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Drilldown: Cases

So far 264 cases have been added to the database, out of 2089 total cases on the website. To see the full list of cases go to the Mental health case law page.

The relevant pages (and summaries) are displayed at the bottom of this page.

Cases > Judges : Baker or Cobb or Hickinbottom or Jacobs or Lloyd-Jones or McFarlane

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Showing below up to 39 results in range #1 to #39.

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Page name Sentence Summary
A Local Authority v BF (2018) EWCA Civ 2962

Inherent jurisdiction to authorise DOL of vulnerable adult

An interim order made on 10/12/18 required BF to reside at a care home, over Christmas, and not at his own or his son's home, despite BF's having capacity to make decisions about his residence and wanting to return home. The order was expressed to last until a further hearing to take place no later than 31/1/19 (later fixed for 16/1/19) when the judge could hear full argument on what relief could be granted pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction. The local authority appealed on the basis that the order infringed Article 5. Permission to appeal was refused: (1) BF is a vulnerable adult (old, blind, infirm, in a squalid and dangerous home, with undue influence present in relationship with son) who needs protection despite not lacking capacity. (2) The test of "unsound mind" is different from the test of capacity, and there is prima facie evidence that he may be of unsound mind. (3) In an emergency situation, someone may be deprived of their liberty in the absence of evidence of mental disorder without infringing Article 5 (Winterwerp); even if BF is found not to be of unsound mind, his vulnerability is such that he could not be returned home without careful planning, which is a crucial component of the protection afforded by the inherent jurisdiction.

A Local Authority v JB (2020) EWCA Civ 735

Capacity and sexual relations

"The issue arising on this appeal is whether a person, in order to have capacity to decide to have sexual relations with another person, needs to understand that the other person must at all times be consenting to sexual relations."

AD'A v Cornwall Partnership NHS Foundation Trust (2020) UKUT 110 (AAC)

Change in status - s3 to guardianship

When the patient had been transferred from s3 detention to s7 guardianship, the tribunal had been wrong to strike out her case for want of jurisdiction. The tribunal's jurisdiction arose from the s3 application, and none of the subsequent changes (including a new right to apply to tribunal, different tribunal powers, and different parties) affected that jurisdiction.

AR v West London NHS Trust (2010) MHLO 49 (UT)

Public hearing and capacity

(1) The four factors set out in AH which must be considered in any application for a public hearing under Tribunal rule 38 are merely factors relevant to the ultimate test of whether a public hearing is in the interests of justice. The first factor ("whether it is consistent with the subjective and informed wishes of the patient (assuming that he is competent to make an informed choice") does not mean that a patient must have capacity in order to be allowed a public hearing, although the wisdom of the patient's wishes is relevant to the application of rule 38. (2) The relevant "matter" for the purposes of assessing capacity is not merely the public hearing application but conduct of the proceedings generally, although lack of capacity in relation to the former entails lack of capacity in relation to the latter. (3) The First-tier Tribunal had restricted its capacity assessment to the decision to apply for a public hearing, and had concluded that "[w]ithout being able to make an informed choice [the patient] cannot have a public hearing", so had erred in relation to both both points.

CD v London Borough of Croydon (2019) EWHC 2943 (Fam)

Inherent jurisdiction or s48 interim order

(1) Cobb J discussed the inherent jurisdiction, setting out the following summary: (a) first the inherent jurisdiction may be deployed for the protection of vulnerable adults, (b) secondly in some cases a vulnerable adult may not be incapacitated within the meaning of the 2005 Mental Capacity Act but may nevertheless be protected under the inherent jurisdiction; (c) third that in some of those cases capacitous individuals may be of unsound mind within the meaning of article 5(i)(e) of the European Rights Convention; (d) fourth, in exercising my powers under the inherent jurisdiction I am bound by the European Convention and the case law under the convention and must only impose orders that are necessary and proportionate and at all times have proper regard to the personal autonomy of the individual; and (e) fifth and finally, that in certain circumstances it may be appropriate for a court to take or maintain interim protective measures while carrying out all necessary investigations. (2) In the end he made an interim order under MCA 2005 s48 enabling the Local Authority to gain access to CD's accommodation in order to provide appropriate care and make it safe for human habitation. (3) CD was a vulnerable adult but the order was made under the MCA because the judge was "satisfied that it is more appropriate, where statute provides a route, that the statute is used".

