Drilldown: Cases
Not many cases (124) have been added to the database so far. To see the full list of cases (1977) go to the Mental health case law page.
Choose a table:
- Books (53)
- Cases (125)
- Consultations (82)
- Contact (215)
- Events (257)
- Jobs (44)
- Legislation (13)
- News (109)
- Resources (48)
- Testhierarchy (4)
- All pages (8082)
Use the filters below to narrow your results. The results will be displayed below the filters.
Subject: (Click arrow to add another value)
Date:
Judges:
Parties:
A Healthcare NHS Trust (1) ·
A Hospital (1) ·
A Nursing Home (1) ·
An NHS Trust (2) ·
Bendigo Health (1) ·
CCG (1) ·
CH (1) ·
DCC (1) ·
East Lancashire Hospitals NHS Trust (1) ·
FB (1) ·
FG (1) ·
HB (1) ·
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (1) ·
JF (1) ·
Jillian Rushton (1) ·
KG (1) ·
King's College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (1) ·
Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust (1) ·
M (1) ·
Melbourne Health (1) ·
Mental Health Tribunal (Victoria) (1) ·
Mr Y (2) ·
Mrs Y (2) ·
NHS Cumbria CCG (1) ·
NHS Windsor and Maidenhead Clinical Commissioning Group (1) ·
NJE (1) ·
NLH (1) ·
PBU (1) ·
PW (1) ·
Salisbury NHS Foundation Trust (1) ·
Secretary of State for the Home Department (1) ·
Sergei Skripal (1) ·
South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust (1) ·
SP (1) ·
SS (1) ·
SW (1) ·
Tim Rushton (1) ·
University College London Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (1) ·
University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust (1) ·
Yulia Skripal (1) ·
Z (1)
Showing below up to 16 results in range #1 to #16.
View (previous 250 | next 250) (20 | 50 | 100 | 250 | 500)
| Page name | Summary |
|---|---|
| DCC v NLH (2019) EWCOP 9 | "I concluded it would be appropriate to make a declaration (1) that NLH lacked capacity (a) to make decisions as to the provision of buccal swab samples, the testing of such samples and the profiling of his DNA and (b) to conduct these proceedings, and further (2) that it was lawful for the local authority to arrange for the taking of buccal swabs from NLH for the purposes of performing DNA paternity testing in respect of the child. I further concluded it would be appropriate to make an order, by consent, that the court consented on NLH's behalf for the swab sample to be taken and tested and so that his DNA could be profiled to establish whether he was the father of the child. Shortly before the order was made, however, it emerged that a member of staff from the DNA testing company, Lextox, had already attended at the nursing home and taken the sample, with the agreement of NLH's family, but without either the formal consent of NLH (who lack capacity to provide consent) or the approval of the court. ... I therefore agreed to prepare this short judgment to remind practitioners, carers and those involved in taking samples in these circumstances that, where the patient lacks capacity and an application has been made to the Court of Protection for an order authorising the taking of a sample, it will be unlawful for the sample to be taken without the Court's permission. All practitioners and professionals working in this field ought to be aware that there is always a judge of the Family Division on duty available to sit in the Court of Protection twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, every day of the year, to deal with urgent applications, usually by telephone. Consequently, there is no excuse for any failure to comply with the obligations to obtain the court's permission in circumstances such as these. As stated, no harm arose on this occasion, but any infringement in future will run the risk not only of attracting severe criticism from the Court but also potentially incurring liability for damages if a breach of human rights were to be established." |
| East Lancashire Hospitals NHS Trust v PW (2019) EWCOP 10 | "This is an application by East Lancashire NHS Trust for orders under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 that PW lacks capacity "to make a decision regarding whether to undergo the leg amputation surgery to address his high risk of sepsis"; and that it is lawful to carry out that surgery having regard to his best interests. Before dealing with the substantive issues in this case I will deal with the timing of the application." |
| King's College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v FG (2019) EWCOP 7 | "[T]he King's College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust seeks an order in the following terms in relation to FG: (a) a declaration that FG lacks capacity to make decisions regarding the medical treatment for his physical health conditions; (b) that it is lawful and in FG's best interests for him to undergo an operation to repair his right shoulder fracture/dislocation; and (c) that it is in his best interests to receive any sedation and anaesthesia his clinicians think necessary to allow the operation to be done. The matter has come in front of me today as urgent applications judge." |
| Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust v JF (2018) EWCOP 32 | "... N suffered a cardiac arrest in the taxi as she was arriving at Leeds General Infirmary and as a result for some 20 minutes or so ceased breathing and suffered a severe hypoxic injury. In consequence she has suffered a very significant and severe brain injury. The position now and since then has remained that she is essentially unconscious. ... The issues before me have been threefold. First, whether or not the tracheostomy tube should be removed. ... The second issue has rather retreated in significance. I have to consider whether or not N should receive an escalation of invasive care or treatment, in particular vasoactive drugs, renal replacement therapy, ventilation treatment that requires central venous action or CPR. ... That brings me on to morphine, and that is a difficult issue." |
