Case and summary Date added Categories
A patient from Scotland travelled to England and was detained at a Priory hospital, and for a few months the Highland Health Board paid the £540-per-day fee. When the Health Board decided to stop paying, the Priory unsuccessfully argued that the that the Health Board was contractually obliged to meet the continuing cost of the patient's care. 2019‑02‑21 15:02:19 , , Miscellaneous

The High Court gave judgment for the Lord Chancellor against John Blavo in the sum of £22,136,001.71 following the allegation that Blavo & Co made dishonest claims for payment on the legal aid fund for thousands of cases where it was not entitled to any fee. 2019‑01‑01 17:19:29 , , , Miscellaneous,

The Law Society successfully appealed against a decision to set aside two statutory demands (of £151,816.27 and £643,489.20) which had been served on John Blavo in relation to costs incurred in respect of the intervention into his practice. 2019‑01‑01 17:01:07 , , , , Miscellaneous,

— "The Claimant, Dr. Caroline Ardron, is a very experienced consultant psychiatrist employed by the Defendant [Trust]. The Trust considers it appropriate for Dr. Ardron to face disciplinary proceedings for alleged gross misconduct relating to her work at HMP Lewes in late 2015 and early 2016. At that time, Dr. Ardron was the responsible clinician of a young prisoner known as JO, who committed suicide by hanging himself on 12 February 2016. The proposed disciplinary proceedings relate, almost exclusively, to Dr. Ardron's care of JO including her record-keeping in that respect. Dr. Ardron does not suggest that disciplinary proceedings are inappropriate as a matter of principle, or that there is no case of misconduct that could be brought against her. However, she contends that there is no basis for a charge of gross misconduct; a charge which, if established, could potentially lead to the termination of her contract and serious ramifications for her including her prospects of obtaining subsequent employment. On 18 June 2018, an interlocutory injunction was granted by Mr. Pushpinder Saini QC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, which restrained the Trust from proceeding until further order with a disciplinary hearing into gross misconduct. The question for resolution now is whether that injunction should be made permanent. That issue depends upon whether Dr. Ardron can prove that the Trust will breach her contract of employment by holding the proposed disciplinary hearing on a charge of gross misconduct. The Trust's intention to proceed to such a hearing was communicated in its letter to Dr. Ardron dated 20 March 2018, and the issue is therefore whether the Trust should be prevented from operating on the basis of that letter. The resolution of that issue depends principally upon the question of whether the facts found in an investigation into Dr. Ardron's conduct could, taken at their highest, amount to gross misconduct." 2018‑11‑23 14:02:05 , , Miscellaneous, ,

(1) The care home provider charged with failing between 1/4/15 and 1/12/15 to comply with the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014 by failing to provide care and treatment in a safe way for service users (reg 12) and failing to put in place, and operate effectively, systems and processes to protect service users from abuse, including sexual abuse (reg 13). The provider had known since 2004 that its resident XX posed risk a of causing sexual abuse. Following an allegation of anal rape of a woman in 2008 his care plan stated that he "identifies with both male and female around his sexual orientation" and that he "needs to be supported at all times and not to be left alone unsupervised when around other service users and when in the community". XX admitted to having sex with two other residents, neither of whom had capacity to consent: a female resident AA in April 2015 and a male resident YY on 1/11/18. The provider had not followed the care plan and the district judge concluded that "[t]he incident with YY could not have happened had there been an extra member of staff on duty to watch XX and where he went." It was found guilty of both charges and was fined £300,000. (2) The judgement states that the CQC's inspection of the care home and seizure of documents took place on 27/7/17: this is the same day as a critical article in the Times (Andrew Norfolk, 'CQC covered up suspected rape in care home' (Times, 27/7/17)). Information about the chronology can be found in the CQC's subsequent report (CQC, 'CQC publishes independent investigation into its regulation of 14 Colne Road' (press release, 13/6/18)). 2018‑11‑17 22:44:00 , , Miscellaneous,

— "This case arises out of the murder of Mary Griffiths by John McFarlane on 6 May 2009 in Bury St Edmunds, Suffolk. The Claimants are her three daughters, suing by their father and litigation friend. They seek damages from the Chief Constable of the Suffolk Police, the 'Suffolk Police', and North and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust, the 'NHS Trust', the first and second Defendants. ... The claim, put very shortly, is that the NHS Trust assessment under the Mental Health Act, MHA, was flawed in a number of respects, and that Mr McFarlane ought to have been admitted to hospital, voluntarily or compulsorily, on 3 May 2009, which would have prevented him being in a position to murder Ms Griffiths on 6 May. In any event, the NHS Trust should have warned her that Mr McFarlane was a danger to her, and they ought also to have communicated with the Suffolk Police. This would have affected the way in which they, in turn, addressed Ms Griffiths' concerns when she telephoned them on 5 May 2009. The Suffolk Police, in any event, ought to have graded Ms Griffiths' call as more serious than they did, and ought to have sent someone round that night. That person would have realised that the situation was more threatening than had the call-taker, and steps would have been taken to protect Ms Griffiths, who faced a real and immediate risk from Mr McFarlane, to remove her from danger, or to warn or detain Mr McFarlane." 2018‑10‑22 15:23:23 , , , Miscellaneous

— "This case arises out of the murder of Mary Griffiths by John McFarlane on 6 May 2009 in Bury St Edmunds, Suffolk. The Claimants are her three daughters, suing by their father and litigation friend. They seek damages from the Chief Constable of the Suffolk Police, the 'Suffolk Police', and North and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust, the 'NHS Trust', the first and second Defendants. ... The claim, put very shortly, is that the NHS Trust assessment under the Mental Health Act, MHA, was flawed in a number of respects, and that Mr McFarlane ought to have been admitted to hospital, voluntarily or compulsorily, on 3 May 2009, which would have prevented him being in a position to murder Ms Griffiths on 6 May. In any event, the NHS Trust should have warned her that Mr McFarlane was a danger to her, and they ought also to have communicated with the Suffolk Police. This would have affected the way in which they, in turn, addressed Ms Griffiths' concerns when she telephoned them on 5 May 2009. The Suffolk Police, in any event, ought to have graded Ms Griffiths' call as more serious than they did, and ought to have sent someone round that night. That person would have realised that the situation was more threatening than had the call-taker, and steps would have been taken to protect Ms Griffiths, who faced a real and immediate risk from Mr McFarlane, to remove her from danger, or to warn or detain Mr McFarlane." 2018‑10‑22 15:23:23 , , , Miscellaneous

— "This case arises out of the murder of Mary Griffiths by John McFarlane on 6 May 2009 in Bury St Edmunds, Suffolk. The Claimants are her three daughters, suing by their father and litigation friend. They seek damages from the Chief Constable of the Suffolk Police, the 'Suffolk Police', and North and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust, the 'NHS Trust', the first and second Defendants. ... The claim, put very shortly, is that the NHS Trust assessment under the Mental Health Act, MHA, was flawed in a number of respects, and that Mr McFarlane ought to have been admitted to hospital, voluntarily or compulsorily, on 3 May 2009, which would have prevented him being in a position to murder Ms Griffiths on 6 May. In any event, the NHS Trust should have warned her that Mr McFarlane was a danger to her, and they ought also to have communicated with the Suffolk Police. This would have affected the way in which they, in turn, addressed Ms Griffiths' concerns when she telephoned them on 5 May 2009. The Suffolk Police, in any event, ought to have graded Ms Griffiths' call as more serious than they did, and ought to have sent someone round that night. That person would have realised that the situation was more threatening than had the call-taker, and steps would have been taken to protect Ms Griffiths, who faced a real and immediate risk from Mr McFarlane, to remove her from danger, or to warn or detain Mr McFarlane." 2018‑10‑22 15:23:23 , , , Miscellaneous

— "On 24 July 2018, Mr Fitzgerald issued an application in the Family Division of the High Court of Justice, under number FD13P90056, seeking an order that, as President of the Family Division, I 'withdraw from public record Judgement EWCOP16 [2018] on the grounds that: (1) It is not given in any recognised court or jurisdiction; (2) It misrepresents the evidence presented in Application; (3) It displays transparent bias and injudicious prejudice.' ... Mr Fitzgerald's latest application is totally without merit. It is a time-wasting abuse of the process, which I accordingly strike out. If Mr Fitzgerald continues to display such forensic incontinence, he may find himself again subject to an extended civil restraint order." 2018‑07‑29 19:19:05 , Miscellaneous, ,

— "The claim arises out of the death of the Deceased who was found dead at her home on the morning of the 30th of January 2012. For present purposes it is accepted that the Deceased took her own life. There are two pleaded causes of action: common law negligence and alleged breaches of convention rights under the Human Rights Act 1998. The Recorder, as I am, was concerned only with the negligence claim and then only with the issue as to the existence of a duty of care owed to the Deceased. Issues as to breach of any such duty or issues as to causation were not before the Recorder. The pleaded particulars of negligence amount to allegations that the defendant, either by his officers, employees or agents, failed expeditiously and/or adequately to deal with, and/or respond to, the information conveyed to them concerning the Deceased in a 999 call made by the Deceased's mother." 2018‑07‑19 16:01:43 , Miscellaneous, ,

— "In November 2015 the Law Society served a statutory demand on Mr Blavo claiming that he owed it £151,816.27. In February 2016 the Law Society served a second statutory demand on Mr Blavo claiming that he owed it a further £643,489.20. On 14 December 2015 Mr Blavo applied to set aside the first statutory demand. On 11 March 2016 Mr Blavo applied to set aside the second statutory demand. ... It is the costs of the intervention, from 15 October 2015 to 20 January 2016, into the company and Mr Blavo's practice which are the underlying subject matter of the statutory demands. ... It follows from all I have said that I have concluded that the statutory demands in this case should be set aside because the debts in question are not for liquidated sums." 2018‑07‑11 12:23:54 , , , Miscellaneous, , ,