DCC v NLH (2019) EWCOP 9

Retrospective authorisation of DNA swab sample

"I concluded it would be appropriate to make a declaration (1) that NLH lacked capacity (a) to make decisions as to the provision of buccal swab samples, the testing of such samples and the profiling of his DNA and (b) to conduct these proceedings, and further (2) that it was lawful for the local authority to arrange for the taking of buccal swabs from NLH for the purposes of performing DNA paternity testing in respect of the child. I further concluded it would be appropriate to make an order, by consent, that the court consented on NLH's behalf for the swab sample to be taken and tested and so that his DNA could be profiled to establish whether he was the father of the child. Shortly before the order was made, however, it emerged that a member of staff from the DNA testing company, Lextox, had already attended at the nursing home and taken the sample, with the agreement of NLH's family, but without either the formal consent of NLH (who lack capacity to provide consent) or the approval of the court. ... I therefore agreed to prepare this short judgment to remind practitioners, carers and those involved in taking samples in these circumstances that, where the patient lacks capacity and an application has been made to the Court of Protection for an order authorising the taking of a sample, it will be unlawful for the sample to be taken without the Court's permission. All practitioners and professionals working in this field ought to be aware that there is always a judge of the Family Division on duty available to sit in the Court of Protection twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, every day of the year, to deal with urgent applications, usually by telephone. Consequently, there is no excuse for any failure to comply with the obligations to obtain the court's permission in circumstances such as these. As stated, no harm arose on this occasion, but any infringement in future will run the risk not only of attracting severe criticism from the Court but also potentially incurring liability for damages if a breach of human rights were to be established."

Djaba v West London Mental Health NHS Trust (2018) MHLO 76 (SC)

ECHR and tribunal criteria

On 15/3/18 the Supreme Court (Lady Hale, Lord Hodge, Lord Lloyd-Jones) refused Jasmin Djaba permission to appeal, giving brief reasons.

DL-H v West London MH NHS Trust (2017) UKUT 387 (AAC)

Religious beliefs and tribunal expertise

Judicial summary from Gov.uk website: (1) "In deciding whether a patient is manifesting religious beliefs or mental disorder, a tribunal is entitled to take account of evidence from both religious and medical experts." (2) "A tribunal is entitled to use its own expertise to make a different diagnosis from those of the medical witnesses, provided it allows the parties a chance to make submissions and explains its decision."

GM v Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust (2020) UKUT 152 (AAC)

Change from s3 to s37 during tribunal proceedings

The First-tier Tribunal had been right to strike out proceedings arising from a s3 reference when the patient was subsequently made subject to a s37 hospital order. It would be contrary to statutory policy if the tribunal were to retain jurisdiction under an application or reference that was made before the date of the hospital order.

JD v West London Mental Health NHS Trust (2016) UKUT 496 (AAC)

ECHR and tribunal criteria

"The patient in this case is held in conditions of exclusion and restraint that are exceptional and perhaps unique. He occupies a ‘super seclusion suite’ consisting of a room with a partition that can divide it into two. No one is allowed to enter without the partition in place, except nursing staff wearing personal protective equipment in order to administer his depot injections. He is only allowed out of the suite in physical restraints that restrict his circulation and under escort by a number of members of staff. ... The Secretary of State referred the patient’s case to the First-tier Tribunal on 28 July 2015. The hearing took place on 19 and 20 November 2015; the tribunal’s reasons are dated 23 November 2015. ... What the tribunal did not do was to deal expressly with the human rights argument put by Ms Bretherton on the patient’s behalf. On 7 January 2016, the tribunal gave permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal identifying as the issue: 'to what extent should the circumstances of the patient’s detention, and any possible breach of the European Convention as a result thereof, have any bearing on the First-tier Tribunal’s exercise of considering sections 72 and 73? Following from that, if the Tribunal is satisfied that the circumstances of a patient’s detention are a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights, how should that be reflected in the decisions that the First-tier Tribunal can lawfully make?'"