| M v A Hospital (2017) EWCOP 19 | "This judgment is given: (a) To explain why CANH was withdrawn from M, a person in a minimally conscious state (MCS). (b) In response to the request of the parties for clarification of whether legal proceedings were necessary or not when there was agreement between M's family and her clinicians that CANH was no longer in her best interests. (c) To explain why the court appointed M's mother, Mrs B, as her litigation friend, rather than the Official Solicitor. The short answer to these questions is that: (a) CANH was withdrawn because it was not in M's best interests for it to be continued. The evidence showed that it had not been beneficial for the previous year. (b) In my view, it was not necessary as a matter of law for this case to have been brought to court, but given the terms of Practice Direction 9E and the state of the affairs before the very recent decision of the Court of Appeal on 31 July in the case of Briggs [2017] EWCA Civ 1169, it is understandable that the application was made. (c) Mrs B was appointed as litigation friend because she was a proper person to act in that role: the fact that she supported the withdrawal of her daughter's treatment did not show that she had an adverse interest to her." |
| NHS Cumbria CCG v Rushton (2018) EWCOP 41 | "This is an application regarding the proposed withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration in respect of Mrs Jillian Rushton, who is now 85 years of age. Since sustaining a traumatic head injury in December 2015, Mrs Rushton has suffered from a prolonged period of disorder of consciousness. Insofar as a label is relevant, the consensus of medical opinion, in respect of which there is no dissent at all, is that she is in a persistent vegetative state (PVS). In their recent guidance, ‘Clinically-assisted nutrition and hydration (CANH) and adults who lack the capacity to consent’, the Royal College of Physicians and the British Medical Association have noted that the importance of obtaining a precise and definitive diagnosis has reduced. It is recognised by the Courts and clinicians that drawing a firm distinction between vegetative state and minimally conscious state is frequently both artificial and unnecessary. In practice, when assessing best interests, information about the patient’s current condition and prognosis for functional recovery and the level of confidence with which these can be evaluated is invariably of greater importance than a precise diagnosis. ... It perhaps requires to be said, though in my view it should be regarded as axiomatic, that the medical profession must give these advanced decisions the utmost care, attention and scrutiny. I am confident the profession does but I regret to say that I do not think sufficient care and scrutiny took place here. The lesson is an obvious one and needs no amplification. Where advanced decisions have been drawn up and placed with GP records there is an onerous burden on the GP to ensure, wherever possible, that they are made available to clinicians in hospital. By this I mean a copy of the decision should be made available and placed within the hospital records with the objective that the document should follow the patient. It need hardly be said that it will rarely, if ever, be sufficient to summarise an advance decision in a telephone conversation. ... The family have ... made it clear to me that she would not have regarded her present situation as tolerable. Whilst I have no doubt that she would understand the commitment of her son, Tim and his profound resistance to letting her go, I have equally no doubt that she would want to be let go and I have no hesitation in concluding that it is my responsibility to respect this." |
| NHS Trust v Y (2017) EWHC 2866 (QB) | "This is a claim for a declaration under CPR Part 8 that it is not mandatory to bring before the Court the withdrawal of Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration ("CANH") from a patient who has a prolonged disorder of consciousness in circumstances where the clinical team and the patient's family are agreed that it is not in the patient's best interests that he continues to receive that treatment, and that no civil or criminal liability will result if CANH is withdrawn." |
| NHS Trust v Y (2018) UKSC 46 | "The question that arises in this appeal is whether a court order must always be obtained before clinically assisted nutrition and hydration, which is keeping alive a person with a prolonged disorder of consciousness, can be withdrawn, or whether, in some circumstances, this can occur without court involvement. ... In conclusion, having looked at the issue in its wider context as well as from a narrower legal perspective, I do not consider that it has been established that the common law or the ECHR, in combination or separately, give rise to the mandatory requirement, for which the Official Solicitor contends, to involve the court to decide upon the best interests of every patient with a prolonged disorder of consciousness before CANH can be withdrawn. If the provisions of the MCA 2005 are followed and the relevant guidance observed, and if there is agreement upon what is in the best interests of the patient, the patient may be treated in accordance with that agreement without application to the court. I would therefore dismiss the appeal. In so doing, however, I would emphasise that, although application to court is not necessary in every case, there will undoubtedly be cases in which an application will be required (or desirable) because of the particular circumstances that appertain, and there should be no reticence about involving the court in such cases." |