— "In November 2015 the Law Society served a statutory demand on Mr Blavo claiming that he owed it £151,816.27. In February 2016 the Law Society served a second statutory demand on Mr Blavo claiming that he owed it a further £643,489.20. On 14 December 2015 Mr Blavo applied to set aside the first statutory demand. On 11 March 2016 Mr Blavo applied to set aside the second statutory demand. ... It is the costs of the intervention, from 15 October 2015 to 20 January 2016, into the company and Mr Blavo's practice which are the underlying subject matter of the statutory demands. ... It follows from all I have said that I have concluded that the statutory demands in this case should be set aside because the debts in question are not for liquidated sums." 2018‑07‑11 12:23:54 , , , Miscellaneous, , ,

— "This is an appeal from the order dated 5 October 2017 of the Divisional Court (Sales LJ, Whipple and Garnham JJ) dismissing the claim of the appellant, Mr Noel Conway, for a declaration under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 in respect of section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961, which imposes a blanket ban on assisted suicide. Mr Conway contends that section 2(1) constitutes a disproportionate interference with his right to respect for his private life under Article 8(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms." 2018‑07‑02 21:28:43 , , Miscellaneous,

— "This is a renewed application for leave to apply for judicial review in relation to an adjudication of the Press Complaints Commission. ... The application arises out of a publication in The Sun newspaper on 26 July 1995. The publication contained an article relating to the applicant, Ian Brady, who was convicted of murder and is now a patient at the Ashworth Hospital. The effect of the article was that he was being treated in a way which was wholly inappropriate having regard to the very serious crimes which he had committed. No complaint, however, is made about the article. Although Mr Beloff certainly does not approve of its contents, he accepts that he cannot say that there was any justification for complaining about the article. His complaint is that the article has alongside it a substantial photograph of the applicant, albeit a photograph which is indistinct and does not show Mr Brady clearly. ... Looking at the matter as a whole, I do not think there is any prospect of this application succeeding and therefore I would dismiss it." 2018‑04‑27 20:00:41 , Miscellaneous, ,

Summary from judgment: "While there is no express power provided by the ETA 1996 or the 2013 Rules made under it, the appointment of a litigation friend is within the power to make a case management order in the 2013 Rules as a procedural matter in a case where otherwise a litigant who lacks capacity to conduct litigation would have no means of accessing justice or achieving a remedy for a legal wrong." 2018‑03‑28 22:58:54 , , , Miscellaneous,

Two hospital order patients contended that if for any reason they were not in receipt of benefits then the trust should provide regular payments to ensure their dignity was maintained whilst in care. (1) The trust did have a power, arising from s43 NHS Act 2006 (which identified the functions of foundation trusts), and either s46 or s47 (which provided sufficiently general powers), to make payments to patients. Any contract with NHS England purporting to restrict the statutory power would be ultra vires. Similarly, any payment outside the s43 purposes (namely, the provision of services to individuals for or in connection with the prevention, diagnosis or treatment of illness and the promotion and protection of public health) would be ultra vires. (2) The amount, timing and frequency of payments was a matter for the discretion of the Defendant, taking into account all relevant factors, including the specific therapeutic requirements of the patient. (3) A standardised approach of making regular payments irrespective of and unrelated to the therapeutic needs of the patient, as sought by the Claimants, would be outside the powers granted to a foundation trust. (4) On the facts, the Defendant had lawfully exercised its power: the financial circumstances of the patients were regularly considered and addressed appropriately (e.g. paying for a winter coat and travel costs). (5) The absence of a policy did not mean that the Defendant had acted unlawfully. 2018‑02‑02 00:33:06 , , , Miscellaneous,

— "This claim concerns the question of whether certain orders should be made in respect of the disposal of the body of Ian Stewart-Brady, formerly Ian Brady, one of the infamous Moors murderers." 2017‑11‑05 23:42:48 , Miscellaneous, ,

— "The Claimant alleges that the particular circumstances of her case mean that the Defendants owed her a duty of care. She says it was critical that she should be informed of her father's diagnosis, firstly presumed and subsequently confirmed, in the light of her pregnancy. This was her first and only child. It was all along known that she would be a single mother with sole responsibility for the upbringing of the child. If informed of her father's diagnosis she would have sought to be tested for Huntington's Disease. If her own diagnosis was confirmed, she would have terminated the pregnancy rather than run the risk that her child might in due course be dependent on a seriously ill single parent or become an orphan, and the risk that in due course her child might inherit the disease. Her diagnosis would have precluded any subsequent pregnancy. The claim therefore includes a 'wrongful birth' claim in respect of the child. The child has an accepted risk of 50 per cent of contracting the disease, but it is not yet possible to reach a diagnosis in her case, one way or another." 2017‑05‑18 23:11:50 , Miscellaneous, ,

— "This case involves a challenge by way of judicial review to the decision made by a psychiatrist at the Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust (Oxleas), the first respondent, which operates a Medium Secure Unit for psychiatric patients in Dartford, Kent, to seek to transfer the claimant to Broadmoor Hospital (operated by the second respondent to whom I shall refer to as Broadmoor) and the decision of Broadmoor to accept him. ... He challenged the decision made to transfer him to Broadmoor on the basis that it was unlawful and in breach of his rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. He contended that he should have been transferred to a Medium Secure Unit. 2017‑04‑29 22:17:07 , , Miscellaneous,

— "On 25th August 2010 Ms Henderson ('the Claimant') stabbed her mother to death. She was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia at the time, and her condition had recently worsened. It is common ground between the parties that this tragic event would not have happened but for the Defendant's breaches of duty in failing to respond in an appropriate way to the Claimant's mental collapse. The Claimant has now brought proceedings in the tort of negligence claiming general damages under various heads, special damages and future losses, and liability has been admitted. The Defendant's position is that all of the claims should be defeated on illegality or public policy grounds, and that binding authority of the Court of Appeal and House of Lords compels that outcome. ... In my view, there are three main questions for me to consider within the agenda circumscribed by the preliminary issue: (1) the correct interpretation of the sentencing remarks of Foskett J [in the Claimant's case], and the extent to which it is permissible, if at all, to go behind them; (2) whether there is binding authority of the Court of Appeal and House of Lords precluding some or all of these claims; and (3) if not, whether the law as accurately enunciated (there remains a dispute between the parties as to what it is) permits, or obviates, the maintenance of some or all of these claims. I frame the questions in this manner because it is the Defendant's submission that I am bound by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Clunis v Camden and Islington HA">[1998] QB 978 and that of the House of Lords in Gray v Thames Trains Ltd">[2009] 1 AC 1339. If I were to uphold the Defendant's submission on stare decisis, the parties are agreed that I need not express a view on question (3) above on the hypothetical basis that I might be overruled. If, on the other hand, question (3) does properly arise for decision, the parties are agreed that the case should be listed for further argument on this point. ...I ... refuse to issue a certificate under section 12 of the . I also refuse permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal for the reason indicated under paragraphs 99 and 104 above." 2016‑12‑27 21:07:36 , , Miscellaneous,

— "On 25 August 2010 the claimant killed her mother. ... She pleaded not guilty of murder, but guilty of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility. Those pleas were accepted. ... The claimant remains in detention pursuant to the Mental Health Act. Long before the manslaughter, the claimant had been diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. At the time, she was under the care of the Southbourne Community Mental Health Team, within the defendant NHS Trust. An inquiry later made findings critical of the defendant's conduct. The core criticism was of a failure to act in a timely manner when alerted by a health worker, Ms Loyne, to a significant deterioration in the claimant's condition. In this unusual personal injury claim the claimant seeks damages against the defendant for personal injury in the form of psychiatric harm, and for the consequences of killing her mother. Proceedings were issued on 22 August 2013. The defendant admitted liability for negligence. Judgment on liability in negligence, with damages to be assessed, was entered by consent as long ago as 12 May 2014. By an order of 17 February 2016 Master Cook directed the trial of preliminary issues which had been proposed by the defendant. That trial is listed to take place over 3 days in the week commencing 5 December 2016. The preliminary issues concern the extent to which the claimant's claims for damages are barred by the rule of law which prohibits a person from recovering damages for the consequences of their own illegality. ... It was on Monday 14 November 2016, seven working days before the start of the preliminary issue trial window, that the claimant's solicitors filed her application. It seeks permission to amend by adding (1) claims under the Human Rights Act 1998, alleging infringement of the claimant's rights under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, and (2) a claim for an extension of time for bringing those claims, pursuant to s 7(5)(b) of the HRA." 2016‑11‑27 00:24:59 , Miscellaneous, ,

— "This appeal raises three questions. The first is whether a court, when entertaining a claim for possession by a private sector owner against a residential occupier, should be required to consider the proportionality of evicting the occupier, in the light of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The second question is whether, if the answer to the first question is yes, the relevant legislation, in particular section 21(4) of the , can be read so as to comply with that conclusion. The third question is whether, if the answer to the first and second questions is yes, the trial judge would have been entitled to dismiss the claim for possession in this case, as he said he would have done. ... The appellant, Fiona McDonald, is aged 45 and, sadly, she has had psychiatric and behavioural problems since she was five. ... In those circumstances, her parents, who are technically the respondents to this appeal, decided to buy a property for her to occupy. ... However, owing to financial difficulties which they unfortunately encountered in their business, they failed to meet all the [loan] interest as it fell due. ... the Receivers served a notice ... indicating that they would be seeking possession of the property." 2016‑06‑20 21:53:27 , Miscellaneous, ,

