disorder, it did not follow that she lacked the capacity to choose whether to agree to sexual activity. [Overturned on appeal.], The application for a declaration of non-recognition of a Muslim marriage pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court and the petition for nullity were unsuccessful: the wife had capacity (though maybe not wisdom) when she got married, so the marriage was valid under English law at its formation; even if the marriage had been voidable the judge would have refused to grant a non-recognition declaration as that would be contrary to statute; and the condition for granting leave out of time for the nullity petition was not satisfied. The judgment contains guidance on capacity to marry., (1) "The important questions on these appeals are as to the factors relevant to making the determinations of capacity which are under challenge and as to the approach to assessment of capacity when the absence of capacity to make a particular decision would conflict with a conclusion that there is capacity to make some other decision." (2) The Court of Appeal also decided on what is necessary to have capacity to consent to sexual relations.
  • 14/02/21
    (1112)
    : Case (Capacity to consent to sex with husband, Capacity to consent to sexual activity, Capacity to marry, Declaration of non-marriage in English law, Overlap between different decisions, sex, Sexual exploitation, restrictions where adults have capacity, Social media and internet use, Social media and sexual relations). Re AB; D Borough Council v AB [2011] EWHC 101 (COP) — "By this judgment, I set out my conclusions in relation to a range of capacity questions on issues relevant to Miss B’s life, including her capacity: (i) To litigate in these proceedings...; (ii) To manage her property and affairs...; (iii) To decide where she resides...; (iv) To decide on her package of care...; (v) To decide with whom she has contact...; (vi) To use the internet and communicate by social media; (specifically, it is agreed that the question is ‘whether Miss B has capacity to make a decision to use social media for the purposes of developing or maintaining connections with others’)...; (vii) To consent to sexual relations... It is clear that the information relevant to the decision in this area includes: (i) the sexual nature and character of the act of sexual intercourse, the mechanics of the act; (ii) the reasonably foreseeable consequences of sexual intercourse, namely pregnancy; (iii) the opportunity to say no; i.e. to choose whether or not to engage in it and the capacity to decide whether to give or withhold consent to sexual intercourse. (iv) that there are health risks involved, particularly the acquisition of sexually transmitted and transmissible infections; (v) that the risks of sexually transmitted infection can be reduced by the taking of precautions such as the use of a condom.", "I have reached the clear view that the issue of whether someone has capacity to engage in social media for the purposes of online ‘contact’ is distinct (and should be treated as such) from general consideration of other forms of direct or indirect contact. ... It is my judgment, having considered the submissions and proposals of the parties in this case and in Re B , that the ‘relevant information’ which P needs to be able to understand, retain, and use and weigh, is as follows: (i) Information and images (including videos) which you share on the internet or through social media could be shared more widely, including with people you don’t know , without you knowing or being able to stop it; (ii) It is possible to limit the sharing of personal information or images (and videos) by using ‘privacy and location settings’ on some internet and social media sites; [see paragraph below]; (iii) If you place material or images (including videos) on social media sites which are rude or offensive, or share those images, other people might be upset or offended; [see paragraph below]; (iv) Some people you meet or communicate with (‘talk to’) online, who you don’t otherwise know, may not be who they say they are (‘they may disguise, or lie about, themselves’); someone who calls themselves a ‘friend’ on social media may not be friendly; (v) Some people you meet or communicate with (‘talk to’) on the internet or through social media, who you don’t otherwise know, may pose a risk to you; they may lie to you, or exploit or take advantage of you sexually, financially, emotionally and/or physically; they may want to cause you harm; (vi) If you look at or share extremely rude or offensive images, messages or videos online you may get into trouble with the police, because you may have committed a crime; [see paragraph below]. With regard to the test above, I would like to add the following points to assist in its interpretation and application: ...", "There is also evidence that indicates that NB very much enjoys the status of marriage, is affectionate to her husband [AU] and, on occasion, initiates sexual relations. This appears consistent with Ms Wilson's