JS v SLAM NHS Foundation Trust (2019) UKUT 172 (AAC)

Reinstatement

(1) Reinstatement: "As there is no right to reinstatement, the tribunal has a discretion whether or not to reinstate the party’s ‘case’. It must, like all discretions, be exercised judicially and that involves complying with the overriding objective of the tribunal’s rules of procedure, which is ‘to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly’ (rule 2(1)). ... Considered methodically, the factors that the tribunal should take into account neatly divide into three. First, the tribunal should consider whether there is anything to undermine either the patient’s application to withdraw or the tribunal’s consent. Just to give some examples, the application may have been based on a misunderstanding of the facts or the law. Or there may be an issue whether the patient had capacity or gave informed consent. Or the tribunal’s reasons for consenting may have been defective. Second, there may have been a change of circumstances that makes it appropriate to agree to reinstatement. Third, the tribunal will have to consider any other factors that may be relevant under the overriding objective. These will include: (a) the reasons given in support of the application, whatever they may be; (b) any prejudice to the patient in refusing consent; (c) any detriment to the other parties if consent is given; (d) any prejudice to other patients if consent is given; and (d) any impact that reinstatement might have on the operation of the tribunal’s mental health jurisdiction system as a whole." (2) Respondent status: "[T]he Trust was properly named as a respondent on the appeal to the Upper Tribunal ... The Trust was the responsible authority and, as such, a party to the proceedings in the First-tier Tribunal ... On appeal by the patient to the Upper Tribunal, everyone else who was a party before the First-tier Tribunal became a respondent ... That is standard procedure in appeal generally. The Trust’s letter shows a confusion between an appeal and a judicial review. In the latter, the tribunal is the respondent, and others may be interested parties."

LW v Cornwall Partnership NHS Foundation Trust (2018) UKUT 408 (AAC)

Meaning of "nature" in discharge criteria

(1) Having considered the statutory framework of CTOs and the legislative purposes behind them the UT concluded, primarily on that basis, that in cases where there is a risk of a relapse which might necessitate recall, how soon that such a relapse is likely to occur is a relevant consideration. However, other factors, including the risk to the patient and/or others if a relapse were to occur, may also be relevant, and there is no requirement for likely relapse to be "soon", "in the near future" or within the permitted duration of a CTO. (2) Addressing the claimants' arguments on the analogy between detention and CTO cases, the judge stated that while there are some parallels between the s3 regime and CTOs they are not such that the same principles necessarily apply to both, and (to the extent necessary to reach a view on the detention cases) neither of the previous judgments cited in CM v Derbyshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust [2011] UKUT 129 (AAC) provided an authoritative basis for the view that imminence of relapse is the only factor or need be in the near future.

M v An NHS Trust (2017) MHLO 39 (UT)

Tribunal reasons

"[T]he tribunal's decision was made in error of law, but not [set aside]. In my grant of permission, I identified two possible errors of law. ... One of those errors was that the tribunal's reasons might be inadequate for being 'long on history and evidence but short on discussion.' ... There is, in truth, only one thing that really has to be said about the quality of reasons, which is that they must be adequate. Everything else is merely application of that principle to the circumstances of a particular case. ... [T]he second possible error [is] that the 'tribunal's reasoning shows that it was confused about its role and the [relevance] of a community treatment order'. ... [T]he reasons at least leave open the possibility that the tribunal may have strayed outside its proper remit. ... The first three sentences read: 'A cardinal issue of this application is whether the patient should be discharged from hospital by a CTO. This issue involves knowledge of the nature of a CTO. A CTO may only be imposed by the patient's RC ...' It may be that the judge did not express himself clearly, but that passage appears to begin by suggesting, and to continue by denying, that the tribunal had power to make Mr M subject to an order or was being asked to approve that course. The judge did then make a distinction between discharge from hospital and discharge from the liability to be detained. So it is possible that his reference to 'discharge from hospital by a CTO' may have been intended, not as a direction about the tribunal's powers on the application, but as a statement of how the responsible clinician envisaged Mr M's eventual progress. This interpretation would be consistent with what the tribunal said later ... In view of Mr M's current status [he had been discharged], I do not have to decide whether those reasons do or do not show that the tribunal misdirected itself. I limit myself to saying that it is risky if reasons can be read in a way that indicates a misdirection. ... Given that Mr M is no longer liable to be detained, I can see no need to venture outside the appropriate role of the Upper Tribunal in mental health cases and state, even in the form of a narrative declaration, that the tribunal should have exercised its power to discharge him. That is why I have exercised my power to refuse to set aside the tribunal's decision regardless of any error of law that it may have made."