— "The complainant has requested information about police powers under Section 136 of the Mental Health Act to detain mentally disordered persons found in public places. By the date of this notice the Home Office had not responded to the request. The Commissioner’s decision is that by failing to respond to the request, the Home Office breached sections 1(1) and 10(1) of the FOIA. The Commissioner requires the Home Office to take the following steps. to ensure compliance with the legislation: Issue a response to the request under the FOIA by either complying with section 1(1) or issuing a valid refusal notice. The Home Office must take these steps within 35 calendar days of the date of this decision notice. Failure to comply may result in the Commissioner making written certification of this fact to the High Court pursuant to section 54 of the Act and may be dealt with as a contempt of court." The request was: "What qualifies a constable to take decisions regarding the mental health of a member of the public, and how is this not a breach of human rights. This is a particularly important request in the context that police forces are unlawfully detaining innocent members of the public by use of this Act." 2016‑05‑26 13:02:00 , Miscellaneous, ,

— "The Appellant appeals against a decision dated 29 July 2011 issued by the Commissioners of Revenue and Customs that the construction services and materials received by the Appellant in the course of the construction of a mental health residential unit are not subject to zero rating for the purposes of VAT. Both parties agreed that the issue in this appeal is whether Prospect Place Low Secure Mental Health Unit was intended for use as a hospital or similar institution. HMRC contend that it was and therefore the supplies were standard rated. The Appellant contends that the use of the Unit satisfies paragraphs (b) and/or (g) of Note (4) and the exception for use as a hospital or similar institution does not apply; accordingly the supplies were eligible for zero rating." 2016‑05‑04 22:49:59 , Miscellaneous, ,

The proposed Legal Aid residence test was lawful (the High Court had been wrong to decide it to be ultra vires and unjustifiably discriminatory). The proposed test is described as follows in the judgment: "To satisfy the residence test, an individual would have to be lawfully resident in the UK, the Channel Islands, Isle of Man or a British Overseas Territory on the day the application for civil legal services was made, and (unless they were under 12 months old or a particular kind of asylum claimant or involved with the UK Armed Forces) have been so lawfully resident for a 12 month period at some time in the past (excluding absences of up to 30 days). There were proposed exceptions to the test. Claimants pursuing certain types of proceedings were not required to satisfy the test (for example, domestic violence cases, and challenges to the lawfulness of detention). In any event, regardless of residence, a claimant who failed the residence test would have been entitled to apply for legal aid under the Exceptional Case Funding regime in s.10 of whose purpose is to ensure that all those who have a right to legal aid under the ECHR or EU law are able to obtain it." 2016‑02‑21 22:49:03 , , Miscellaneous,

There was a strongly arguable case that John Blavo was party to an arrangement whereby false claims were submitted to the LAA in many thousands of cases, there was evidence of a less than scrupulous approach to his duty of disclosure to the Court, and evidence of a recent attempt improperly to put property beyond the reach of the Lord Chancellor. Taking these matters together there was a real risk that any judgment would go unsatisfied because of disposal of assets. Given the sums of money involved and the admitted financial difficulties it was just and convenient in all the circumstances to continue the freezing order. (The precursor to the official investigation was an audit during which 49 files were passed to the LAA's counter-fraud team, whose conclusions included: "In respect of 42 of these 49 files HMCTS have confirmed that they have no record of there having been tribunal proceedings either in respect of the individual client or on the date when the file indicates...Following this, the LAA made inquiries of the NHS on a selection of files among the 42 that had no tribunal hearing and the NHS confirmed that they have no records relating to 16 of the clients... After completing this analysis the Applicant undertook a further comparison of all mental health tribunal claims against the HMCTS system. As a result of this analysis, it was found that the Company had submitted a total of 24,658 claims for attendance at tribunals of which 1485 (6%) tribunals were recorded by HMCTS as having taken place... After visiting the Company's Head Office and requesting documentation from the Company and the Respondent, the LAA team used an electronic sampling tool to randomly select 144 cases for further investigation, across the last three complete financial years. Only 3% could be evidenced from HMCTS records...") 2016‑02‑02 15:46:47 , , Miscellaneous

This was a claim for false imprisonment and assault arising out of arrest and detention by the police. Paragraph 21 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the relates to Legal Aid for civil legal services under the heading "Abuse of position or powers by public authority". Following an initial refusal of Legal Aid, this case concerned the interpretation of sub-paragraph (4): "For the purposes of this paragraph, an act or omission by a public authority does not constitute an abuse of its position or powers unless the act or omission (a) is deliberate or dishonest, and (b) results in harm to a person or property that was reasonably foreseeable." The High Court had held that (a) paragraph 21(4) was a comprehensive definition of what was entailed in a claim for abuse of position or power (rather than a statement of the minimum criteria for such a claim), and (b) for the purposes of the definition in this case it was only the arrest itself that had to be deliberate (it was not necessary to allege that the arresting officers knew that they had no power of arrest). The Court of Appeal, allowing the appeal, held that: (a) the judge, in interpreting the words so that that any deliberate act by a public authority that causes reasonably foreseeable harm to another would count as an abuse of power, had ignored what it was that was being defined ("abuse of position or power") and gave no weight at all to the meaning of that phrase: abuse of position or power is a recognised juridical concept which, like many other public law concepts, is both flexible and context-specific and should, therefore, be given meaning in paragraph 21(4); (b) something more than an intentional tort (requiring only a deliberate act, such as, here, false imprisonment) is necessary before the impugned act becomes an "abuse of power": in this case it was not merely the fact of arrest, but the arrest without lawful justification, which had to be deliberate or dishonest. The Court of Appeal noted that a general policy not to fund purely money claims is what explains the anomaly that a claimant able to bring judicial review proceedings under paragraph 19 may add a claim for damages without having to satisfy any equivalent of paragraph 21(4). (There is also no equivalent in paragraph 20, for habeas corpus, or in paragraph 22, for significant breach of Convention rights.) 2016‑01‑28 16:34:26 , , Miscellaneous,

— "In this claim, the Claimant challenges an alleged failure by the public authorities responsible for the National Health Service in Wales to discharge the duty imposed upon them by section 3(1) of the to provide hospital accommodation 'throughout Wales, to such extent as they consider necessary to meet all reasonable requirements'. In particular, she contends that the duty has been breached because no decision has been taken by any authority as to either (i) the 'reasonable requirements' of women in Wales with ASD and LD for secure in-patient assessment and treatment; or (ii) the level of provision necessary to meet the reasonable requirements found to exist. Indeed, the relevant authorities have not only failed to make those decisions, it is said that they have failed to collate the information required to make them; and so they are not even in a position to make properly informed (and, therefore, lawful) decisions. That is the legal basis of the claim. However, the concern of the Claimant and her family underlying the claim is more personal and practical in nature. The last time the Claimant required compulsory detention on account of her mental condition was in August 2014 when, because there was no appropriate and available facility in Wales, she was sent to a hospital in Brighton where she was detained for some weeks. ... However, this court can intervene only if a decision-making authority has acted unlawfully. For the reasons I have given, none of the Defendants has done so in this case." 2015‑12‑21 22:52:10 , , Miscellaneous, ,

— "The claimant in this case is Ian Henderson. Ian's mother, Mrs Lillian Henderson, died on 2 April 2013 as a result of injuries sustained in a severe assault on her by Ian on the night of 13 March 2013. Ian was convicted of manslaughter at a trial on 15 September 2014, his plea of guilty to that charge and not guilty to murder having been accepted on the basis that he had not intended to kill his mother or cause her really serious injury. He was sentenced (with the agreement of the prosecution) to be detained in hospital under section 37 Mental Health Act 1983, the judge being satisfied that he suffered from a mental disorder such as to make his detention and treatment in hospital appropriate (section 37 (2)), coupled with a restriction order made under section 47 of that Act in order to prevent the public from serious harm if he should be at large. ... Mrs Henderson's will made in 2006 left her entire estate to Ian if he survived her, but it is accepted that by virtue of his having caused her death by his own criminal act prima facie Ian is excluded from benefitting under the will under the common law rule known as the 'forfeiture rule'. The court however has power to modify the application of that rule in certain circumstances pursuant to the Forfeiture Act 1982, and Ian brings this claim seeking, principally, an order under that Act that permits him to inherit his mother's estate." 2015‑12‑20 22:30:47 , Miscellaneous, ,

This was an appeal against the refusal of permission to apply for judicial review of changes introduced to criminal legal aid for prison law by the . (1) The 'lack of consultation' challenge was unarguable. (2) The appellants also challenged the removal of criminal legal aid funding in seven principal areas of prison law (including pre-tariff reviews and return to open condition cases before the Parole Board) on the basis that they either impact upon the liberty of the prisoner or they engage his or her Article 8 Convention rights in a way that is systemically unfair. The Court of Appeal accepted that it was arguable that, without appropriate assistance, the system could carry an unacceptable risk of unlawful decision making in relation to those with mental health, learning or other difficulties which effectively deprive them of the ability effectively to participate in the relevant decisions. 2015‑11‑14 22:04:40 , , Miscellaneous,