observations as long ago as 1996. The primary issue before the Court is whether NB truly has the capacity to consent to sexual relations. ... Unfortunately, the case attracted a great deal of media coverage, this notwithstanding that no argument had been heard and no Judgment delivered. A great deal of the comment was sententious and, in some instances, irresponsible. It is considered, by the Official Solicitor and the applicant Local Authority, that the impact of that publicity frightened AU very considerably, leading him to believe that he was likely to be sent to prison. He has left the party's flat and disengaged with these proceedings. ... [Mr Bagchi for the OS] submits it is a 'general' or 'issue-specific' test rather than a partner-specific one. If Mr Bagchi is correct, the difficulty that presents in this case is that there is only one individual with whom it is really contemplated that NB is likely to have a sexual relationship i.e. her husband of 27 years. It seems entirely artificial therefore to be assessing her capacity in general terms when the reality is entirely specific. ... As I said on the last occasion, these issues are integral to the couple's basic human rights. There is a crucial social, ethical and moral principle in focus. It is important that the relevant test is not framed in such a restrictive way that it serves to discriminate against those with disabilities, in particular those with low intelligence or border line capacity. ... Mr Bagchi has accepted that if a person-specific test were applied here then the outcome, in terms of assessment of NB's capacity may be different. ... I do not necessarily consider that the applicable test in the Court of Protection necessarily excludes the 'person specific approach'. I am reserving my Judgment ...", "These complex and difficult proceedings in the Court of Protection concern a 37-year-old woman, hereafter referred to as M, who (as I have found, for reasons set out below) at present lacks capacity by virtue of a combination of psychotic illness and acquired brain injury. The parties to the proceedings are the applicant, M's father, hereafter referred to as AB; her aunt, hereafter referred to as HT; the local authority for the area where HT, and currently M, live, namely the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham; and a man hereafter referred to as MS, with whom M went through a religious ceremony of marriage in 2013. A dispute has arisen concerning a number of issues about her past, present and future which has necessitated a lengthy and unusual fact-finding hearing. This judgment sets out my conclusions on the disputed matters of fact, together with an analysis as to her capacity, and orders made following my findings.", After a circuit judge endorsed a care plan which led to the repeated sexual exploitation by strangers of a young woman with autism and significant learning disabilities (who had capacity to consent to sexual relations but lacked capacity to make decisions on her contact with men), Hayden J provided guidance that 'where issues arise that may necessitate restrictions in areas where adults have capacity, these should be heard by a High Court Judge in the Court of Protection'., If the complainant consented to sexual activity against her inclination because she was frightened of the defendant, even if her fear was irrational and caused by her mental disorder, it did not follow that she lacked the capacity to choose whether to agree to sexual activity. [Overturned on appeal.], The application for a declaration of non-recognition of a Muslim marriage pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court and the petition for nullity were unsuccessful: the wife had capacity (though maybe not wisdom) when she got married, so the marriage was valid under English law at its formation; even if the marriage had been voidable the judge would have refused to grant a non-recognition declaration as that would be contrary to statute; and the condition for granting leave out of time for the nullity petition was not satisfied. The judgment contains guidance on capacity to marry., (1) "The important questions on these appeals are as to the factors relevant to making the determinations of capacity which are under challenge and as to the approach to assessment of capacity when the absence of capacity to make a particular decision would conflict with a conclusion that there is capacity to make some other decision." (2) The Court of Appeal also decided on what is necessary to have capacity to consent to sexual relations.
  • 13/02/21
    (2321)
    : MHA reform. Neil Allen, 'Discussion paper: Modernising the Mental Health Act' (15/1/21) — This document contains information under the following headings: (a) Introduction; (b) A Matter of Principle; (c) Civil Admission Criteria; (d) Treatment for Mental Disorder; (e) Community Treatment Orders; (f) Improving support for people who are detained; (g) Tribunals; (h) Caring for patients in the Criminal Justice System; (i) Children and Young People; (j) Useful resources.