| NHS Windsor, Ascot and Maidenhead CCG v SP (Withdrawal of CANH) (2018) EWCOP 11 | "Windsor, Ascot and Maidenhead CCG have applied to the court for a personal welfare order in respect of SP. The order sought is for a Declaration and Order that it is not in SP's best interests for Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration (CANH) to be continued. In tandem with the withdrawal of CANH palliative care will be provided. The consequence is an expectation that SP will die within 7-14 days. ... In early 2015 she was diagnosed as being in a continuing vegetative state and in April 2015 as being in a permanent vegetative state (PVS). She has been in receipt of CANH since October 2014." |
| PBU v Mental Health Tribunal (2018) VSC 564 | Headnotes from judgment: (1) "ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal – decisions of Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (‘VCAT’) that two persons with mental illness be compulsorily subjected to electroconvulsive treatment (‘ECT’) – determination that they lacked the capacity to give informed consent to or refuse treatment – whether VCAT properly interpreted and applied requirement that person be able to ‘use or weigh’ information relevant to decision – further requirement that there be no less restrictive way for the person to be treated – whether this requirement only met where treatment immediately needed to prevent serious deterioration in person’s health or serious self-harm or harm to another – ‘capacity to give informed consent’ – Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) ss 68, 69, 70, 72, 93 and 96." (2) "HUMAN RIGHTS – two persons having mental disability found by VCAT to lack capacity to give informed consent to or refuse ECT – whether incompatible with human rights to self-determination, to be free of non-consensual medical treatment and to personal inviolability – assessing capacity compatibly with those rights and the right to health – applicable principles – dignity of risk – Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) ss 8(3), 10(c), 13(a), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art 12(1), Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities arts 12(4), 24." |
| Re SW (2017) EWCOP 7 | (1) "[A]s matters stand, the transplant being proposed cannot proceed, whatever the court may say or do. As it has been presented to the court, this scarcely coherent application is totally without merit, it is misconceived and it is vexatious. It would be contrary to every principle of how litigation ought to be conducted in the Court of Protection, and every principle of proper case management, to allow this hopelessly defective application to proceed on the forlorn assumption that the son could somehow get his tackle in order and present a revised application which could somehow avoid the fate of its predecessor." (2) "As against the son, the claim for costs could not, in my judgment, be clearer. Given everything I have said, this is the plainest possible case for departing from the ordinary rule, set out in rule 157 of the Court of Protection Rules 2007, and applying the principles set out in rule 159. ... [B]oth Dr Waghorn and Dr Jooste, in my judgment, are persons against whom a costs order can be made even though are not, formally, parties to the litigation – and, if that is so, then for the same reasons as in relation to the son, it is, in my judgment, fair and just to order them to pay the costs." (3) "There is no reason why either SW or SAN should be named, and, indeed, every reason why they should not. Nor, in all the circumstances, is there any reason why the son should be named. Dr Waghorn and Dr Jooste, however, stand in a very different position. There is a very strong public interest in exposing the antics which these two struck-off doctors have got up to, not least so that others may be protected from their behaviour." |
| SS v CCG (2018) EWCOP 40 | "The application seeks a declaration pursuant to section 15 (that it is lawful and in B's best interests for CANH to be withdrawn) and, secondly, an order pursuant to section 16 for such withdrawal and for B to receive palliative care only. If granted, it is anticipated that B will pass away. ... In support of granting the application there are a number of important factors. It is consistent with her previously expressed feelings and wishes. It supports her right, I suspect strongly held, to self-determination. She has no quality of life. Therapeutically, her life is futile, there is no hope of recovery. There is no hope. If I allow the application and make the declarations, it will bring to an end the invasive and, in my judgment, burdensome medical treatment from which she, B, obtains no benefit. It is consistent with her Muslim religion. It is consistent with her devoted husband's views of his wife's best interests. It is consistent with the unanimous views of those that are responsible for caring and treating her, whether it be the clinical or the support team. Is there any factor which weighs in the scales against granting the application? There is. It is the powerful principle that if I make the declarations, it will inevitably lead to B's death, so offends against the very strong principle of the sanctity of life. Having taken time to consider the matter, it seems to me clear that the direction of travel is all one way. It is with my very greatest sympathy to the family and B's husband in particular that balance falls very clearly in favour of me granting the application and making the declarations as sought, and I do so." |