MC v Cygnet Behavioural Health Ltd (2020) UKUT 230 (AAC)

Conditional discharge and DOL

(1) Although, following MM, the First-tier Tribunal has no power to impose conditions which would amount to a deprivation of liberty, it does have the power to coordinate its decision with the provision of an authorisation under the MCA, either by "the different hats approach" (the same judge sitting in the COP and the FTT) or "the ducks in a row approach" (adjournment or deferred conditional discharge). (2) This involves no Article 14 discrimination in favour of incapacitous restricted patients as, under SSJ guidance, the equivalent outcome can be reached for capacitous patients by using s17 leave. (3) The FTT had misunderstood the MM decision and had been wrong to refuse to defer conditional discharge for a standard authorisation to be put in place. (4) The UT discharged the patient subject to conditions of residence, supervision and compliance with "all aspects of the care package" (surprisingly, as the care package would amount to a deprivation of liberty), with permission to apply to the FTT for variation on a material change in circumstances (surprisingly, as the MHA sets out when an application may be made).

Miller v DPP (2018) EWHC 262 (Admin)

Appropriate adult

"This is an appeal by way of case stated from a pre-trial ruling of the Black Country Magistrates' Court sitting at Dudley on 13 October 2016 in respect of an information preferred against the Appellant for failing to provide a specimen of blood in breach of section 7 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, not to exercise its discretion under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to exclude evidence of the drug drive procedure at Oldbury Police Station that led to the charge being made. ... On 24 June 2016, the Appellant was stopped by the police on suspicion of driving under the influence of drugs. When arrested and taken into custody, he behaved erratically and aggressively. It appears that he was known to the police as a person who had learning difficulties and autism. ... As Mr Scott submitted, the presence of an appropriate adult (whilst not being able to provide technical, legal or medical advice) would have provided the Appellant with the opportunity not only to have the question as to whether or not to provide a sample explained to him, but also to obtain an appreciation of the consequences of failing to do so. He points out that the offence of failing to provide a blood sample is predicated not only on the person's comprehension of the requirement to provide a sample, but also of the consequences of failing to do so in terms of criminal liability. The Appellant was clearly very exercised whilst being detained, and there is a very real possibility that the presence of an appropriate adult would have calmed him, and led him to behave differently and make different choices from those he in fact made. ... [H]aving found there to have been a breach of Code C in failing to inform and summon an appropriate adult to the police station, we do not consider that the magistrates did properly exercise their discretion under section 78 of PACE not to exclude the evidence of the drug drive procedure. Their reasoning was, unfortunately, fundamentally flawed; and, had they exercised their discretion properly, they would have been bound to have excluded the evidence of the drug drive procedure."

NHS Dorset CCG v LB (2018) EWCOP 7

COP costs

"In 2017, the NHS Dorset Clinical Commissioning Group launched what were intended to be four test cases seeking clarification of the law concerning the deprivation of liberty of mentally capacitated adults. For various reasons, however, all of those applications, or in some cases that part of the application relating to the deprivation of liberty issue, were withdrawn, but not before the Official Solicitor had agreed to act for two of the respondents with the benefit of publicly-funded certificates and had incurred some legal costs. Subsequently, the Official Solicitor has applied for all or part of those costs to be paid by the applicant. This judgment sets out my decision on that costs application and the reasons for that decision."

