Not many cases (181) have been added to the database so far. To see the full list of cases (2014) go to the Mental health case law page.
Choose a table:
- Books (53)
- Cases (181)
- Consultations (82)
- Contact (231)
- Events (308)
- Jobs (49)
- Legislation (74)
- News (220)
- Resources (72)
- Testhierarchy (4)
- All pages (8306)
Use the filters below to narrow your results. The results will be displayed below the filters.
Showing below up to 7 results in range #1 to #7.
|Maitland-Hudson v SRA (2019) EWHC 67 (Admin)||Dishonest solicitor||"The Appellant appeals against findings of misconduct and dishonesty made against him by ... the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal ... Pursuant to those findings, on 2 May 2018 the Appellant was struck off the Roll of Solicitors and ordered to pay the SRA's costs, including £300,000 by way of interim payment. The Tribunal found the Appellant to have been guilty of misconduct "at the highest level", characterised as "deliberate, calculated and repeated… over a number of years". It was aggravated by the Appellant's dishonesty and attempts to defend his conduct. The appeal is based on grounds of alleged procedural unfairness, specifically that the Appellant, a litigant in person, was substantially impaired in his ability to defend himself, to the extent that he admitted himself to hospital. Despite the fact that consultant psychiatrist experts on both sides found that the Appellant was unable to represent himself, the Tribunal refused to dismiss the proceedings on the basis of "incurable unfairness" or even to stay or adjourn their remainder."|
|Parker v Chief Constable of Essex Police (2018) EWCA Civ 2788||Nominal damages (Barrymore)||"In the early hours of 31 March 2001, Michael Parker (a celebrity entertainer who is better known by his stage name, Michael Barrymore) returned to his home with eight guests. ... In relation to Mr Parker, that arrest was to be effected by Det. Con. Susan Jenkins who had played a central role in the re-investigation and was well aware of the evidence: she believed she had reasonable grounds both to suspect Mr Parker of committing an offence and to conclude that it was necessary to effect his arrest. In the event, she was detained in traffic and a surveillance officer (P.C. Cootes) was ordered to effect the arrest, which he did. ... For these reasons, I would conclude that Stuart-Smith J was correct to conclude that there were reasonable grounds both to suspect Mr Parker of committing an offence and that it was necessary to arrest him. Equally, however, I have no doubt that had things been done as they should have been done (to quote Baroness Hale in Kambadzi), a lawful arrest would have been effected. Thus, I would allow this appeal and, in answer to the issue posed by the Master, declare that Mr Parker is entitled to nominal damages only."|
|R (ASK) v SSHD (2017) EWHC 196 (Admin)||Immigration detention||"The issue in this case concerns an allegation that in 2013 the Claimant - 'ASK' - was unlawfully detained in an Immigration Removal Centre pending removal from the United Kingdom and, once he was definitively declared unfit to fly, detained for an unreasonably long period of time before eventual transfer to a psychiatric unit. I was told that there are a growing number of similar cases before the Courts. The case raises a number of issues. First, the implications of the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in R (on the application of O) (by her litigation friend the Official Solicitor) v Secretary of State for the Home Department! and the change that it has brought to the law relating to detention, in the light of R (Das) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mind and another intervening) !. In O v SSHD the Supreme Court modified the test for when a person awaiting removal could be detained in a detention centre by rejecting the view of the Court of Appeal in Das that the Defendant was not required to take account of the possibility that a detainee would receive better care and treatment in a psychiatric unit relative to that available in the IRC. Second, the extent of the duty on the Secretary of State to make inquiries as to a person's mental health before she transfers an immigration over-stayer to an IRC and whether it is sufficient to complete the medical assessment only once the person has been detained? Third, whether there is a duty upon IRC caseworkers when they complete their records to refer expressly to HO policy and the questions they need to address and whether the omission of such information or entries in recorded form has significance in law? Fourth, how a court is to assess the point in time at which a detainee must be treated as definitively unfit to fly for the purpose of determining when an otherwise legitimate rationale of detention for the purpose of removal ends? Fifth, once a decision is taken that a detainee must be transferred to a psychiatric unit under the Mental Health Act 1983 what is meant by?'"`UNIQ--nowiki-00000049-QINU`"'?prompt?'"`UNIQ--nowiki-0000004A-QINU`"'? transfer and in particular what happens if there is disagreement between the transferring clinicians who issue certificates under sections 47 and 48 MHA 1983 and the receiving clinician(s) to whom the IRC wishes to transfer and entrust the detainee? Sixth, how the Court should evaluate different types of evidence including: caseworkers reviews and notes, contemporaneous clinical notes and reports, and subsequent (ex post facto) expert reports which rely upon earlier notes and clinical reports."|
