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Drilldown: Cases

Not many cases (261 of them) have been added to the database so far. To see the full list of cases (2087) go to the Mental health case law page.

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Cases > Judges : Arden or Hayden or McFarlane

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Page name Sentence Summary
Cardiff and Vale University Health Board v P (2020) EWCOP 8

Dental treatment - delay

"It might seem, from the above account, that some dental assessment was required quickly and now as long ago as November or early December 2019. Plainly, it was. But the application was only made by the Health Board on 20th February 2020. The proposed inspection and/or treatment is not to take place until early March. For anybody who has had toothache, even delay between now and then looks like an eternity. But this young man, it seems, has been suffering, and significantly so, for nearly five months. This is little short of an outrage. It is indefensible. ... An additional complication arose in November when P was taken to the local A&E by his parents with an obvious bruise to his forehead. They believed that his behaviour was so markedly changed that they feared he had some sort of concussion and may have fractured his skull. It is, to my mind, self-evident that there was an urgent medical emergency that should have been investigated within hours or days, but in fact there has, as yet, been no CT scan at all. ... It is, sadly, yet again, a situation in which there has been a fundamental failure to communicate effectively by those responsible for P's care. This message has now been the conclusion of so many reviews, including serious case reviews, that it has become almost trite. There is no point identifying lessons to be learned if they are not, in fact, learned."

CB v Medway Council (2019) EWCOP 5

Unfair summary disposal of DOL/residence case

"The simple issue is whether the Judge had sufficient information before her to discount, at this stage, any real possibility of CB returning to her home, supported by the extensive and expensive care package that is being mooted. The language of the Judgment itself, to my mind, answers this question in phrases such as “I very much doubt…. I am very sceptical…. The practicalities are…. likely to be extremely difficult….” I share the Judge’s scepticism and I also very much doubt that even with an extensive package of support a return home will be in CB’s best interest. I note too that Dr Ajiteru expressed himself in cautious terms (see para 10 above). However, scepticism and “doubt” is not sufficient to discount a proper enquiry in to such a fundamental issue of individual liberty. ... It is easy to see why the Judge took the course she did and I have a good deal of sympathy with her. She will have recognised, as do I, that the effluxion of time has had its own impact on the viability of the options in this case. However, what is involved here is nothing less than CB’s liberty. Curtailing, restricting or depriving any adult of such a fundamental freedom will always require cogent evidence and proper enquiry. I cannot envisage any circumstances where it would be right to determine such issues on the basis of speculation and general experience in other cases."

Djaba v West London Mental Health NHS Trust (2017) EWCA Civ 436

ECHR and tribunal criteria

"[T]he appeal is concerned with the narrow issue whether the statutory tests within ss. 72, 73 and 145 of the Mental Health Act 1983 require a 'proportionality assessment' to be conducted, pursuant to articles 5 and/or 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Human Rights Act 1998, taking into account the conditions of the appellant's detention. ... The position established by these cases is that, where the question whether the detention complies with the European Convention on Human Rights is not expressly within the powers of the tribunals but can be heard in other proceedings, section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 does not require the powers of the tribunals to be interpreted by reference to the Convention to give them the powers to consider Convention-compliance as well. The same principle applies here too. In this case, the appellant must apply for judicial review to the Administrative Court if he considers that the conditions of his detention are disproportionate and do not comply with the Convention. That Court is able to carry out a sufficient review on the merits to meet the requirements of the Convention."

Guy's and St Thomas' NHS Foundation Trust v R (2020) EWCOP 4

Contingent/anticipatory declarations - MCA/inherent jurisdiction - Caesarean section

R had capacity to make decisions as to her ante-natal and obstetric care but there was a risk that she would lose capacity during labour and refuse a Caesarean section. (1) MCA 2005 s16 (Powers to make decisions and appoint deputies: general) applies only to those who currently lack capacity. (2) MCA 2005 s15 (Power to make declarations) is not so limited and so can authorise contingent declarations. (3) Deprivation of liberty cannot be authorised by s15 but the inherent jurisdiction may be utilised to fill that lacuna which would otherwise render the s15 power nugatory.

Health Service Executive of Ireland v Moorgate (2020) EWCOP 12

Recognition of foreign protective measure

(1) The necessary criteria were met for the recognition and enforcement of protective measures contained in an order made by the Southern Irish High Court which authorised the patient's transfer from a London hospital to a specialist hospital in Leeds. (2) An appendix entitled "Domestic regimes applicable to SM and those in her position" contains the following headings: (a) Application of the MHA; (b) Hospital admission under the MHA; (c) Treatment under the MHA; (d) Representation and support; (e) Challenging detention; (f) Removal of alien patients; (g) Mental Capacity Act 2005 (excluding the provisions of Schedule 3); (h) Inherent jurisdiction of the High Court; (i) Comparison of protections under MHA and under Schedule 3.