  • 13/02/21
    (2314)
    : Mental capacity law newsletter. 39 Essex Chambers, 'Mental Capacity Report' (issue 111, February 2021) — "Highlights this month include: (1) In the Health, Welfare and Deprivation of Liberty Report: vaccination; interim authority to treat pending a final order, and a further LPS impact assessment; (2) In the Property and Affairs Report: guidance following ACC for professional deputies; (3) In the Practice and Procedure Report: a checklist for international relocation, covert treatment and the courts, and recording of court proceedings; (4) In the Wider Context Report: decision-making and 16/17 year olds, FAQs following the Devon judgment on personal assessment, spotting coercion and control and the BIHR’s resources for service providers; (5) In the Scotland Report: further developments relating to the Scott review, including an update from the Chair, and Scottish consideration of relocation."
  • 12/02/21
    (2240)
    : Case (DOL of child at unregulated placement). Lancashire County Council v G (No 4) [2021] EWHC 244 (Fam)The judge authorised the continued deprivation of liberty, concluding as follows: "In the circumstances I have set out above, I once again and wearily must authorise the continued deprivation of G in an unregulated placement that is not fully equipped to meet her complex needs by reason of the fact that I have no other option but to do so. I make clear that I consider that I can say that the placement is in G's best interests only because it is the sole option available to the court to prevent G causing herself serious and possibly fatal harm. Even then, it is clear that the placement is increasingly struggling to achieve even that limited goal. As has been the case each time this matter has come before me in the past number of months, I make the decision I do because I am left with no choice."
  • 12/02/21
    (2234)
    : Case (Cancer treatment). Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v RB [2021] EWCOP 11RB lacked capacity to make decisions regarding his treatment. During the course of the hearing his litigation friend came to the view that the form of cancer care set out by the Trust was in RB's best interests. The matter was therefore agreed, but the court gave a short judgment.
  • 12/02/21
    (2227)
    : Event. PELT: Introduction to COP, including s21A appeals (online, 27/4/21) —"The Court of Protection has a very wide ambit potential touching the lives of many vulnerable people. DoLS and procedures are authorised or challenged and where arguments about capacity or adult protection and best interests are resolved. It is essential for those working with vulnerable people/safeguarding." Speaker: Peter Edwards. Cost: £125 + VAT (£150). See PELT website for further details and booking information.
  • 12/02/21
    (2224)
    : Event. PELT: Accredited - Admission to the MHT Panel (online, 11-12 May 2021) —This course is designed for those who want to be accredited tribunal representatives. The course will also be of benefit for all those who want a more detailed understanding of tribunals. Day 2 will very useful for lawyers who are going through the reaccreditation. Speaker: Peter Edwards and Dr Rob Brown. Cost: £175 + VAT per day (£350 + VAT both days). See PELT website for further details and booking information.
  • 11/02/21
    (2331)
    : Mental health Legal Aid form. Legal Aid Agency, 'Form CW 1&2 MH' (v15, 1/2/21) — This is an amended version of the form to reflect the removal of the mortgage cap as part of the means test for civil Legal Aid. Under Total Net Equity the text reads "Deduct the full amount of any debt secured by a mortgage or charge on the property." instead of "The maximum disregard allowable is capped at £100,000 for all outstanding mortgages/loans covering all property held. You must carry out the calculation of total net equity on 'other property' before 'main home' (i.e. use the mortgage disregard on other property first)."
  • 11/02/21
    (2310)
    : Case (DOL of child at unregulated placement). A Borough Council v E [2021] EWHC 183 (Fam)The court, with reservations, authorised the deprivation of a child's liberty in a placement unregulated by Ofsted: she was being deprived of her liberty in an inappropriate hospital setting and there were no regulated placements available or willing to meet her identified welfare needs.