— "In this judgment, within ongoing care proceedings, I have determined the applications by T and Mother under the Human Rights Act for declarations and damages. I have set out below the alarming history of the unlawful accommodation of T by Medway Council for over 2 years, and my reasons for declarations to that effect and for the award of damages of £20,000 each to T and her Mother for breaches of their rights to respect for their family life under Article 8 and to fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. [The following are two paragraphs of the judgment which set out just part of the history.] [24] Instead, again, the Social Worker AT, accompanied by Mother's mental health Social Worker, visited Mother on 3.10.13 and purported to obtain a fresh s20 agreement which they were satisfied she understood and had capacity to make as Mother was able to repeat back to them that it was her consent to Medway Council, that it was voluntary and she accepted she could not care for T then. Medway Council has not been able to provide this document. To its credit, Medway Council does not now attempt to suggest that they obtained a valid s20 agreement from Mother. It is conceded that the August and October 'consents' should not have been relied upon. Clearly Mother should have been properly assessed for her decision-specific capacity, and been fully informed and supported. It is highly unlikely that she would have been assessed as having capacity given her low functioning in combination with her mental illness. [25] In the meantime on 10.9.13, the social work records reveal a note entered by DH, presumably then managing this case as it is headed "Manager's Decisions: Supervision". She wrongly describes T as having been placed in foster care as an "abandoned child when Mother was detained under the MHA". T was not abandoned. Detention in hospital for treatment under the Mental Health Act does not constitute and should never be treated as an abandonment by a parent of their child. DH, however, correctly goes on to say the following: "Mother has signed the Section 20 but Social Worker was concerned whether she fully understood the meaning of this", and with a mixed stab at an accurate understanding of the position wrote: "T cannot remain under Section 20 indefinitely and clear decision making should be made…", continuing under the heading "Actions" she includes this: "Attend a legal gateway meeting to discuss actions regarding long term care plan for child (permanency). The local authority do not have PR and cannot make decisions regarding child under Section 20 without consent from M". These last comments are of course correct, but again such a meeting did not occur and still no steps were taken to address the situation." 2015‑10‑30 23:13:26 , Miscellaneous, ,

The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis applied for an order to impose notification requirements for a period of 15 years on Syed Talha Ahsan under the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. The notification order would require him for that period to attend police stations to provide, and update, information about his living arrangements and to provide details about his travel plans, for which permission can be refused; breach of the requirements is punishable with imprisonment of up to 5 years. (1) Ahsan had been convicted in the United States of providing material assistance for the Taliban, while they were harbouring Osama bin Laden, through his involvement in a US-hosted website, but he argued that this did not constitute an act which "would have constituted an offence… if it had been done in any part of the United Kingdom…" because it was in fact done within the United Kingdom. The judge decided that (a) Parliament must have intended that the notification requirements should apply to terrorist conduct committed here which results in a conviction in a foreign court, even if it could have been prosecuted here but was not; (b) by inadvertence Parliament had failed to give effect to that purpose; (c) taking a purposive approach, even assuming that all elements of Mr Ahsan's offending occurred here, the offences he was convicted of in the US were corresponding foreign offences. (2) Ashan argued that the Commissioner had failed to take into account relevant considerations and therefore the exercise of discretion to make the application was unlawful. The judge decided that: (a) since there is a discretion, its exercise should be open to public law challenge; (b) only in exceptional circumstances would this be successful, because of the strong legislative steer that, where there has been a corresponding foreign conviction and the requisite sentence has been imposed, an application should be made; (c) the public law challenge should, to avoid wasting time and money, be heard within the 2008 Act proceedings rather than by separate judicial review proceedings; (d) failure to consider the sentencing remarks, his mental health, and the fact that Ahsan had not been prosecuted here, did not render the decision unlawful. (3) The notification requirements did not meet the minimum level of severity required for a successful Article 3 claim. (4) The interference with Ahsan's private and family life was not necessary and proportionate under Article 8: (a) this was an exceptional case where there was no significant future risk; (b) the medical evidence was that that the notification requirements were likely to have a severe adverse impact on Ahsan's mental health, and despite this likelihood the requirements would continue for 15 years with no review mechanism. (5) The application was therefore dismissed. 2015‑08‑23 22:33:37 , , Miscellaneous,

(1) YZ ceased to comply with clozapine treatment, and was referred by a medium secure unit (MSU) to Broadmoor hospital. After Broadmoor's Admission Panel decided that while off clozapine the risks justified a setting, YZ became willing to restart clozapine but his new doctor at the MSU was unwilling to prescribe it. YZ appealed the Admission Panel decision and argued that new information meant the case should be reconsidered by the original panel, but Broadmoor decided there was no new information so the case was considered by the Admission Appeals Panel, which upheld the decision. (2) YZ's position was that he could restart clozapine in medium security, the relationship with staff at the MSU had broken down but he should be transferred to another MSU, and once treatment of his gender dysphoria commenced his mental state would probably improve. He argued that transfer to Broadmoor would breach the 's least restriction principle and violate and . He sought judicial review of: (a) the decision not to prescribe clozapine; (b) the decision to transfer him to Broadmoor; (c) Broadmoor's decision to accept him; (d) the decision not to refer the case back to the original admissions panel. (3) Taking the grounds in turn, the court held that: (a) There was no clinician willing to prescribe clozapine, and the court "cannot and should not seek to decide what medical treatment is appropriate in these circumstances and declare an informed and justified decision unlawful". (b) The decision to transfer to Broadmoor was taken carefully and through the correct procedures, and no medium secure unit was willing to take the patient. (c) The decision to accept was a rational decision open to the admissions panel on the material before it. (d) The appeals panel decision was not susceptible to judicial review, and the process was rational and had not been challenged at the time. Permission was therefore refused. 2015‑08‑01 21:09:36 , , Miscellaneous,

— "The Local Authority applies for a secure accommodation order in respect of her under s.25 of the Children Act 1989. The Local Authority's case is that A is a danger to herself and others, and that she is no longer containable in any form of ordinary residential unit. ... Put in lay language, the expert consensus of CAMHS is that A's problems, although recognised as being severe and extreme, are not of a mental health or psychiatric nature; but rather are of a behavioural nature. Therefore, admission to a Young Person's Psychiatric Unit for assessment and potential subsequent treatment is not currently 'on offer' as a way of dealing with A's problems. ... Conventionally, a specific placement is identified before a secure accommodation order is made. However, that is simply not possible here, and both the Local Authority and the Children's Guardian invite me to make the order in general terms, leaving it to the Local Authority, on consultation with the Children's Guardian, to place A at an appropriate unit as and when one is identified. ... A can be seen as falling between two stools. She is not amenable to a psychiatric disposal on the expert report available, but she is unable to be contained in ordinary residential homes. It is clearly unsatisfactory that no secure arrangements can readily be found for her, and that she remains currently at some measure of risk, howsoever hard the staff struggle to contain it, in the ordinary residential unit where she is placed. The Local Authority must, and will, therefore continue its efforts to find secure accommodation. They tell me that funding is not a problem in this case. The Local Authority will also be considering the possibility of obtaining an independent psychiatric report into her situation, which could then be shared with the local CAMHS team to see if it affected their current opinion." 2015‑06‑24 09:59:09 , Miscellaneous, ,

The claimant's father had killed his wife, was detained under s37/41, and refused to allow the Trust to inform his pregnant daughter of his Huntingdon's disease diagnosis. She claimed that the failure to inform her: (a) was negligent and breached Article 8; and (b) had caused psychiatric damage, and (if her daughter also has the disease) additional expense which she would have avoided by an abortion. Her claim was struck out. 2015‑05‑23 21:52:22 , , Miscellaneous,

The Claimant's partner committed suicide while being detained under Mental Health Act. The Claimant and the deceased were not married but had been cohabiting for a number of years. The deceased was also the Claimant's full time carer as a result of the spinal fusion surgery the Claimant had undergone some years previously. The deceased had a history of mental illness which was depressive in nature. At the time of his death his mental health had deteriorated significantly. While detained under the Mental Health Act, the deceased was initially assessed as not having capacity nor insight into his illness; he was also becoming aggressive and a risk to himself and others. However, an assessment by the duty doctor the following night did not indicate that the deceased was a self-harm risk, nor were there any known acts/plans since admission. Later that evening the deceased killed himself. The Trust carried out a Serious Untoward Incident investigation which highlighted a number of failings in the care of the deceased. The Defendant made some admissions of liability in its Letter of Response. However, the Defendant put the Claimant to proof as to the nature of his relationship with the deceased and the level of care he required. The Claimant made a claim for dependency as the deceased had been his full time carer. A claim was also made under the Human Rights Act 1998 for a breach of , the Right to Life. It was acknowledged by the Claimant that there would be no monetary award under this Act (only an acknowledgement of the breach) as compensation was sought under the . A Round Table Meeting was held in June 2014 and the Claimant accepted a settlement of £185,000. (Summary provided by claimant's solicitor.) 2015‑04‑13 14:21:41 , , Miscellaneous,

— "This action arises out of the tragic suicide of Philip Baker ... The claim is brought on behalf of his widow, Pauline Baker ... It is alleged that the treatment plan provided by Dr Kabacs on 29 September was inadequate and her decision on 26 October 2010 to discharge Mr Baker to the care of his general practitioner, caused him to take his own life." 2015‑03‑24 21:45:50 , Miscellaneous, ,

— "This is an appeal against an order ... which ... dismissed the claimant's claim for damages for clinical negligence. Permission to appeal was granted on a single ground, which relates to the issue of the claimant's consent to a particular medical procedure, namely the insertion of a cannula into her left arm for the purpose of intravenous access. ... A finding of absence of consent to the insertion of the cannula leads inexorably in this case to a finding of breach of duty in inserting it. The duty to obtain the patient's consent to treatment is a fundamental tenet of medical practice and is inherent in the case-law concerning the duty to take reasonable steps to warn a patient of the risks of treatment so that the patient can make an informed decision about whether to consent to it ... I would dispose of the appeal by (i) granting a declaration that Dr Prenter was in breach of his duty of care by inserting the cannula without the claimant's consent and (ii) remitting the matter to Judge Moloney to determine the outstanding issue of causation and, if liability is thereby established, to reach a final determination with regard to damages." 2015‑01‑31 20:14:53 , Miscellaneous, ,