Hounslow Clinical Commissioning Group v RW (2019) EWCOP 12

Death

"This is an application brought by the Hounslow Clinical Commissioning Group concerning RW a 78-year-old man, suffering from vascular dementia. ... I would very much have liked to have been able to endorse a plan which permitted RW to return home. There is no doubt at all, as the history of this case shows, that RW would want to die at home. I do not know whether he would survive the transition but I should have been prepared to take that risk. However, PT would, in my judgement, continue to try to give his father food and water. As I speak these words he indicates to me that this is precisely what he would do. I have been told by Ms I that, at this stage, if PT were to attempt to feed his father there is a real risk that he would asphyxiate on any food given. I cannot permit RW to be exposed to the risk of ending his life in this way and, if I may say so, I would not be prepared to take that risk for PT either, especially having regard to all the loving care he has provided for his father. I endorse the applicant's plan. I indicate that it is in RW's best interest to have his sons with him as much as possible. I am not prepared to be prescriptive of the times and the circumstances in which the sons may visit. In this I reject the applicant's proposals in this respect."

London Borough of Tower Hamlets v NB (2019) EWCOP 17

Capacity to consent to sex with husband

"There is also evidence that indicates that NB very much enjoys the status of marriage, is affectionate to her husband [AU] and, on occasion, initiates sexual relations. This appears consistent with Ms Wilson's observations as long ago as 1996. The primary issue before the Court is whether NB truly has the capacity to consent to sexual relations. ... Unfortunately, the case attracted a great deal of media coverage, this notwithstanding that no argument had been heard and no Judgment delivered. A great deal of the comment was sententious and, in some instances, irresponsible. It is considered, by the Official Solicitor and the applicant Local Authority, that the impact of that publicity frightened AU very considerably, leading him to believe that he was likely to be sent to prison. He has left the party's flat and disengaged with these proceedings. ... [Mr Bagchi for the OS] submits it is a 'general' or 'issue-specific' test rather than a partner-specific one. If Mr Bagchi is correct, the difficulty that presents in this case is that there is only one individual with whom it is really contemplated that NB is likely to have a sexual relationship i.e. her husband of 27 years. It seems entirely artificial therefore to be assessing her capacity in general terms when the reality is entirely specific. ... As I said on the last occasion, these issues are integral to the couple's basic human rights. There is a crucial social, ethical and moral principle in focus. It is important that the relevant test is not framed in such a restrictive way that it serves to discriminate against those with disabilities, in particular those with low intelligence or border line capacity. ... Mr Bagchi has accepted that if a person-specific test were applied here then the outcome, in terms of assessment of NB's capacity may be different. ... I do not necessarily consider that the applicable test in the Court of Protection necessarily excludes the 'person specific approach'. I am reserving my Judgment ..."

Manchester City Council Legal Services v LC (2018) EWCOP 30

Sexual exploitation, restrictions where adults have capacity

After a circuit judge endorsed a care plan which led to the repeated sexual exploitation by strangers of a young woman with autism and significant learning disabilities (who had capacity to consent to sexual relations but lacked capacity to make decisions on her contact with men), Hayden J provided guidance that 'where issues arise that may necessitate restrictions in areas where adults have capacity, these should be heard by a High Court Judge in the Court of Protection'.

NHS Cumbria CCG v Rushton (2018) EWCOP 41

Withdrawal of CANH; advance decision

"This is an application regarding the proposed withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration in respect of Mrs Jillian Rushton, who is now 85 years of age. Since sustaining a traumatic head injury in December 2015, Mrs Rushton has suffered from a prolonged period of disorder of consciousness. Insofar as a label is relevant, the consensus of medical opinion, in respect of which there is no dissent at all, is that she is in a persistent vegetative state (PVS). In their recent guidance, ‘Clinically-assisted nutrition and hydration (CANH) and adults who lack the capacity to consent’, the Royal College of Physicians and the British Medical Association have noted that the importance of obtaining a precise and definitive diagnosis has reduced. It is recognised by the Courts and clinicians that drawing a firm distinction between vegetative state and minimally conscious state is frequently both artificial and unnecessary. In practice, when assessing best interests, information about the patient’s current condition and prognosis for functional recovery and the level of confidence with which these can be evaluated is invariably of greater importance than a precise diagnosis. ... It perhaps requires to be said, though in my view it should be regarded as axiomatic, that the medical profession must give these advanced decisions the utmost care, attention and scrutiny. I am confident the profession does but I regret to say that I do not think sufficient care and scrutiny took place here. The lesson is an obvious one and needs no amplification. Where advanced decisions have been drawn up and placed with GP records there is an onerous burden on the GP to ensure, wherever possible, that they are made available to clinicians in hospital. By this I mean a copy of the decision should be made available and placed within the hospital records with the objective that the document should follow the patient. It need hardly be said that it will rarely, if ever, be sufficient to summarise an advance decision in a telephone conversation. ... The family have ... made it clear to me that she would not have regarded her present situation as tolerable. Whilst I have no doubt that she would understand the commitment of her son, Tim and his profound resistance to letting her go, I have equally no doubt that she would want to be let go and I have no hesitation in concluding that it is my responsibility to respect this."