PS v Camden and Islington NHS Foundation Trust (2011) UKUT 143 (AAC)

The Tribunal's policy was that a reference made under s68(7) (triggered by the revocation of a CTO) would be treated as having lapsed if the patient subsequently was placed on a new CTO (see Guidance: References made under section 68(7) Mental Health Act 1983 (as amended)). When the patient's representative argued that the case should be heard, the Tribunal treated that letter as the patient's own application. (1) The policy was unlawful: (a) whether the reference has lapsed depends on the nature of the reference, which is a matter of statutory interpretation, so neither the overriding objective nor the policy is relevant; (b) the subject matter of a reference under s68(7) (the duty to consider the s72 criteria) is not related to the circumstances that trigger it (the revocation of the CTO) so survives the change in circumstances; (c) the policy was inconsistent with s68(3)(c) (no six-month reference if revocation reference has been made) which would not be necessary if the revocation reference lapses. (2) The power to treat a letter as a Tribunal application is only appropriately exercised for the applicant's advantage, not potential detriment; it is not permissible to override an unequivocal indication by the solicitor to the opposite effect, especially if to do so would deprive the patient of the chance to make an application later should discharge not be obtained on the reference. (3) If the hospital managers had been represented, the judge would have wanted to know why it took 12 days to complete the simple referral form. (4) The Tribunal Procedure Committee will be consulting on rule changes to make it easier to handle CTO revocation cases in which the patient does not 'co-operate': in the meantime, the judge suggested that proceedings could be stayed, or hearings conducted in patients' absence.

Public Guardian v DA (2018) EWCOP 26

LPA wording - euthanasia and multiple attorneys

"This judgment concerns two test cases brought by the Public Guardian, by applications made under s.23 and Schedule 1 paragraph 11 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, regarding the validity of words in lasting powers of attorney ('LPAs'). The first concerns words relating to euthanasia or assisted suicide, whereas the second concerns words as to the appointment of multiple attorneys. Although the substance of the issues to which the words are directed is very different in the two cases, there is considerable overlap in the legal argument, the active parties were the same in the two sets of proceedings (the Public Guardian and the Official Solicitor) represented by the same counsel, and it is convenient to consider both cases in one judgment."

R (ASK) v SSHD (2019) EWCA Civ 1239

Immigration detention

"These appeals raise important issues concerning the powers of the Respondent Secretary of State to detain those who suffer from mental health conditions pending removal from the United Kingdom. In each case, the Appellant is a foreign national who satisfied the statutory criteria for detention pending removal, but who suffered from mental illness such that it is said that, for at least some of the period he was detained, he was not only unfit to be removed and/or detained in an immigration removal centre ("IRC"), but did not have mental capacity to challenge his detention and/or engage with the procedures to which he was subject as a detainee. As a result, it is submitted that, in detaining each Appellant, the Secretary of State acted unlawfully in one or more of the following ways. ..."

R (Gourlay) v Parole Board (2017) EWCA Civ 1003

Costs against Parole Board

"Does the established practice of the High Court, to make no order for costs for or against an inferior tribunal or court which plays no active part in a judicial review of one of its decisions, extend to the [Parole] Board?"

R (Jollah) v SSHD (2018) EWCA Civ 1260

False imprisonment and damages

"The context is one of immigration detention. The claimant, who is the respondent to this appeal (and who for present purposes I will call "IJ"), was made subject to a curfew restriction between the hours of 23.00 and 07.00 for a period between 3 February 2014 and 14 July 2016, pending potential deportation. Such curfew was imposed by those acting on behalf of the appellant Secretary of State purportedly pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 2 (5) of Schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 1971 (as it then stood). It has, however, been accepted in these proceedings that, in the light of subsequent Court of Appeal authority, there was no power to impose a curfew under those provisions. Consequently, the curfew was unlawfully imposed. The question arising is whether IJ is entitled to damages for false imprisonment in respect of the time during which he was subject to the unlawful curfew. The trial judge, Lewis J, decided that he was. Having so decided, the judge at a subsequent hearing assessed the damages at £4,000: [2017] EWHC 330 (Admin)B; [2017] EWHC 2821 (Admin)B. The Secretary of State now appeals, with leave granted by the judge, against the decision that IJ was entitled to damages for false imprisonment. IJ cross-appeals, with leave granted by Singh LJ, against the amount of the award of damages. It is said on behalf of IJ that a much greater award should have been made."

