View source for R (B) v London Borough of Lambeth (2006) EWHC 2362 (Admin)

{{Case
|Date=2006
|NCN=[2006] EWHC 2362 (Admin)
|Court=High Court (Administrative Court)
|Judges=Gilbart
|Parties=B, London Borough of Lambeth
|Sentence=After-care
|Summary=The council's decision to postpone an offer of re-housing until shortly before possession proceedings which it had instituted was putting off the inevitable and amounted to a breach of s117.
|Detail===Extract from Mwanza judgment==
<div class="perm">
72. The only case to which I was referred directly on point was R (B) v London Borough of Lambeth [2006] EWHC 2362 (Admin), a judgment of His Honour Judge Gilbart QC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge. That case concerned Miss B (a schizophrenic) and her need for (bare) accommodation. In that case, without argument and apparently by way of concession by the local authority, it appears to have been accepted that there was a duty to provide accommodation. At [3], Judge Gilbart said:

:"It is also plain from the decision of [Stennett]… that the duty to provide aftercare services includes a freestanding duty to provide accommodation: see Lord Steyn's speech at [10] and [11]"

73. Mr Armstrong of course relied upon this case. However, although, as Mr Sharland pointed out, contrary to the indication in Mr Jones' book, the judgment appears to have followed a rolled-up hearing rather than an application for permission, in my judgment Mr Armstrong can gain little strength from it. First, in B, the point appears to have been conceded by the authority without argument. Second, from his short judgment, the judge does not appear to have been referred to all of the relevant authorities: and the authority he does cite (Stennett), as I have indicated, did not concern bare accommodation. The citation from Lord Steyn was dealt with caring accommodation. Third, the passage I have quoted from Judge Gilbart, upon which Mr Armstrong relies, appears to emphasis the freestanding nature of the section 117 duty, rather than the scope of that duty.

74. For those reasons, I am unconvinced that Judge Gilbart made any finding that, on the facts of that case, ordinary accommodation was a service properly required by section 117. Insofar as he did, whilst, as I have stressed, each case must depend upon its own facts, having heard full argument on the point, I would very much doubt that finding on the basis of a proper construction of section 117, as I consider it to be.
</div>
|Subject=After-care
|News=No
|RSS pubdate=2025-04-13 08:54:30 PM
}}