— "Currently, the effects of the [Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measure] in general, whatever the particular effects of certain restrictions, and the effects of the three most contentious conditions apart from the tag, plainly do not cross that high threshold so as to breach of Article 3. I reach that conclusion recognising that the maintenance of the TPIM and those conditions is significantly worse for DD than for a person who is in normal mental health, and that particular care is required in judging whether a mentally ill and vulnerable person is being treated with proper respect for the fact that he is a human being. The tag as described by Professor Fahy and Dr Deeley is undoubtedly the most severe requirement in its impact on DD, because of his paranoid ideation. DD's delusions about the tag being an explosive device and a camera are very frightening and distressing. He wants to remove it, as voices tell him to, yet knows this would continue with the cycle of breaching the TPIM, facing prison, release, revival of the TPIM and breach. The doctors agree that the removal of the tag would not simply lead to paranoid delusions associated with it being transferred to another object, because of the particular nature of the tag. Its removal would reduce the number and intensity of the stressors he has to cope with, which could increase his ability to handle those which remain. That is a judgment I make, but it is consistent with the medical evidence; indeed it seems obvious. However, I am not persuaded that the effect of the tag, on top of the other TPIM effects, does breach Article 3 in these circumstances in view of the high threshold required to be crossed." 2014‑12‑31 20:49:25 , Miscellaneous, ,

In each of these three cases, which were heard together, the applicant failed to file a notice of appeal within the time prescribed by 52.4(2), which made it necessary for him to seek an extension of time. The mental health case involved a nearest relative who had been awarded costs after displacement proceedings and who (nearly six years out of time) wished to appeal against the sum ordered by the judge. The Court of Appeal, having held that the guidance in the Mitchell and Denton cases applied to applications for extensions of time for filing a notice of appeal, dealt with some questions of general importance (public law cases, shortage of funds, litigants in person, the merits). In the mental health case, the extension of time was refused. 2014‑12‑31 16:04:25 , , , Miscellaneous,

— "Mr Graves has permission to appeal on the question whether the provisions of ss.140A and 140B apply to the mortgage in this case and, if so, whether the relationship between himself and CHL was unfair because of (a) the inclusion of clause 9.1.6 of the mortgage; and/or because of (b) the way in which CHL exercised or enforced its rights under the agreement in the light of its knowledge of Mr Graves' mental disability." (Section 140A is entitled "Unfair relationships between creditors and debtors" and s140B "Powers of court in relation to unfair relationships".) 2014‑12‑30 15:15:27 , Miscellaneous, ,

— "What is meant by the statutory expression 'a state of arrested development or incomplete physical development of the brain'? This is one, but only one, of a number of tightly defined conditions which must be satisfied under the 'severe mental impairment' rules in order to qualify for the higher rate of the mobility component of disability living allowance. It is the main issue arising on this appeal. Social Security Commissioner’s decision R(DLA) 2/96 has long been recognised as authority for the proposition that the human brain is fully developed before an adult reaches the age of 30. On that basis it has been consistently held that a person who suffers from what would otherwise be regarded as 'a state of arrested development or incomplete physical development of the brain' does not qualify under the SMI rules if that condition first occurs after the age of 30 (e.g. as a result of traumatic brain injury). I refer to this as the 'age 30 cut-off rule'. In the light of the expert evidence reviewed in this decision, I decide that the age 30 cut-off rule is no longer good law and R(DLA) 2/96 should no longer be followed in that respect." 2014‑08‑08 21:26:42 , Miscellaneous, ,

— "This matter is listed for a directions hearing at my direction in light of the">contumelious failure of the London Borough of Bexley to comply with directions set out in an order of 12 May 2014. By paragraph 19 of that order the local authority were to file their final evidence by 4.00pm on 2 June. ... I understand that social work professionals and lawyers, whether engaged by public authorities or in private practice, are under enormous great strain in the current circumstances and economic climate, particularly given changes to public funding, but that does not relieve them of the obligation to comply with orders made by the court. The failures by the London Borough of Bexley in this matter are stark. This hearing would not have been required if they had complied with their orders and, in my judgment, it was right that this matter was listed at the earliest opportunity to address those failings and to enable the other parties to make submissions as to when they could comply with their obligations to file documents. Accordingly, I am in no doubt that it is right that the local authority should be ordered to pay the costs of this hearing." 2014‑08‑05 22:38:36 , , Miscellaneous,

— "This [welfare benefits] appeal raises the issue of whether the claimant, who was 12 years old at the date of the hearing, should have been allowed to give evidence to the tribunal or at least to attend the hearing. I have decided that the approach to children, whether as witnesses or as persons present in the hearing room, has to be updated in order to be consistent with the international obligations on the rights of children, the right to a fair hearing and the right to family life. This approach is reflected in decisions of the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court in family cases. Doing so, requires some modification to the guidance given by the Tribunal of Commissioners in R(DLA) 3/06 and some care in applying the ." 2014‑08‑03 20:01:26 , Miscellaneous, ,

(1) There was no challenge to the first instance judge's finding that the common law duty of procedural fairness applies to decisions to transfer from medium to high security. (2) However, the judge had gone beyond what fairness requires, by requiring an overly-adversarial procedure. (3) Relief should not have been given on the facts of L's case, including because he had been able to put across his side of a disputed incident and had ceased objecting to transfer. (4) The ability of the decision-making process to achieve fairness has an undesirable element of fortuity. The decision-making process should therefore be "amended so that, absent urgency, a clinical reason precluding such notification, or some other reason such as the exposure of other patients or staff to the risk of harm, the 'gists' of the letter of reference to the high security hospital by the hospital that wishes to transfer the patient and the assessment by the clinician from the high security hospital are provided to the patient and/or his representative, and that the patient be afforded an opportunity to make written submissions to the panel." 2014‑07‑22 20:57:13 , , , Miscellaneous,

The proposed legal aid 'residence test' was unlawful: (1) the statutory instrument containing it was ultra vires and unlawful, as did not permit such a criterion to be introduced by secondary legislation; (2) residence is not a lawful ground for discriminating between those who would otherwise be eligible for legal assistance by virtue of Schedule 1 LASPO. 2014‑07‑17 21:36:37 , , , Miscellaneous,

Permission to apply for judicial review of the decision to refer the claimant prisoner to a prison Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder (DSPD) unit for assessment was refused because it was 'a classic example of a situation in which two experts disagree' and it was not for the court to interfere and substitute its own view. 2013‑12‑30 22:23:14 , , Miscellaneous,

C had long-standing mental health problems and her two children had previously been removed from her. (1) Under the inherent jurisdiction Parker J made an anticipatory declaration that it was lawful for C's third baby to be removed immediately upon delivery, in order to safeguards the child's interests, on the understanding that the local authority would apply for an emergency protection order or an interim care order at the first possible moment. (2) No evidence was heard from C, and a litigation friend was not appointed, in order to avoid C being informed, the judge (and local authority solicitor) thinking that that (a) Official Solicitor would become C's solicitor so the solicitor-client duty of disclosure would apply, and (b) the only exception to that duty is when the client consents. 2013‑12‑22 00:53:19 , , Miscellaneous,

A carer at Dormers Wells Lodge secretly recorded ill-treatment, which led to the conviction of two staff (Sonika Limbu, 25, of Hayes, and Pashi Sahota, 57, of Southall) under . The manager appealed against the CQC's cancellation of her registration as a manager, but the tribunal found that she was not fit to be registered as a manager. In relation to one allegation (although technically there was no breach as at the relevant time she was not yet registered), the tribunal noted: "the necessary paperwork was not present in the form of a Deprivation of Liberty for a number of service users, and in that respect the appellant did not have suitable arrangements in place to protect service users against the risk of such control or restraint being unlawful or otherwise excessive as required under regulation 11(2) , since proper assessment and recording was not being carried out." 2013‑12‑21 23:45:18 , , Miscellaneous,

The decision not to authorise exceptional Legal Aid funding for representation at an inquest into the death of Paul Shovelton (who died in his own home on the day following his discharge from hospital) was lawful. 2013‑12‑21 23:00:37 , Miscellaneous, ,

The facts can be found in the summary of the Court of Appeal's judgment. The Supreme Court allowed Dr Chhabra's appeal, granting an order restraining the Trust from (a) pursuing any of the confidentiality concerns contained in the Trust's letter of 12 August 2011 as matters of gross misconduct and (b) pursuing any confidentiality concerns without first re-starting and completing an investigation under its policy D4A. 2013‑12‑19 00:34:13 , , Miscellaneous,

— Care proceedings judgment in 'Italian forced caesarian' case. [Summary required.] 2013‑12‑03 21:43:29 , Miscellaneous, ,

Unsuccessful challenge to (1) detention under (a subsequent tribunal decision to discharge was consistent with a lawful initial detention) and (2) decision not to hold hospital managers' hearing (it was reasonable to wait a few days for the tribunal). 2013‑11‑19 23:10:58 , , Miscellaneous, ,

In Court of Protection proceedings, the patient's mother was financially ineligible for Legal Aid (the equity in her home was about £65,000 over the £100,000 limit) so the patient's brother was added as a party purely because he would be financially eligible. The LSC refused him funding, for reasons including that the mother should fund the case. Permission to apply for judicial review of that decision was refused. 2013‑09‑17 20:54:48 , , Miscellaneous,

Mark Neary's appeal against Hillingdon's decision to end Housing Benefit was unsuccessful: as he was estranged from his wife, who lived separately in a jointly-owned property, his share of the property counted towards the statutory limit for Housing Benefit purposes. 2013‑09‑08 21:21:43 , , Miscellaneous,

— Payment for expert evidence. [Summary required; detailed external review available.] 2013‑08‑12 22:27:59 , , Miscellaneous, ,

The LSC's decision in care proceedings to agree prior authority for a multi-disciplinary assessment at a lower amount than that sought was unlawful because of the lack of reasons given, and was quashed. 2013‑05‑05 21:11:44 , , Miscellaneous,