Practice Guidance (Court of Protection: Serious Medical Treatment) (2020) EWCOP 2

Serious medical treatment guidance

"This practice guidance sets out the procedure to be followed where a decision relating to medical treatment arises and where thought requires to be given to bringing an application before the Court of Protection. The procedure is currently being reviewed within the revised MCA Code. That will, in due course, be subject to public consultation and Parliamentary scrutiny. This guidance is intended to operate until such time as it is superseded by the revised Code."

PW v Chelsea and Westminster Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (2018) EWCA Civ 1067

Best interests/transparency

"Two central criticisms are made of the judgment below, and the judge's determination of best interests. First, that the judge failed to appreciate and therefore give any or any adequate weight to RW's wishes and feeling. These were, contrary to her findings, ascertainable; they pointed to the fact that he was a "fighter", to the value he ascribed to life and to his desire to "hold fast to it" no matter how "poor" or "vestigial" in nature it was. Secondly, the judge overstated the risk that having the NG tube in place would pose for RW at home and the burden this would place on him, in circumstances where the dedicated care his sons could provide would remove or mitigate that risk. In the result, and in any event, it is submitted the judge's overall analysis of what was in RW's best interests failed adequately to address the relevant issues and evidence, and was a flawed one. In my view neither criticism is well-founded." Another aspect of this case related to the transparency order/reporting restrictions.

QJ v A Local Authority (2020) EWCOP 3

Finely-balanced treatment decision

(1) This s21A appeal was adjourned for medical evidence in relation to whether QJ had capacity (a) to decide on whether to receive nutrition and hydration either orally or artificially; (b) to decide more generally on medical treatment; and (c) to decide on admission to hospital. (2) On the day of the hearing QJ had for the first time indicated a willingness to be put on a drip. Even if QJ were now found to have capacity, the case should still come back before the court because: (a) it may very well be a "finely balaced" decision (and so within Practice Guidance (Court of Protection: Serious Medical Treatment) [2020] EWCOP 2); and, in any event, (b) where there is already an application in relation to the central issue the matter should only be concluded within court proceedings and not left to clinical decisions.

QJ v A Local Authority (2020) EWCOP 7

Capacity and nutrition/hydration

QJ had capacity to decide about nutrition and hydration despite his reluctance to answer certain questions. He was in agreement with the care plan, which included (a) Fortisip; (b) weighing; (c) discharge to a care home; (d) no readmission to hospital if he refuses to accept food or water.

R (VC) v SSHD (2018) EWCA Civ 57

Immigration detention

"There are broadly two questions before the court in this appeal. The first concerns the application of the Secretary of State for the Home Department's policy governing the detention under the Immigration Act 1971 of persons who have a mental illness, and the consequences if she is found not to have applied that policy correctly. The second concerns the adequacy at common law and under the Equality Act 2010 of the procedures under which mentally ill detainees can make representations on matters relating to their detention."

Re D (A Child): Liverpool City Council v AM (2018) EWCOP 31

Placement for child

"However, an extensive search for a therapeutic placement was undertaken throughout the UK with repeated emails being sent to multiple providers. Unfortunately, due to there being a limited number of placements available and demand being high, no offers of placements were made that were remotely suitable to D's identified needs. The Placements Team contacted commissioners in other Local Authorities, requesting any intelligence concerning potentially suitable placements. I have been told that they obtained a Residential Framework Placement list to ensure that they were contacting every possible provider. The case has been heard by HHJ De Haas QC, the Designated Family Judge for Liverpool and Merseyside whose robust and determined case management is clear from the papers. Having failed, entirely, to achieve a placement, over so many months Judge De Haas, yesterday, in desperation and no doubt exasperation, ordered the case to be transferred to me. I have interposed it into my list to be heard, as it has been throughout, in open Court with, I note, the press in attendance."

Re K (Forced Marriage: Passport Order) (2020) EWCA Civ 190

FMPOs and capacity

(1) The Family Court the court has jurisdiction to make a Forced Marriage Protection Order to protect an adult who does not lack mental capacity (and the statistics demonstrate that the courts regularly make FMPOs to protect capacitous adults). (2) An open-ended passport order or travel ban should only be imposed in the most exceptional of cases and where the court can look sufficiently far into the future to be satisfied that highly restrictive orders of that nature will be required indefinitely.