R v Fisher (2019) EWCA Crim 1066

Summary of MH sentencing guidance - life sentence replaced with s37/41

Having summarised the Sentencing Council's Definitive Guideline for Manslaughter (in force 1/11/18) and the relevant available disposals under the MHA, the Court of Appeal revoked sentences of imprisonment and replaced the life sentence with a s37/41 restricted hospital order.

Re A (Capacity: Social Media and Internet Use: Best Interests) (2019) EWCOP 2

Social media and internet use

"I have reached the clear view that the issue of whether someone has capacity to engage in social media for the purposes of online ‘contact’ is distinct (and should be treated as such) from general consideration of other forms of direct or indirect contact. ... It is my judgment, having considered the submissions and proposals of the parties in this case and in Re B , that the ‘relevant information’ which P needs to be able to understand, retain, and use and weigh, is as follows: (i) Information and images (including videos) which you share on the internet or through social media could be shared more widely, including with people you don’t know , without you knowing or being able to stop it; (ii) It is possible to limit the sharing of personal information or images (and videos) by using ‘privacy and location settings’ on some internet and social media sites; [see paragraph below]; (iii) If you place material or images (including videos) on social media sites which are rude or offensive, or share those images, other people might be upset or offended; [see paragraph below]; (iv) Some people you meet or communicate with (‘talk to’) online, who you don’t otherwise know, may not be who they say they are (‘they may disguise, or lie about, themselves’); someone who calls themselves a ‘friend’ on social media may not be friendly; (v) Some people you meet or communicate with (‘talk to’) on the internet or through social media, who you don’t otherwise know, may pose a risk to you; they may lie to you, or exploit or take advantage of you sexually, financially, emotionally and/or physically; they may want to cause you harm; (vi) If you look at or share extremely rude or offensive images, messages or videos online you may get into trouble with the police, because you may have committed a crime; [see paragraph below]. With regard to the test above, I would like to add the following points to assist in its interpretation and application: ..."

Re B (Capacity: Social Media: Care and Contact) (2019) EWCOP 3

Social media and sexual relations

"By this judgment, I set out my conclusions in relation to a range of capacity questions on issues relevant to Miss B’s life, including her capacity: (i) To litigate in these proceedings...; (ii) To manage her property and affairs...; (iii) To decide where she resides...; (iv) To decide on her package of care...; (v) To decide with whom she has contact...; (vi) To use the internet and communicate by social media; (specifically, it is agreed that the question is ‘whether Miss B has capacity to make a decision to use social media for the purposes of developing or maintaining connections with others’)...; (vii) To consent to sexual relations... It is clear that the information relevant to the decision in this area includes: (i) the sexual nature and character of the act of sexual intercourse, the mechanics of the act; (ii) the reasonably foreseeable consequences of sexual intercourse, namely pregnancy; (iii) the opportunity to say no; i.e. to choose whether or not to engage in it and the capacity to decide whether to give or withhold consent to sexual intercourse. (iv) that there are health risks involved, particularly the acquisition of sexually transmitted and transmissible infections; (v) that the risks of sexually transmitted infection can be reduced by the taking of precautions such as the use of a condom."

Re K (Forced Marriage: Passport Order) (2020) EWCA Civ 190

FMPOs and capacity

(1) The Family Court the court has jurisdiction to make a Forced Marriage Protection Order to protect an adult who does not lack mental capacity (and the statistics demonstrate that the courts regularly make FMPOs to protect capacitous adults). (2) An open-ended passport order or travel ban should only be imposed in the most exceptional of cases and where the court can look sufficiently far into the future to be satisfied that highly restrictive orders of that nature will be required indefinitely.