— "Can an involuntary patient detained in a mental hospital under the provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983 pay for his care or treatment, or is such a possibility denied the patient (or his family on his behalf) by the provisions of that Act (the "MHA 1983") and/or public policy? ... In these circumstances, it seems to me that there is nothing inherent in the structure or wording of the MHA 1983 or the 2006 Act, and nothing by way of public policy, to exclude absolutely the possibilities of detained patients (or their family or others holding responsibility for looking after their assets) paying for or contributing in part to the cost of their treatment or care. Presumably, private patients detained in a private hospital do exactly that. Detained patients who are being looked after by an NHS authority will have most, if not all, of their costs funded by the state: but even in their case, it may be possible, as in the case of any patient within the NHS system, to purchase private accommodation or other top-up care facilities available within the applicable Guidance. Of course, it will not be possible to provide for care or treatment which is in conflict with the recommendations of the responsible clinician. Nor may it always or perhaps even often be possible within the NHS system to purchase additional care or treatment facilities without running into the principle of free provision and the limitations upon the exceptions to that principle. However, the cases cited above show that responsible clinicians may recommend treatment or care which the NHS is not under a duty to provide, because it goes beyond its statutory duty. There seems to me no reason in statute or public policy why there should be an absolute bar on the provision of facilities, recommended by or consistent with the recommendations of the responsible clinician, which may be available at a price, within or without the NHS system. Ms Richards submits, as she did below, that private payment may create difficulties of a practical nature, as where private funding previously available breaks down. However, as the judge said, such difficulties of funding may always raise their head, and do not create public policy bars of their own. It seems likely that the same answer is applicable whether the detained patient has a claim against a tortfeasor or whether it is simply a matter of a personal choice to pay. Similarly, it seems also quite possible that even detained patients under Part III have to be assimilated for these, as for other purposes, with detained patients under Part II. However, it is not necessary in this case to determine those matters. It is sufficient to say, in the case of this claimant, who is a detained patient within Part II of the MHA 1983 and has a claim against admitted tortfeasors, that the answer to the issue posed, namely whether there is anything in public policy or otherwise which prevents him paying for his own care or treatment, is No." 2013‑05‑03 19:07:31 , , Miscellaneous,

DD wished to bring proceedings against local authorities arguing that (a) the two assessing AMHPs owed a duty to him (a legal responsibility not only for assessing whether the patient should be detained, but also for the suitability of the hospital at which the patient was to be detained and the regime under which he would be held); (b) that by making the application for admission, each was in breach of duty; and (c) that the county council was responsible vicariously for that breach of duty. (1) The Court of Appeal (reversing the High Court decision in this respect) decided that the argument was sufficient for leave under to bring proceedings to be granted. (2) DD should not have been made responsible for the costs of Middlesbrough City Council. 2013‑03‑28 21:14:23 , , Miscellaneous,

— "DD appeals against the decision refusing leave and that part of the order relating to the payment of Middlesbrough City Council's costs. There is no appeal against the decision that Durham would be the body liable for any breach of duty or infringement of the Human Rights Act by the second AMHP. ... It was contended by Ms Lieven QC, on behalf of DD, that the two AMHPs owed a duty to DD; that by making the application for admission to the Hutton Unit, each was in breach of duty and that the County Council was responsible vicariously for that breach of duty. It was Ms Lieven QC's primary case that under the statutory scheme the AMHP had the legal responsibility not only for assessing whether the patient should be detained, but also for the suitability of the hospital at which the patient was to be detained and the regime under which he would be held. Although not precisely delineated, the responsibility gave rise to an obligation under the Human Rights Act 1998 to take reasonable steps to ensure that the patient's Article 3 and 8 rights were not infringed. This obligation did not extend to preventing some casual act committed by those at the hospital which might violate the Convention rights of DD. In the alternative, there was a duty of care to like effect to be derived from the scheme of the 1983 Act. ... It is clear, therefore, that the only point we could determine was whether the judge was correct in refusing leave. The threshold under s.139 is a low one: see Winch v Jones [1986] QB 296Not on BailiiNot on Bailii and Johnston v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police">[2009] EWHC 2969 (QB). I have no doubt that the argument advanced by Ms Lieven QC meets this threshold. ... I would, therefore allow this appeal on the application under s.139(2). ... In my judgment, DD should not have been made responsible for the costs of Middlesbrough City Council." [Summary required.] 2013‑03‑28 21:13:48 , Miscellaneous, ,

— "This is a claim by the claimant, Rosalind Copson, for an order quashing the decision of the defendant, Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust, on 14 June 2012 to implement its Mental Health Urgent Care Services Project for the reconfiguration of mental health services in the west of Dorset. ... The claim is put on two grounds. First, it is said that the defendant failed, before reaching its decision, to carry out an adequate consultation with users of its mental health services, chiefly in that it failed to provide to those users sufficient information to enable them to engage meaningfully with the proposals. Second, it is said that the defendant failed to comply with its duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 to have due regard, in the exercise of its functions, to the need to advance equality of opportunity. ... The claimant is a user of mental health facilities in Bridport, Dorset. The facilities that she uses include the in-patient facility at the Hughes Unit in Bridport. The defendant's proposed reconfiguration of mental health services in the area will involve the loss of that facility. ... For the reasons given, this claim is dismissed." [Summary required.] 2013‑03‑28 21:04:04 , Miscellaneous, ,

— "The claimant, Mrs Z, who very ably represented herself, was sectioned under the Mental Health Act shortly after giving birth to her first baby after a prolonged and very difficult labour. ... Miss Z says that looking at the reasons that were given at the time, which are recorded in a document signed by both doctors (Form A3, that is the formal sectioning document) the reasons that are there recorded are insufficient reasons to warrant her detention under the Mental Health Act." [Summary required.] 2013‑03‑28 11:33:06 , , Miscellaneous, ,

— "This is an appeal, with permission granted by Maurice Kay LJ on 3 April 2012, against the judgment of Foskett J given in the Administrative Court on 11 January 2012 (">[2012] EWHC Admin 8), by which he dismissed the appellant's application for judicial review seeking an order that the defendant Secretary of State provide or facilitate the provision of information to stated categories of children as to the illegal use of restraint techniques on them when they were detained in Secure Training Centres (STCs) in the United Kingdom." [Summary required; detailed external summary available.] 2013‑03‑26 22:11:58 , , Miscellaneous,

— "On 17 December 2007, the claimant's solicitors wrote to the Council intimating a claim for damages in respect of assaults alleged to have been committed by staff at the Centre when he was there in the early 1980s. The letter included a request for the disclosure of certain documents. Some documents were disclosed in redacted form. On 25 March 2011, the claimant issued these proceedings. This appeal is concerned with the ambit of the Council's duty of disclosure. ... In particular, confusion can arise as to whether the duty of disclosure is primarily one that arises under the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) or one arising pursuant to the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR)." [Summary required; detailed external summary available.] 2013‑03‑26 21:42:52 , Miscellaneous, ,

(1) Various complaints had been made against Dr Chhabra, including in relation to breaches of patient confidentiality, and the case investigator's report stated that Dr Chhabra admitted to reading CPA notes and dictating reports on public transport. (2) Upon reading the case investigator's report the case manager decided to convene a disciplinary panel to consider the following allegations and to consider them as potential gross misconduct which could lead to dismissal: (a) that Dr Chhabra breached patient confidentiality whilst reading notes and discussing patients whilst on public transport (the complaint being made by another passenger who happened to be Head of Secure Services Policy at the Department of Health); (b) that she undertook dictation on at least two occasions whilst completing Mental Health Tribunal reports whilst on public transport (the complaint being made by a member of secretarial staff); (c) that whilst travelling to work on public transport she would often call her secretary to discuss patient related matters breaching confidentiality (the complaint being made by her PA). (3) The High Court had made a declaration and injunction the effect of which were to prevent a disciplinary panel from investigating these complaints as matters of gross misconduct and under the terms of its disciplinary policy. (4) The Court of Appeal overturned that decision, stating the case manager's decision was justified on the basis of the disciplinary procedures and the evidence: patients' right to confidentiality is fundamental in the Health Service and must be respected by doctors and other staff; the case manager was entitled to regard breach of it in a public place by a consultant at Broadmoor as a potentially serious offence. 2013‑01‑27 21:32:37 , , Miscellaneous,

— "This is an appeal from a striking-out order of HH Judge Walton sitting in the Newcastle upon Tyne County Court on 25 February 2011. The claimant, the appellant in this court, had brought an action for personal injuries against Durham County Council, (her employer) and two NHS trusts with whom she collaborated in the course of her work. She alleged that all three defendants had been negligent and that, as a result, she had been exposed to danger, in the course of her employment, from a man to whom I shall refer as GB who was mentally disturbed and had threatened to harm her. In the event, GB attacked her with a long-bladed knife and caused very serious injuries. The two NHS trusts (the respondents in this court) applied to strike out the action contending, successfully, that they did not owe her any duty of care in respect of the action of a third party. The appellant appeals against that decision with the permission of Macduff J. The appeal therefore raises the question of whether it is reasonably arguable that such a duty was owed in the circumstances of the case. The claimant had also pleaded that there had been a breach by the second and third defendants of her right under article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights. The judge also struck out those claims and that issue is raised in this appeal." Appeal allowed and all issues sent for trial. [Detailed summary available.] 2012‑12‑23 01:29:27 , , , Miscellaneous,

