LPA cases - capacity to make an LPA
The old category structure used on this page is comprehensive as it contains every relevant case. The new database structure was introduced in 2019. It is more potentially useful than the old categorisation system: it includes all cases since January 2017, but only a minority of older cases: see Special:Drilldown/Cases. The pages below are initially ordered according to the dates on which they were added to the site (most recent first). The order can be changed by clicking on the symbol beside a column heading: click on the symbol beside "Page and summary" for alphabetical order; click beside "Categories" for the order in which the cases were reported. Click on the arrow symbol again to reverse the order. Click on a page name to view the relevant page. Asterisks mark those cases which have been added to the new database structure.
|Case and summary||Date added||Categories|
|* Capacity to execute LPA The Public Guardian v RI  EWCOP 22 — "The sole question which this judgment addresses is whether the donor under a Lasting Power of Attorney for Property and Financial Affairs (LPA) executed in 2009 had capacity to execute it. ... I proceed on the basis that the relevant information in relation to the execution of an LPA is: (a) The effect of the LPA. (b) Who the attorneys are. (c) The scope of the attorneys' powers and that the MCA 2005 restricts the exercise of their powers. (d) When the attorneys can exercise those powers, including the need for the LPA to be executed before it is effective. (e) The scope of the assets the attorneys can deal with under the LPA. (f) The power of the donor to revoke the LPA when he has capacity to do so. (g) The pros and cons of executing the particular LPA and of not doing so."||2022‑07‑25 22:03:44||2022 cases, Cases, Judgment available on Bailii, LPA cases - capacity to make an LPA, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment available on Bailii
|A, B and C v X, Y and Z  EWHC 2400 (COP),  MHLO 112 — The court considered X's capacity to marry, make a will or power of attorney, manage affairs, and litigate. (1) X did not lack capacity to marry. The basis for this assessment was correctly stated in Sheffield as follows: (a) it is not enough that someone appreciates that he or she is taking part in a marriage ceremony or understands its words; (b) he or she must understand the nature of the marriage contract; (c) this means that he or she must be mentally capable of understanding the duties and responsibilities that normally attach to marriage; (d) that said, the contract of marriage is in essence a simple one, which does not require a high degree of intelligence to comprehend, and the contract of marriage can readily be understood by anyone of normal intelligence. (2) The judge did not make a general declaration that X lacked testamentary capacity, but qualified this by saying that (a) there would be increasingly many times when X lacked such capacity, and (b) any will now made, if unaccompanied by contemporary medical evidence asserting capacity, might be seriously open to challenge. (3) The same observations applied to X's capacity to revoke or create lasting or enduring powers of attorney. (4) X lacked capacity to manage his own affairs: although a snapshot of X's condition at certain times would reveal an ability to manage his affairs, the general concept of managing affairs is an ongoing act and relates to a continuous state of affairs whose demands may be unpredictable and may occasionally be urgent. (5) X also lacked capacity to litigate: this required separate consideration because the time frame involved is different to managing affairs on the one hand, or making a will or granting power of attorney on the other. The basis for this assessment was stated in Masterman-Lister: 'whether the party to the legal proceedings is capable of understanding, with the assistance of proper explanation from legal advisers and experts in other disciplines as the case may require, the issues on which his consent or decision is likely to be necessary in the course of those proceedings'. (6) No finding was sought in relation to capacity to decide on contact, and the judge thought 'the idea that this distinguished elderly gentleman’s life should be circumscribed by contact provisions as though he was a child in a separated family' to be deeply unattractive. (7) There should be (a) a greater emphasis on judicial continuity in the COP, and (b) a pre-hearing review in any case estimated to last three days or more.||2012‑11‑12 22:59:02||2012 cases, Brief summary, Judgment available on MHLO, Judgment missing from Bailii, LPA cases - capacity to make an LPA, Other capacity cases, Transcript
|Re Collis (2010) COP 27/10/10 — An application was made to the court to direct the Public Guardian to cancel the registration of an LPA on the grounds that the instrument was not a valid LPA because the Donor lacked capacity to create an LPA at the date of execution. In the course of his judgment the Senior Judge set out the law relating to capacity to create an LPA. [OPG summary - LPA case.]||2010‑11‑06 12:31:19||2010 cases, Brief summary, Judgment available on MHLO, LPA cases - capacity to make an LPA, Neutral citation unknown or not applicable, Transcript
The following 3 pages are in this category.