  • 11/02/21
    (2253)
    : Case (Unlawful DOL damages). London Borough of Haringey v Emile [2020] MHLO 70 (CC)The local authority commenced proceedings seeking payment of £80,913.38 outstanding care fees, and were successful, but ended up also being ordered to pay damages of £130,000 (uplifted to £143,000) for 7 years and 10 months of unlawful deprivation of liberty, and costs following their refusal of an offer to settle. It appealed from the District Judge to a Circuit Judge, unsuccessfully.
  • 11/02/21
    (2231)
    : OPG vaccination guidance. James Morrey, 'Lasting Power of Attorney and the COVID Vaccine' (OPG blog, 8/2/21) — This guidance is under two main headings: (1) Guidance for those administering vaccines, including to seek legal advice advice if you disagree with an attorney or deputy's refusal (no mention is made of disagreement with consent), or make a best interests decision if there is no COP order or LPA; (2) Guidance for attorneys and deputies, including to think about what the person's wishes would be, and to ensure that you are contacted for your decision.
  • 11/02/21
    (1711)
    : Panel guidance. Law Society, 'Mental Health Accreditation: Application and re-accreditation application forms guidance notes and policies' (dated 27/1/21) — The main changes since the 30/9/20 version are under the "Initial accreditation", "The interview" and "Information to be provided following the interview" headings, for instance: (a) all interviews during the coronavirus pandemic are held via Microsoft Teams; (b) the case study will be read out, and notes may be taken; (c) reference materials can be used for the case study but not for the practice and professional conduct part; and (d) the interview will now be recorded for "quality assurance purposes only" rather than also for assessor training and appeal purposes as before.
  • 11/02/21
    (1632)
    : Event. MHLA: Panel Course (online, 1-3 March 2020) —The MHLA is an approved provider of the two-day course which must be attended by prospective members of the Law Society’s mental health accreditation scheme. Price: £300 (MHLA members); £390 (non-members); £270 (group discount). See MHLA website for further details and to book online.
  • 07/02/21
    (2306)
    : Case (Medical treatment and children). Re X (A Child) (No 2): An NHS Trust v X [2021] EWHC 65 (Fam)The applicant, a Jehovah's Witness child refusing blood transfusions, unsuccessfully challenged the conventional wisdom that the court can in an appropriate case overrule the consent or refusal of medical or surgical treatment given by a person who has not yet reached the age of 18.
  • 03/02/21
    (2248)
    : Remote MHA assessments. NHS England, 'Further legal advice on remote MHA assessments' (3/2/21) — This guidance advises that (a) there be no further remote assessments for s2, s3 or s4 detention, or s7 guardianship, and that anyone subject to those sections as a result of a remote assessment be reassessed as soon as possible, and (b) providers and councils may wish to take a precautionary approach and stop all remote assessments and renewals where the clinician or AMHP is required to "examine" or "see" the patient (including s136, and renewals of s3, s7, s37 and CTOs) and should seek their own legal advice if they have further concerns.
  • 01/02/21
    (1117)
    : Remote MHA assessments. NHS England, 'Legal advice on remote MHA assessments' (26/1/21) — This email sets out advice on Devon Partnership NHS Trust v SSHSC [2021] EWHC 101 (Admin) and "immediate action required" based on that advice: (1) "The ruling applies to Part II of the MHA only, and not Part III of the MHA. It applies to both new assessments for detention and section renewals (including CTO renewals). Individuals who are currently detained following a remote assessment will need to be reassessed in person, if ongoing detention is deemed necessary." (2) "Stop using remote methods for any new or ongoing assessments for detention or section renewals under Part II of the Act. All mental health providers should identify and reassess individuals who are currently detained under Part II of the MHA following a remote assessment as soon as possible, if ongoing detention is deemed necessary. We also recommend notifying people who were detained via remote assessment, but have since been discharged from their section, that this Court ruling has now passed." Updated guidance: NHS England, 'Further legal advice on remote MHA assessments' (3/2/21).