(1) In relation to limitation the court held as follows: 'I am satisfied that it would be fair and just to invoke the discretion afforded to the court by section 33 of the 1980 Act and permit this trial to proceed. I do so for the following reasons: (i) Having read the lengthy report of Dr Roychowdhury, it is clear that as a result of the abuse perpetrated upon her, the mental health of the claimant has been adversely affected. It has fluctuated over the years, at its worst, it has entailed compulsory hospitalisation. I find that the mental health of the claimant played a real part in the delay which has occurred in the bringing of the civil claim. I accept that the nature of the matters to be explored in this case are of themselves a deterrent for a person in the position of the claimant in bringing such a claim. (ii) In 1977/1978 the defendant had cause to consider allegations of sexual assault upon the claimant by reason of the criminal proceedings. That he did so, and that his memory remains to this day, is evidenced by the detailed witness statement which the defendant has filed in these proceedings. (iii) This case depends upon the evidence of two people, the claimant and the defendant. Although the claimant will find it distressing to give evidence, the detail contained in her witness statement demonstrates that she is able to remember and articulate her memories, however unpleasant. There is nothing in the witness statement of the defendant which demonstrates any difficulty on his part remembering the detail of relevant periods. The evidence of both parties remains sufficiently cogent to enable a fair trial to take place. (2) The other issues considered were: (ii) What was the nature and extent of the alleged assaults perpetrated by the defendant upon the claimant? (iii) What is the nature and extent of any resultant personal injury and loss? (iv) What is the appropriate level of damages? 2012‑12‑21 00:28:59 , , Miscellaneous,

The recorder's decision to refuse to grant a possession order (on the basis that by the time of the delayed hearing possession was no longer appropriate because there had been full compliance with the terms of the tenancy for the 12 months prior to the hearing) was upheld on appeal. 2012‑12‑20 23:49:50 , , Miscellaneous, ,

The claimant local authority sought possession of an introductory tenancy on the basis of the defendant's antisocial behaviour. (1) The procedure was followed properly so there was no defence to the claim under the . (2) The original decision to seek possession was a necessary and proportionate interference with the defendant's rights: in particular, the diagnosis of Aspergers and depression (which led to lack of litigation capacity and appointment of a litigation friend) did not explain the defendant's conduct and was properly considered by the claimant. (3) However, there had been full compliance with the terms of the tenancy for the 12 months prior to the delayed final hearing, so possession was no longer proportionate. (4) No order for costs (despite the claimant seeking costs). 2012‑12‑20 23:42:45 , , Miscellaneous,

— "This is a claim for judicial review and a claim pursuant to section 7 Human Rights Act 1998 in respect of: (i) the failure by the first defendant to treat the claimant's late wife, Janet Tracey lawfully; (ii) the failure by the first defendant to treat Janet Tracey in a manner that respected her rights under Articles 2, 3 and 8 ECHR, and in a manner that respected the claimant's rights under Article 8 ECHR; and (iii) the failure by the first defendant to have in place and to operate lawfully an appropriate policy on the use of Do Not Attempt Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation orders; (iv) the failure by the second defendant effectively to promulgate any clear policy or guidance on the use of DNACPRs, which is accessible to patients and their families, and which properly informs them of their rights and legitimate expectations in respect of the use of DNACPRs by hospitals such as that operated by the first defendant." [Summary required.] 2012‑12‑20 21:28:44 , Miscellaneous, ,

— Harassment led to breaches of and . [Detailed summary available via external link.] 2012‑12‑19 18:57:56 , , Miscellaneous, ,

— "This appeal raises a question as to the effect of a commencement provision in a statute which provides that provisions "shall come into force" on a specified date, and a consequential question as to the effect of a provision conferring upon Ministers the power to make regulations, where the provisions which are subject to the commencement provision cannot come into effective operation unless such regulations have been made. ... These questions arise in relation to the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 ("the 2003 Act"). The relevant substantive provisions are contained in Chapter 3 of Part 17, comprising sections 264 to 273. That Chapter is concerned with the detention of patients in conditions of excessive security." [Detailed summary available.] 2012‑12‑19 18:23:04 , , , Miscellaneous, ,

— Unsuccessful challenge relating to effectiveness of Scottish "conditions of excessive security" legislation. [Summary required.] 2012‑12‑19 18:21:51 , Miscellaneous, , ,

The defendant Trust granted unescorted leave to a detained patient who then ran in front of a bus. The claimant bus driver suffered PTSD and sued the Trust. The court held that a custody authority responsible for the negligent release of a patient did not owe a duty to a victim unless that victim had been identifiable: the Trust therefore owed no duty of care to the driver. 2012‑12‑17 00:47:55 , , Miscellaneous,

— "The police are under an absolute and unconditional obligation to take all steps which appear to them to be necessary for keeping the peace, for preventing crime or for protecting property from criminal injury. ... ... provides that: '1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. ...' This case concerns the interaction of those two principles in a situation where the police believe that a citizen, though committing no crime and though free of any criminal record or allegation of crime against him, has engaged in a private sexual life which indicates he may become a danger to women and propose to make public the details of this by selective disclosure." [Summary required.] 2012‑12‑16 22:57:32 , Miscellaneous, ,

The claimant began proceedings to challenge the decision to transfer him from a medium secure unit to Broadmoor high secure hospital. (1) The claimant no longer wished to challenge the transfer decision, but the claims were of general importance and merited review, and were not merely academic, so the judge proceeded to hear the case and set out his reasons at extraordinary length. (2) The potential adverse consequences of a transfer to high security are: (a) the potential for delaying the ultimate date of discharge from detention; and (b) the potential for more restrictive detention conditions. (3) The nature of the decision making process as to whether a patient should be transferred from medium to high security is such as to engage a common law duty of fairness. (4) Subject to the need to protect persons from the risk of harm or some other substantial reason, that duty of fairness requires: (a) the patient and his advisers to be informed of any intention to refer him to high security; (b) the gist of the reasons for referral and any relevant reports to be provided; (c) the gist to be sufficiently detailed to enable meaningful and focussed representations, and reasons to be given if reports are withheld; (d) requests for additional information to be considered; (e) all such information to be communicated in time for the patient to make representations before the earliest possible of (i) the admissions panel meeting, (ii) the high security hospital accepting, (iii) the medium secure hospital deciding to transfer, or (iv) the decision being implemented; (f) all such information to be communicated immediately upon transfer at the latest; (g) reasons for the various decisions to be communicated, and to be sufficiently detailed to enable the patient to decide whether a worthwhile challenge can be made (see para 557-8). (5) In this case, in various ways, the requirements of the common law duty of fairness were not complied with and a declaration to that effect was made. (6) In relation to the Article 6 claim: (a) the transfer decision is not a 'determination' of his 'civil rights', so Article 6 does not apply; (b) but, if it did apply, and if there were a good arguable Article 8 claim, then the judicial review court would be required to exercise a fact-finding function; (c) it was inappropriate in this case for the judge to decide whether (if Article 6 applies and judicial review is inadequate) an independent panel (at least in a case turning on a disputed issue of fact) should decide on transfer; (d) similarly, it was inappropriate to decide whether (if Article 6 applies, judicial review is inadequate, and no hospital is empowered to contract out its function to a panel) the lack of provision for an independent panel makes the MHA incompatible with Article 6. 2012‑11‑15 00:25:40 , , Miscellaneous,

This appeal followed an unsuccessful judicial review of the LSC's rejection of the appellant's tender in relation to community care law in 2010. (1) The issues were set out by the court as follows: (a) Were any of the Appellant's applications acceptable without clarification or amendment? (b) Leaving aside the evidence of the Commission's communications with other applicants, should the Commission have sought clarification or suggested amendment of any of the applications, and if so should the Commission have accepted the resulting application(s)? (c) Do the Commission's communications with other applicants show that by rejecting the Appellant's applications, it acted in breach of its duty to treat all applicants equally? (2) The appeal had no real prospects of success and therefore permission was refused. (3) The LSC were awarded its costs: (a) the appellant's impecuniosity and the fact that her activity both as a solicitor and as a proposed foster parent may be or indeed are in the public interest does not justify depriving the Commission of the normal order; (b) the Appellant was clearly warned of the costs risks of pursuing her application for permission to appeal and her application for disclosure, which was liable to be very expensive indeed; and (c) the court directed a rolled up hearing for her benefit, so that her claim could be determined as soon as possible, as she sought. 2012‑10‑27 20:33:00 , , Miscellaneous,

A local authority should not be liable for the costs of interveners against whom allegations have been reasonably made that are held unfounded; the general practice of not awarding costs against a party, including a local authority, in the absence of reprehensible behaviour or an unreasonable stance, is one that accords with the ends of justice and which should not be subject to an exception in the case of split hearings. (This case related to care proceedings.) 2012‑09‑30 21:57:38 , , , Miscellaneous,

The conditions in an overcrowded psychiatric ward with very poor standards of hygiene led to inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of . 2012‑06‑23 11:47:20 , , , Miscellaneous,

The claimant was gate sectioned at Durham prison and detained under , then , in a Middlesborough hospital. He had complaints of false imprisonment and breaches of and relating to matters such as his being kept in seclusion, the lighting in his room, the number of people supervising his activities and a general lack of privacy. (1) He needed leave under to bring civil proceedings against Durham County Council and Middlesborough City Council. This was refused: there was no realistic prospect of establishing illegality against the AMHPs who made the recommendations for s2 and s3 as AMHPs are (a) not required to choose or investigate the quality of the place of detention, (b) not required to research medical views earlier than those in the statutory recommendations, (c) not responsible for the medical or other regimes to which a detained person is subjected. (2) The AMHP who applied for s3 detention was employed by Middlesborough, so Durham claimed that Middlesborough would be vicariously liable. This was incorrect: Durham would have been liable for any wrongdoing, because vicarious liability arises not as a result of employment law but through the statutory relationship in . 2012‑05‑05 21:47:43 , , Miscellaneous,

