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Drilldown: Cases

Not many cases (252 of them) have been added to the database so far. To see the full list of cases (2079) go to the Mental health case law page.

The relevant pages (and summaries) are displayed at the bottom of this page.

Cases > Court : High Court (Chancery Division) or Northern Ireland High Court or Supreme Court

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Parties:
Alexandra Deborah Louise Parsons (1) · Alison Taylor (1) · An NHS Trust (1) · Ashok Parmanand Hinduja (1) · Christine Hancock (1) · David Patrick Christopher O'Hagan (1) · Derby City Council (1) · Derby Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (1) · Duncan Parsonage (1) · Elizabeth Jane Todd (1) · ET (1) · Gopichand Parmanand Hinduja (1) · Ian Parsonage (1) · Jalloh (1) · Janet Ann Whittaker (1) · Jasmin Djaba (1) · John Blavo (1) · John Clitheroe (1) · Jollah (1) · JP (1) · Karen James (1) · Law Society (1) · Linda Ann Davidson (1) · London Borough of Enfield (1) · Margaret Ann Parker (1) · McCann (1) · Michael James Todd (1) · MM (1) · Mr Y (1) · Mrs Y (1) · Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council (1) · PJ (1) · Prakash Parmanand Hinduja (1) · Raymond Allen James (1) · Richards (Kenneth John) (1) · Robin Makin (1) · Royal Liverpool & Broadgreen University Hospital NHS Trust (1) · RR (1) · Sandra James (1) · Secretary of State for Health (1) · Secretary of State for Justice (2) · Secretary of State for the Home Department (1) · Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (1) · Sefton Metropolitan Borough Council (1) · Serena Underwood (1) · Sian Folley (1) · South Worcestershire Clinical Commissioning Group (1) · Srichand Parmanand Hinduja (1) · State Hospitals Board for Scotland (1) · Susan Bond (1) · Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council (1) · Tomas Parsonage (1) · Welsh Ministers (1) · West London Mental Health NHS Trust (1) · Western Health and Social Care Trust (1) · Worcestershire County Council (1)

Showing below up to 19 results in range #1 to #19.

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Page name Sentence Summary
Clitheroe v Bond (2020) EWHC 1185 (Ch)

Testamentary capacity

"This is a bitter family dispute between the Claimant brother and Defendant sister as to whether their mother, the deceased, had testamentary capacity to make each of her two wills and in addition or in the alternative whether either or both wills resulted from fraudulent calumny."

Derby Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v Derby City Council (2019) EWHC 3436 (Ch)

Charitable status of foundation trusts

Seventeen NHS foundation trusts argued that, as foundation trusts, they were entitled under s43(5) Local Government Finance Act 1988 to the four-fifths reduction in non-domestic rates because they were charities and the relevant properties were wholly or mainly used for charitable purposes. The High Court answered the preliminary question "Whether the Lead Claimant is a charity for the purposes of section 43(6) of the Local Government Finance Act 1988?" in the negative.

Djaba v West London Mental Health NHS Trust (2018) MHLO 76 (SC)

ECHR and tribunal criteria

On 15/3/18 the Supreme Court (Lady Hale, Lord Hodge, Lord Lloyd-Jones) refused Jasmin Djaba permission to appeal, giving brief reasons.

ET v JP (2018) EWHC 685 (Ch)

Variation of Trusts Act

"This judgment deals with one point which arose in the course of an application for the court's approval to a variation of a trust pursuant to the Variation of Trusts Act 1958. ... The way in which section 1 of the 1958 Act operates can be summarised as follows: (1) In the case of an adult beneficiary who has capacity within section 2(1) of the 2005 Act, the adult can decide for himself whether to agree to a proposed variation of a trust and the court has no power to give approval on his behalf; (2) In the case of an adult beneficiary who does not have capacity within section 2(1) of the 2005 Act to agree to the variation of a trust, the court has power to give approval on his behalf but the question as to whether the variation is for his benefit is decided by the Court of Protection rather than by the High Court; (3) In the case of a minor beneficiary, the minor does not have capacity (by reason of being a minor) to decide for himself whether to agree a proposed variation of a trust and the court has power to give approval on his behalf. The question then arises: what is the position of a minor beneficiary who, by reason of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain would not have capacity for the purposes of section 2(1) of the 2005 Act to make decisions for himself in relation to certain matters? Is such a minor within section 1(3) of the 1958 Act so that the question as to whether a variation of a trust would be for his benefit is to be determined by the Court of Protection rather than by the High Court? If that question had to be referred to the Court of Protection and that court determined that the variation was for the benefit of the minor, the matter would then have to return to the High Court for it to give its approval to the variation under section 1 of the 1958 Act."