| SSHD v Skripal (2018) EWCOP 6 | "On 4 March 2018 Sergei Skripal and Yulia Skripal were admitted to hospital in Salisbury. Tests carried out by Defence Science and Technology Laboratory at Porton Down concluded that they had been exposed to a nerve agent. Both Mr and Ms Skripal remain in hospital under heavy sedation. The precise effect of their exposure on their long term health remains unclear albeit medical tests indicate that their mental capacity might be compromised to an unknown and so far unascertained degree. The fact of their exposure to a nerve agent has already had significant consequences on the wider domestic and international stage which I need not go into for the purposes of this judgment. However central to the application before me is the fact that on 14 and 16 March 2018 the UK government issued a formal invitation to the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to send a team of experts to the United Kingdom 'to assist in the technical evaluation of unscheduled chemicals in accordance with Article VIII 38(e).' This in effect is to independently verify the analysis carried out by Porton Down. In order to conduct their enquiries the OPCW wish to: (i) Collect fresh blood samples from Mr and Ms Skripal to (a) undertake their own analysis in relation to evidence of nerve agents, (b) conduct DNA analysis to confirm the samples originally tested by Porton Down are from Mr and Ms Skripal; (ii) Analyse the medical records of Mr and Ms Skripal setting out their treatment since 4 March 2018; (iii) Re-test the samples already analysed by Porton Down. Because Mr Skripal and Ms Skripal are unconscious and neither are in a position to consent to the taking of further blood samples for these purposes or to the disclosure of their medical records Salisbury NHS Foundation Trust have quite properly confirmed to the UK Government that a court order would be required to authorise (a) and (b) above." |
| University College London Hospitals v KG (2018) EWCOP 29 | "In this case the University College London Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust seeks the court's authority to administer a treatment known as PRN100 to a patient KG. KG is represented by the Official Solicitor. KG, the Official Solicitor on his behalf, his family and the Trust all ask for the court's approval. The matter is before the court because PRN100 has never been tested on or administered to any person anywhere. It is thus a completely novel treatment." |
| University Hospitals Birmingham NHSFT v HB (2018) EWCOP 39 | "When considering what is in HB's best interests, I take account of the fact that the balance of medical evidence would support the view that the treatment set out in the second part of the treatment plan would bring about no significant improvement in HB's underlying condition and, to that end, they might be seen as futile. ... Against that, I have to balance the very clear wishes, expressed by HB to her daughter, that she would want all steps taken to preserve her life ... Where it is not clear whether HB will make an improvement in her neurological condition, it is, in my judgment, contrary to her best interests and premature to rule out the treatments set out in Part 2 of the updated treatment plan, numbers (2) to (6). ... Mr McKendrick submits that it would not be in HB's best interests that the potentially last moments of her life were lived with her undergoing the violent and invasive procedures necessary in providing CPR, that it would be a traumatic scene for her children to witness in her final moments. I entirely accept those submissions and the force in them, but key to the decision must be the wishes and feelings of HB and it is plain that administering CPR in the event of a further collapse and giving her, albeit a very, very small chance of life, is what she would wish. In my judgment, at the moment, it remains in her best interests for that treatment to be provided to her. I entirely accept that there will undoubtedly come a time when such treatments would no longer be in her best interests but I am entirely satisfied that that stage has not been reached yet." |
| Y v A Healthcare NHS Trust (2018) EWCOP 18 | "This application was made by Y on 12 July 2018 when I was sitting as the emergency applications judge. It required urgent determination by reason of the critical medical condition of Z, Y's husband. Y sought the following relief: (a) A declaration that, notwithstanding her husband's incapacity and his inability to consent, it was lawful and in his best interests for his sperm to be retrieved and stored prior to his death; (b) An order pursuant to section 16 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 directing that a suitable person should sign the relevant consent form for the storage of Z's sperm on her husband's behalf." |