Re M: AB v HT (2018) EWCOP 2

Declaration of non-marriage in English law

"These complex and difficult proceedings in the Court of Protection concern a 37-year-old woman, hereafter referred to as M, who (as I have found, for reasons set out below) at present lacks capacity by virtue of a combination of psychotic illness and acquired brain injury. The parties to the proceedings are the applicant, M's father, hereafter referred to as AB; her aunt, hereafter referred to as HT; the local authority for the area where HT, and currently M, live, namely the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham; and a man hereafter referred to as MS, with whom M went through a religious ceremony of marriage in 2013. A dispute has arisen concerning a number of issues about her past, present and future which has necessitated a lengthy and unusual fact-finding hearing. This judgment sets out my conclusions on the disputed matters of fact, together with an analysis as to her capacity, and orders made following my findings."

Re P (Sexual Relations and Contraception): A Local Authority v P (2018) EWCOP 10

Sex and covert contraception

"This judgment in long-running proceedings involving a vulnerable young woman, hereafter referred to as 'P', addresses difficult issues concerning her sexual relationships and the covert insertion of a contraceptive device. ... I shall address these issues in the following order: (1) Capacity - general principles. (2) P's capacity other than sexual relations. (3) P's capacity to consent to sexual relations. (4) Best interests: general principles. (5) Best interests: contraception. (6) Best interests: covert treatment (6) Best interests: sexual relationships and supervision. (7) Further issues arising from the draft order." ... Given the serious infringement of rights involved in the covert insertion of a contraceptive device, it is in my judgement highly probable that, in most, if not all, cases, professionals faced with a decision whether to take that step will conclude that it is appropriate to apply to the court to facilitate a comprehensive analysis of best interests, with P having the benefit of legal representation and independent expert advice.

Re QD (2019) EWCOP 56

Habitual residence

QD, who had dementia, was living in Spain with his second wife when adult children from his first marriage flew him to England by stealth. The children unsuccessfully argued that: (a) he was now habitually resident in England, so the MCA applied in the usual way; (b) removal was justified under the common law doctrine of necessity; (c) jurisdiction was established on grounds of urgency; (d) even if QD were habitually resident in Spain, orders could be made under the inherent jurisdiction. The judge therefore made a protective measures order under sch 3 MCA 2005 pending a determination by the national authorities in Spain on what should happen next.

Re QD (No.2) (2020) EWCOP 14

Habitual residence

A legal deadlock had arisen: (a) the English court did not have primary jurisdiction, as QD was habitually resident in Spain; (b) the Spanish court would not exercise its jurisdiction unless QD were in Spain; (c) there was no obligation to return QD there. The coronavirus travel bans meant an "urgent" decision under MCA 2005 sch 3 that he be returned could not be made, so the decision was adjourned for 3-4 months.

Re RD (Deprivation or Restriction of Liberty) (2018) EWFC 47

"The court is concerned in this application with the circumstances of RD. She is 14½ years old. She is currently the subject of an application for a care order under Part IV Children Act 1989, and is in the interim care of Northumberland County Council. ... RD has been placed by the Local Authority at a residential placement in Scotland, which I shall call Lennox House. ... The issue for my determination is whether the regime which applies to RD at Lennox House deprives her of her liberty in such a way as to engage her Article 5 ECHR rights. ... The implications of my determination are not insignificant. If I were to find as a fact that RD is deprived of her liberty in Article 5 terms, I would feel obliged to adjourn the Part IV proceedings, and would propose that the Local Authority present a petition to the nobile officium of the Court of Session seeking authorisation of that Court for RD's deprivation of liberty ... If I find that she is not deprived of her liberty, then there would be little impediment to my concluding the Part IV proceedings in this jurisdiction."

Re SF (2020) EWCOP 15

Sexual relations and contact with husband

(1) SF lacked capacity in relation to some areas (litigation, care, residence, finances, tenancy, contact with strangers and people who are unfamiliar) but did have capacity to consent to sexual relations and to decide on contact with her husband. The psychiatric evidence was that SF would only have episodic memory ("memory for the personally experienced events of a person’s life, with retention of the details of time and situation in which they were acquired") in relation to contact with strangers, but would have semantic memory ("knowledge which is retained irrespective of the circumstances in which it was acquired [deriving] from the 'feeling' around the memory rather than the 'facts' surrounding the memory") in relation to her husband. (2) The court authorised the deprivation of liberty which existed both when living at her home and (on an interim basis until authorised by the placement) when receiving respite care at a residential supported care provision.