Hinduja v Hinduja (2020) EWHC 1533 (Ch)

Protected party - litigation friend

(1) Medical evidence on capacity to conduct proceedings is not required under the CPR, and in this case to require it would not be necessary or in accordance with the overriding objective. The court decided that SP was a protected party. (2) The defendants argued that the proposed litigation friend failed both limbs of the relevant test (ability fairly and competently to conduct proceedings and having no adverse interest). Having considered the tests (including noting that "[w]hether the existence of a financial interest on the part of the litigation friend should debar [her] from acting will depend on the nature of the interest, and whether it is in fact adverse or whether it otherwise prevents the litigation friend conducting the proceedings fairly and competently on the protected party's behalf") the court made the appointment sought.

James v James (2018) EWHC 43 (Ch)

Banks v Goodfellow test for testamentary capacity survives MCA

"There is a preliminary question of law as to the test to be applied for testamentary capacity in a case like this, where the testator has made a will, died, and then the question of capacity has arisen. The traditional test for such a case is that laid down in Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549, 565, per Cockburn CJ: 'It is essential … that a testator shall understand the nature of his act and its effects; shall understand the extent of the property of which he is disposing; shall be able to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which he ought to give effect, and, with a view to the latter object, that no disorder of the mind shall poison his affections, avert his sense of right, or prevent the exercise of his natural faculties, that no insane delusion shall influence his will in disposing of his property and bring about a disposal of it which, if his mind had been sound, would not have been made.' ... More recently the Mental Capacity Act 2005 has made fresh provision for the law of mental capacity in certain situations. What is unfortunately not made express in that legislation is the extent to which this fresh provision affects the test for capacity to make a will when that question is being judged retrospectively (typically, though not necessarily, post mortem). ... The general rule of precedent, as applied in the High Court, is that that court is not strictly bound by decisions of co-ordinate jurisdiction, but will follow them as a matter of comity unless convinced they are wrong ... As it happens, I think the decision in Walker v Badmin [2014] EWHC 71 (Ch)Not on Bailii! [that the test in Banks v Goodfellow not only had survived the enactment of the 2005 Act, but that it, rather than anything in the Act, was still the sole test of capacity for judging will-making capacity in retrospect] is right, and for the reasons given by the deputy judge. ... Whilst it is a complication to have two tests for mental capacity in making wills, one prospective and the other retrospective, it is a complication created by the decision of Parliament to legislate as it has, a decision that the courts must respect."

John Blavo v Law Society (2017) EWHC 561 (Ch)

Statutory demands set aside

"In November 2015 the Law Society served a statutory demand on Mr Blavo claiming that he owed it £151,816.27. In February 2016 the Law Society served a second statutory demand on Mr Blavo claiming that he owed it a further £643,489.20. On 14 December 2015 Mr Blavo applied to set aside the first statutory demand. On 11 March 2016 Mr Blavo applied to set aside the second statutory demand. ... It is the costs of the intervention, from 15 October 2015 to 20 January 2016, into the company and Mr Blavo's practice which are the underlying subject matter of the statutory demands. ... It follows from all I have said that I have concluded that the statutory demands in this case should be set aside because the debts in question are not for liquidated sums."