Re T (A Child) (2018) EWCA Civ 2136

Secure accommodation

"This appeal relates to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction by the High Court, Family Division when called upon to make orders which, but for a lack of capacity in the statutory system, would be made as secure accommodation orders under Children Act 1989, s 25 (CA 1989)."

RR v SSWP (2019) UKSC 52

ECHR and subordinate legislation

(1) There is nothing unconstitutional about a public authority, court or tribunal disapplying a provision of subordinate legislation which would otherwise result in their acting incompatibly with a Convention right, where this is necessary in order to comply with the Human Rights Act 1998. (2) On the facts of this case, the public authority should disobey Regulation B13 of the Housing Benefit Regulations 2006 and retrospectively apply the Supreme Court's decision in R (Carmichael) v SSWP [2016] UKSC 58B that the "bedroom tax" was an unjustified discrimination on the ground of disability where there was a transparent medical need for an additional bedroom.

Sherwood Forest Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v C (2020) EWCOP 10

Treatment despite religious delusions

(1) Having previously undergone two hysteroscopies, and initially consented to removal of her ovaries and fallopian tubes, C disengaged, expressed religious views (such as that only God could cure her cancer), and was assessed as lacking capacity. The judge decided that "she clearly lacked capacity and her rejection of the treatment, which is clinically so manifestly in her best interests, is predicated on a delusional belief structure which manifests itself in the language of religion". (2) The delay in this case, which was attributable to the treating clinicians not initially knowing C had paranoid schizophrenia, and their reluctance to contemplate coercion, should not have happened and likely stressed C and her family, but had not led to neglect of the cancer.

Sherwood Forest Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v H (2020) EWCOP 5

Medical treatment delay

Noting that the delay in bringing the case to court "may mean that a life is lost that could well have been saved", the judge authorised surgical excision under general anaesthetic of a squamous cell carcinoma on Mrs H's left cheek.

Sherwood Forest Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v H (2020) EWCOP 6

Medical treatment

In the previous judgment the court had authorised surgical excision of a squamous cell carcinoma on Mrs H's left cheek. By the surgery date its further growth rendered it inoperable. Other treatments, including electro-chemo therapy and paliative radiotherapy under general anaesthetic were under consideration, with a view to putting together a care plan for Mrs H's needs for the remainder of her life. The court would review the care plan because (a) the history of the case required that it be monitored, and (b) Mrs H's daughter had requested this.

Southend-On-Sea Borough Council v Meyers (2019) EWHC 399 (Fam)

Inherent jurisdiction prevents elderly man from living with son

"The essence of his vulnerability is, in fact, his entirely dysfunctional relationship with his son ... Mr Meyers, I am satisfied, is entirely capable of and has the capacity ... for determining where he wishes to reside and with whom. ... I instinctively recoil from intervening in the decision making of a capacitious adult ... Here Mr Meyers' life requires to be protected and I consider that, ultimately, the State has an obligation to do so. Additionally, it is important to recognise that the treatment of Mr Meyers has not merely been neglectful but abusive and corrosive of his dignity. To the extent that the Court's decision encroaches on Mr Meyers' personal autonomy it is, I believe, a justified and proportionate intervention. The preservation of a human life will always weigh heavily when evaluating issues of this kind. ... The objective here ... is that Mr Meyers be prevented from living with his son, either in the bungalow or in alternative accommodation. I do not compel him to reside in any other place or otherwise limit with whom he should live. ... The impact of the Court's intervention is to limit Mr Meyers's accommodation options but it does not deprive of his physical liberty which is the essence of the right guaranteed by Article 5. ... It is also necessary to restrict the extent of Mr Meyers's contact with his son in order to keep him safe. ... To the extent that this interferes with his Article 8 rights it is, again as I have indicated above, a necessary and proportionate intervention. ... The ideal solution here, it seems to me, would be for Mr Meyers to return to his bungalow with a suitable package of support, his son having been excluded from the property."

SSHD v KE (Nigeria) (2017) EWCA Civ 1382

Deportation following hospital order

"This is an appeal [which] gives rise to the narrow, but important, issue as to whether a non-British citizen who is convicted and sentenced to a hospital order with restrictions under sections 37 and 41 of the Mental Health Act 1983 is 'a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years' for the purposes of section 117C(6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, so that the public interest requires his deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances that mean that it would be a disproportionate interference with his rights under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights to deport him."

WB v W District Council (2018) EWCA Civ 928

Homelessness

"This appeal is about when a person who is homeless and suffers from mental illness may apply for housing under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996. ... The difficulty for the appellant in this case, WB, is that it has been held she does not have capacity to make the decisions necessary to complete the process of applying for accommodation as a homeless person. In 1993, the House of Lords held that a homeless person with mental disabilities, who could not understand the choices she had to make when offered accommodation, could not be treated as a person in priority need..."

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