Re T (A Child) (2018) EWCA Civ 2136

Secure accommodation

"This appeal relates to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction by the High Court, Family Division when called upon to make orders which, but for a lack of capacity in the statutory system, would be made as secure accommodation orders under Children Act 1989, s 25 (CA 1989)."

RM v St Andrew's Healthcare (2010) UKUT 119 (AAC)

Non-disclosure of covert medication

(1) When considering the "interests of justice" limb of rule 14(2), the key test to be applied is whether or not non-disclosure of the document or information would allow the patient to make an effective challenge to his detention. (2) On the facts, without knowing that he was being covertly medicated the patient would be unable effectively to challenge his detention; the non-disclosure decision was set aside and re-made. (3) Non-disclosure orders should not only be drafted in terms of documents, but also should deal, in a precise, clear and exhaustive way, with the information which should not be disclosed.

Rushbrooke v HM Coroner for West London (2020) EWHC 1612 (Admin)

Inquest determination and findings quashed

The applicant, who had been the deceased's Relevant Person's Representative under a DOLS authorisation successfully argued for the inquest's determination and findings to be quashed.

SSHD v KE (Nigeria) (2017) EWCA Civ 1382

Deportation following hospital order

"This is an appeal [which] gives rise to the narrow, but important, issue as to whether a non-British citizen who is convicted and sentenced to a hospital order with restrictions under sections 37 and 41 of the Mental Health Act 1983 is 'a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years' for the purposes of section 117C(6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, so that the public interest requires his deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances that mean that it would be a disproportionate interference with his rights under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights to deport him."

SSJ v MM (2018) UKSC 60

The patient had capacity to and was prepared to consent to a conditional discharge requiring that he live at a particular place, which he would not be free to leave, and from which he would not be allowed out without an escort. (1) The Supreme Court decided 4-1 that the MHA 1983 does not permit either the First-tier Tribunal or the Secretary of State to impose conditions amounting to detention or a deprivation of liberty upon a conditionally discharged restricted patient. (2) The dissenting decision was that the tribunal has the power to impose such conditions so long as the loss of liberty is not greater than that already authorised by the hospital and restriction orders, and that this power does not depend on the consent of the (capacitous) patient.

Sunderland City Council v AS (2020) EWCOP 13

Capacity - DOL

(1) The court decided that a CTO patient lacked capacity in all relevant areas (litigation, residence, care and contact). When giving oral evidence the jointly-instructed psychologist changed her mind on: litigation capacity (initially she thought AS had litigation capacity while not having subject matter capacity), residence (she placed insufficient weight on 'structure and routine', which is an integral part of the information relevant to a decision on residence in supported as opposed to independent living), and fluctuating capacity. The judge noted with approval the approach in NICE guidance on "Decision-making and mental capacity" to people with executive dysfunction. (2) The court authorised the deprivation of liberty (there was a high level of supervision throughout the day and night, in the accommodation and community).

VS v St Andrew's Healthcare (2018) UKUT 250 (AAC)

Capacity to make tribunal application

(1) The capacity that a patient must have in order to make a valid MHT application is that the patient must understand that he is being detained against his wishes and that the First-tier Tribunal is a body that will be able to decide whether he should be released. This is a lower threshold than the capacity to conduct proceedings. (2) (Obiter) a solicitor appointed under rule 11(7)(b) can request to withdraw an application in the best interests of the patient, but on the facts the tribunal had been entitled to give effect to the patient's own desire to come before a tribunal. (3) When a tribunal lacks jurisdiction it should strike out the proceedings but (obiter) if the proceedings were fair then the use of withdrawal rather than strike out is unlikely to be a material error of law.

Welsh Ministers v PJ (2018) UKSC 66

(1) There is no power to impose conditions in a CTO which have the effect of depriving a patient of his liberty. (2) The patient's situation may be relevant to the tribunal's discharge criteria, and the tribunal may explain the true legal effect of a CTO (for the RC to act on that information), but if a patient is being unlawfully detained then the remedy is either habeas corpus or judicial review.

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