McCann v State Hospitals Board for Scotland (2017) UKSC 31

Scottish smoking ban

"This is a challenge by application for judicial review to the legality of the comprehensive ban on smoking at the State Hospital at Carstairs which the State Hospitals Board for Scotland adopted by a decision taken at a meeting on 25 August 2011 and implemented on 5 December 2011. The appellant, Mr McCann, does not challenge the ban on smoking indoors. His challenge relates only to the ban on smoking in the grounds of the State Hospital and on home visits, which, by creating a comprehensive ban, prevents detained patients from smoking anywhere. ... Mr McCann raises three principal issues in his challenge. First, he argues that the impugned decision is invalid at common law on the ground of ultra vires because, when so deciding, it did not adhere to the principles laid down in section 1 of the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 (which I set out in para 22 below) or comply with the requirements of subordinate legislation made under the 2003 Act. Secondly, he submits that the impugned decision was unlawful because it unjustifiably interfered with his private life and thereby infringed his right to respect for his private life under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Thirdly, founding on article 14 of ECHR in combination with article 8, he argues that the Board, by implementing the comprehensive smoking ban, has treated him in a discriminatory manner which cannot be objectively justified when compared with (i) people detained in prison, (ii) patients in other hospitals (whether detained or not) or (iii) members of the public who remain at liberty. ... [T]he prohibition on having tobacco products and the related powers to search and confiscate are in my view illegal and fall to be annulled. ... [B]ut for the illegality under our domestic law of the prohibition of possession of tobacco products, the searches and the confiscation of tobacco products which are part of the impugned decision, I would have held that the decision was not contrary to Mr McCann’s article 8 right to respect for his private life. ... The article 14 challenge ... fails."

NHS Trust v Y (2018) UKSC 46

Court order not always necessary for withdrawal of CANH

"The question that arises in this appeal is whether a court order must always be obtained before clinically assisted nutrition and hydration, which is keeping alive a person with a prolonged disorder of consciousness, can be withdrawn, or whether, in some circumstances, this can occur without court involvement. ... In conclusion, having looked at the issue in its wider context as well as from a narrower legal perspective, I do not consider that it has been established that the common law or the ECHR, in combination or separately, give rise to the mandatory requirement, for which the Official Solicitor contends, to involve the court to decide upon the best interests of every patient with a prolonged disorder of consciousness before CANH can be withdrawn. If the provisions of the MCA 2005 are followed and the relevant guidance observed, and if there is agreement upon what is in the best interests of the patient, the patient may be treated in accordance with that agreement without application to the court. I would therefore dismiss the appeal. In so doing, however, I would emphasise that, although application to court is not necessary in every case, there will undoubtedly be cases in which an application will be required (or desirable) because of the particular circumstances that appertain, and there should be no reticence about involving the court in such cases."

Oldham MBC v Makin (2017) EWHC 2543 (Ch)

Disposal of Ian Brady's body

"This claim concerns the question of whether certain orders should be made in respect of the disposal of the body of Ian Stewart-Brady, formerly Ian Brady, one of the infamous Moors murderers."

Parsonage v Parsonage (2019) EWHC 2362 (Ch)

Validity of will

" The validity of the 2011 Will is challenged by D1 on the grounds that BP lacked capacity (1) to know and understand the nature and effect of the 2011 Will, (2) to know and understand the size of her estate, and/or (3) to know and appreciate the claims to which she ought to give effect. The underlying factual basis of the challenge is the severity or extent of BP's dementia and the circumstances in which the 2011 Will was prepared and executed."

R (Jalloh) v SSHD (2020) UKSC 4

DOL and common law

"The right to physical liberty was highly prized and protected by the common law long before the United Kingdom became party to the European Convention on Human Rights. A person who was unlawfully imprisoned could, and can, secure his release through the writ of habeas corpus. He could, and can, also secure damages for the tort of false imprisonment. This case is about the meaning of imprisonment at common law and whether it should, or should not, now be aligned with the concept of deprivation of liberty in article 5 of the ECHR."

R (Western Health and Social Care Trust) v Secretary of State for Health (2018) NIQB 67

"The impugned determination is that of the [Secretary of State for Health of England and Wales] to the effect that a lady whom I shall describe as CM (aged 32 years) is 'ordinarily resident' in Northern Ireland and has been thus since 2009, with the result that the care management and funding responsibilities for her have fallen on the Trust, rather than [the London Borough of Enfield], since that date. In very brief compass, lying at the heart of this challenge is a funding dispute between the Trust and Enfield."

Richards v Worcestershire County Council (2016) EWHC 1954 (Ch)

After-care

"The present proceedings were issued on 6 March 2015. They seek to recover sums totalling £644,645.87, which, it is said, were spent by Mr Richards' deputy on his behalf on providing him with care. The claim is based on section 117 of the 1983 Act. It is Mr Richards' case that section 117 applied when he was released from hospital in 2004 and that, accordingly, the defendants had a duty to provide him with after-care services. He contends that that duty extended to the provision of the various services which have thus far been paid for privately. ... There are essentially two issues to consider: (i) Is it in principle possible for Mr Richards to bring a restitutionary claim? (ii) If so, can the present claim be pursued otherwise than by way of judicial review?"