|R (Bate) v Parole Board (2018) EWHC 2820 (Admin)||Damages for Parole Board delay||"Four grounds of claim were pleaded in detail. They can be summarised as challenging: (i) a failure, in violation of Art 5(4), to provide a parole hearing within a reasonably speedy interval; (ii) a systemic failure to maintain and operate a system for speedy and prompt parole reviews; (iii) an unlawful policy for prioritisation of listing which ignores support for release and prospects of release which are identified as realistic, and/or ignores a legitimate expectation given as to the timetable for a deferred hearing; (iv) an unlawful failure, by the decision letter of 2nd December 2016, to direct expedition in the listing of Mr Bate's deferred hearing. ... For the reason I have given, I would find in Mr Bate's favour on ground 1 and ground 4, and would award him damages on the basis indicated in paragraphs 77, 88 and 89 above. I would refuse relief in respect of grounds 3 and 4."|
|R (Conway) v SSJ (2018) EWCA Civ 1431||Assisted suicide||"This is an appeal from the order dated 5 October 2017 of the Divisional Court (Sales LJ, Whipple and Garnham JJ) dismissing the claim of the appellant, Mr Noel Conway, for a declaration under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 in respect of section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961, which imposes a blanket ban on assisted suicide. Mr Conway contends that section 2(1) constitutes a disproportionate interference with his right to respect for his private life under Article 8(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms."|
|R v Taj (2018) EWCA Crim 1743||Intoxication||(1) Appeal against conviction: "The defence sought to rely on self-defence as codified in s76 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 noting, in particular, s76(4)(b) which makes it clear that the defence is available even if the defendant is mistaken as to the circumstances as he genuinely believed them to be whether or not the mistake was a reasonable one for him to have made. Although s76(5) provides that a defendant is not entitled to rely upon any mistaken belief attributable to intoxication that was voluntarily induced, it was argued that as there was no suggestion that Taj had alcohol or drugs present in his system at the time, he was not 'intoxicated' and so was not deprived of the defence. It was also submitted that R v McGee, R v Harris, R v Coley  EWCA Crim 223 supported the proposition that to be in a state of 'voluntarily intoxication' there had to be alcohol or drugs active in the system at the time of the offence. ... In our view, the words "attributable to intoxication" in s. 76(5) are broad enough to encompass both (a) a mistaken state of mind as a result of being drunk or intoxicated at the time and (b) a mistaken state of mind immediately and proximately consequent upon earlier drink or drug-taking, so that even though the person concerned is not drunk or intoxicated at the time, the short-term effects can be shown to have triggered subsequent episodes of e.g. paranoia. This is consistent with common law principles. We repeat that this conclusion does not extend to long term mental illness precipitated (perhaps over a considerable period) by alcohol or drug misuse. In the circumstances, we agree with Judge Dodgson, that the phrase "attributable to intoxication" is not confined to cases in which alcohol or drugs are still present in a defendant's system. It is unnecessary for us to consider whether this analysis affects the decision in Harris: it is sufficient to underline that the potential significance of voluntary intoxication in the two cases differs." The appeal against conviction was dismissed. (2) The application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused.|
|R v Thompson (2018) EWCA Crim 639||Guidance on sentencing on appeal||"These four otherwise unconnected appeals have been listed together as each potentially raises an issue in relation to the effect of s11(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 which requires this court, on an appeal against sentence, to exercise its powers such that 'taking the case as a whole, the appellant is not more severely dealt with on appeal than he was dealt with by the court below'. Articulating the issue with reference to the specific sentences that may give rise to the issue, it is about the extent to which this court can substitute what is a standard determinate sentence with (i) a special custodial sentence for offenders of particular concern under s236A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003; (ii) an extended sentence under s226A or B of the 2003 Act; or (iii) a hospital order with restriction or hybrid order under s37 and 41 or 45A of the Mental Health Act 1983."|