RR v SSWP (2019) UKSC 52

ECHR and subordinate legislation

(1) There is nothing unconstitutional about a public authority, court or tribunal disapplying a provision of subordinate legislation which would otherwise result in their acting incompatibly with a Convention right, where this is necessary in order to comply with the Human Rights Act 1998. (2) On the facts of this case, the public authority should disobey Regulation B13 of the Housing Benefit Regulations 2006 and retrospectively apply the Supreme Court's decision in R (Carmichael) v SSWP [2016] UKSC 58B that the "bedroom tax" was an unjustified discrimination on the ground of disability where there was a transparent medical need for an additional bedroom.

SSJ v MM (2018) UKSC 60

The patient had capacity to and was prepared to consent to a conditional discharge requiring that he live at a particular place, which he would not be free to leave, and from which he would not be allowed out without an escort. (1) The Supreme Court decided 4-1 that the MHA 1983 does not permit either the First-tier Tribunal or the Secretary of State to impose conditions amounting to detention or a deprivation of liberty upon a conditionally discharged restricted patient. (2) The dissenting decision was that the tribunal has the power to impose such conditions so long as the loss of liberty is not greater than that already authorised by the hospital and restriction orders, and that this power does not depend on the consent of the (capacitous) patient.

Todd v Parsons (2019) EWHC 3366 (Ch)

Testamentary capacity

"The claim was opposed by the third defendant, challenging that will on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, want of knowledge and approval and undue influence. ... The traditional test for capacity is that laid down in Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549 ... In James v James [2018] WTLR 1313, I held that the traditional test still applied, and had not been replaced by that contained in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Neither party argued before me that the test should now be that contained in the 2005 Act, although the third defendant reserved the right to argue otherwise on appeal. ... In my judgment the 2008 will is valid."

Welsh Ministers v PJ (2018) UKSC 66

(1) There is no power to impose conditions in a CTO which have the effect of depriving a patient of his liberty. (2) The patient's situation may be relevant to the tribunal's discharge criteria, and the tribunal may explain the true legal effect of a CTO (for the RC to act on that information), but if a patient is being unlawfully detained then the remedy is either habeas corpus or judicial review.

Whittaker v Hancock & Ors (2018) EWHC 3478 (Ch)

LPA attorney as substituted personal representative

"The claimant has brought a claim under section 50 of the Administration of Justice Act 1985 to be appointed as substitute personal representative of the estate of John Parker in place of the second defendant, her mother, and for a caveat entered by the third defendant on 20 July 2016 to be removed. ... The third defendant is the deceased's daughter and opposes the claim. ... In a statement accompanying the Will, signed by the deceased and witnessed by a legal secretary the deceased explains that he has made no provision for the third defendant ... On 20 July 2016 the third defendant caused a caveat to be entered. She subsequently entered an appearance to the claimant's warning asserting that the 2003 Will may be invalid due to the deceased lacking testamentary capacity, being subject to undue influence and want of knowledge and approval. ... Mr Devereux-Cooke submits that I should make an order appointing the claimant as substitute personal representative for the second defendant. The claimant is the attorney for the second defendant, the LPA having been registered on 16 January 2014. The second defendant cannot consent to the claim as she lacks capacity. The first defendant does not oppose the claim. ... It is a general LPA in respect of property and financial affairs that is in wide terms enabling the claimant, as attorney, to make decisions about the second defendant's property and financial affairs. There are no conditions or restrictions specified in the instrument. ... It is also relevant that the second defendant is the sole beneficiary under the 2003 will. She is in a different position to a case where there are a number of beneficiaries. ... I accept Mr Devereux-Cooke's analysis that the claimant has standing to bring this claim under section 50. If I am wrong in my analysis I consider that the position could be remedied by adding the second defendant as a claimant and appointing the current claimant as her litigation friend. I also accept Mr Devereux-Cooke's analysis of rules 31 and 35 of the Non-Contentious Probate Rules 1987 and would have been prepared to treat the claim as including this as an alternative legal route, had it been necessary. ... I consider that in order for the deceased's estate to be administered it is necessary to substitute the claimant as personal representative in place of the second defendant."

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