MS was taken to a police station under having assaulted his aunt, but the FME assessed him as not fit for interview. The local psychiatric intensive care unit refused to admit him on the basis that he required a medium secure unit but, for various reasons, there was a delay in transferring him there. (1) The delay led to detention beyond the 72-hour limit of s136, but he did not make any claim under . (2) His claim was instead in negligence and breach of and, as the case was summarily dismissed in the domestic proceedings, the Article 3 aspect of the case proceeded to the ECtHR. The ECtHR made no criticism of the initial detention under s136 in a police station, the attitude of the authorities or the material conditions (food and liquid) of detention. It did, however, conclude that - because MS was in a state of great vulnerability throughout his detention, as manifested by the abject condition to which he quickly descended inside his cell, and that he was in dire need of appropriate psychiatric treatment - the conditions which the applicant was required to endure were an affront to human dignity and reached the threshold of degrading treatment for the purposes of Article 3. (3) There was no breach of as an appropriate remedy was available in domestic law, notwithstanding the fact that he had been unsuccessful. (4) Compensation of €3,000 was awarded. 2012‑05‑05 12:07:15 , , , Miscellaneous,

Costs judgment in mental health/community care judicial review: no order for costs. 2012‑04‑28 18:02:06 , , Miscellaneous,

(1) A voluntary in-patient killed himself by breaking and jumping out of a sixth-floor window: the court held that there was an arguable claim that an operational duty under arose to take reasonable steps to protect him from a real and immediate risk of suicide and that that duty was not fulfilled. (2) There were no domestic civil proceedings available to his mother to establish any liability and compensation due as regards the non-pecuniary damage suffered by her on her son’s death, and therefore there was a violation of in conjunction with Article 2. In particular: (a) neither the inquest nor the internal inquiry were an effective remedy; (b) the HRA claim under Article 2 was struck out by the county court because of domestic case law at that time which required gross negligence; (c) the mother had no prospect of obtaining adequate compensation for non-pecuniary damage under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (she was not a dependent) or the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 (death was instantaneous); (d) the lack of adequate compensation would itself reduce access to the civil remedy, as the legal aid 'cost/benefit analysis' would not be met and legal fees were unaffordable. (3) It was not necessary to examine the same complaint under Article 2 alone. (4) €7000 compensation was awarded. 2012‑03‑24 15:14:48 , , , Miscellaneous,

In Housing Benefit cases, a landlord cannot exercise an independent right of appeal to the First Tier Tribunal against a decision of the Local Authority other than in the cases for which specific provision is made by the subordinate legislation. 2012‑03‑24 13:29:37 , , Miscellaneous,

The Claimant unsuccessfully sought permission to challenge the decision of the Defendant local authority to terminate its contract to provide care for elderly dementia sufferers. 2012‑03‑24 13:23:51 , , Miscellaneous,

A warrant for the claimant's transfer to prison was issued on the RC's advice in the context of Broadmoor's DSPD unit being about to close on 29/3/12. (1) It is not unlawful for an RC to tick both the 'no longer requires treatment in hospital for mental disorder' and the 'no effective treatment for his disorder can be given in the hospital to which he has been removed' boxes on the proforma. (2) There was no evidence that the views expressed on the form were not those of the RC or that he had subordinated his clinical judgment to expediency or national strategies. (3) No relief would have been granted even had there been unlawfulness: the claimant had to leave Broadmoor, no MSU would then take him, so he had to return to prison in any event. 2012‑03‑20 22:07:58 , , Miscellaneous, ,

The employees had been dismissed for gross misconduct for restraining a patient on a chair which was tied to a table; they disputed the allegation that they tied the patient to the chair with a sheet. (1) The Employment Tribunal had been entitled to conclude that there had been two procedural errors (in failing to obtain the witness's first statement, and in carrying out a practical experiment on the chair without notification to the appellants) and that they were errors that a reasonable employer would not have made; although the ET went too far in saying no reasonable employer could have preferred the witness's evidence over the employees', this did not invalidate the finding of unfair dismissal. (2) The case was remitted to the ET to consider the Polkey point (reduction in compensation based on chance of dismissal following fair procedure) but the 25% reduction for contributory fault (failure to report the incident) was upheld. (3) (Obiter) The court expressed scepticism about the need for suspension during the disciplinary process, and stated that, as the conduct did not deserve the epithet 'criminal', the police should never have been involved: while the hospital must act transparently it also owes duties to long-serving staff. 2012‑03‑05 11:26:17 , , Miscellaneous,

Whether the claimant, who had sustained a serious head injury while a detained patient, should be permitted to fund his future care. (1) The defendant argued that (a) a detained patient could not choose to pay for his treatment, particularly because the RC chose where and how he was treated; (b) allowing payment would create a contract, contrary to the purpose of the MHA to take care and treatment out of patients’ hands; (c) there was no significant difference compared with prisoners, whose expenses are met by the government under s51 Prison Act 1952; (d) while the statute did not prohibit payment, it would be contrary to public policy to allow a patient to use his own funds. (2) The claimant argued that (a) there was no reason why a detained patient should not be able to pay if he wishes; (b) while the patient could not choose where or how he was treated, he should be able to top-up payments if he preferred a placement for which the funding authority were unwilling to pay; (c) denying the right to pay would breach Article 5. (3) Held: (a) the relationship between care providers and a detained patient was different to that with ordinary patients, as the RC has the right to decide on appropriate placement and treatment, but if the patient could pay for a particular appropriate placement or treatment there was nothing to prevent this; (b) prisoners and detained patients should not be regarded in the same way: with patients there was no punitive element; patients are not detained for finite periods; the purpose and effect of s51 Prison Act 1952 had no application to patients; (c) Article 5 relates to lawfulness of detention, not conditions of detention (which concerned Article 3); (d) public policy considerations amounted to mere repetition of other arguments; (e) a detained patient is not prevented from paying for his own care or treatment. The defendant was granted permission to appeal. [Based on Lawtel summary.] 2012‑03‑05 08:57:00 , , Miscellaneous,

PFZ, an informal patient with a long history of mental illness, was allowed to run away from hospital in a suicidal state, then jumped from a balcony sustaining and permanent and catastrophic spinal cord injury which left him tetraplegic and wheelchair-bound. He sued the Trust for negligent failure to provide him with adequate treatment. The Trust agreed to compensate him on the basis of 40% liability, and made an advance payment of £75,000; the full amount was yet to be assessed but to meet PFZ's care needs for the remainder of his life was estimated to require millions of pounds. 2011‑12‑10 12:45:12 , , Miscellaneous,

Unsuccessful judicial review of a decision of the LSC rejecting the claimant's tender for the provision of legal services in the field of community care following a competitive tendering exercise in 2010. 2011‑11‑26 15:27:02 , , Miscellaneous,

— Dispute over accommodation for child in need. 2011‑09‑29 20:57:33 , , Miscellaneous,

The claimant social worker was not informed of a patient's threats to kill her and was subsequently stabbed by him; she sued the local authority and relevant NHS Trusts in negligence or breach of statutory duty and alternatively alleged a breach of . The Trusts' application for strike out was successful. [Caution.] 2011‑08‑22 22:40:53 , , Miscellaneous,

Unsuccessful appeal by the mother against a judgment refusing her a wide ranging series of declarations, the object of which was to deny the father (who suffered from mental illness) all knowledge of the birth and subsequent development of his legitimate child. 2011‑08‑22 21:47:46 , , Miscellaneous,

Unsuccessful application by BBC journalist to record and broadcast proceedings of First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber). 2011‑08‑16 21:51:57 , , Miscellaneous,

An email sent by Swindon College, a past employer, to the claimant's then current employer, raising safeguarding issues, caused him to lose his job, for which Swindon were liable in negligence. (Full legal summary required.) (A forthright judgment: '[18] ... Even if there were any substance in that complaint at all, which as I say seems to me to be bordering on the ludicrous... [26] ... We are into the realms of hearsay upon hearsay. ... [27] ... I think when we actually look at the circumstances, we can see that the procedure adopted at Swindon College giving rise to the sending of the email, can be described as slapdash, sloppy, failing to comply with any sort of minimum standards of fairness, certainly any such standards as would be recognised by any judicial body taking decisions and disseminating information about another individual, because Mr Rowe agreed he had no personal knowledge of things at all. ... [29] So not only do I take the view that the contents of the email are not in fact supported by any evidence, I also take the view that the circumstances surrounding the sending of the email flouted elementary standards of fairness, diligence, proper enquiry, natural justice, whichever set of epithets you wish to use. ... [34] ... The idea that she should have been part of a disciplinary process as it transpired on 10 June whilst being on the governing body of Swindon College, I find staggering. It contradicts almost every rule, as it seems to me, about decision making in a quasi-judicial matter.' etc) 2011‑08‑04 22:22:26 , , Miscellaneous,

— Judicial review of rejection of tenders for community care law. [Summary required.] 2011‑07‑20 19:48:57 , Miscellaneous, ,

— Undue influence. [Summary required.] 2011‑06‑22 20:22:00 , Miscellaneous, ,

(1) A settlement offer which is time-limited is not capable of being a Part 36 offer; (2) in the context of the intention to comply with Part 36, the statement that the offer be 'open for 21 days' did not mean that it was a time-limited offer (rather, it was indicating that it could be withdrawn after 21 days); (3) on the facts, the Part 36 offer had not expired and was capable of acceptance. 2011‑05‑28 12:00:44 , , , Miscellaneous,

An email from a local authority stating that Clift was on its violent persons register was published too widely: (1) the disproportionate publication was an unjustified breach of ; (2) the Article 8 breach prevented the local authority from using the qualified privilege defence to defamation. 2011‑04‑30 18:56:15 , , Miscellaneous,

The applicant law firm failed properly to complete the online documentation for the 2010 mental health tendering exercise and unsuccessfully challenged the LSC's decision not to award it a contract. 2011‑04‑30 17:03:44 , , Miscellaneous,

(1) The immunity from suit for breach of duty that expert witnesses have enjoyed in relation to their participation in legal proceedings is abolished. (2) This does not affect the absolute privilege that all witnesses enjoy in respect of claims in defamation. 2011‑03‑30 21:54:11 , , Miscellaneous,

The claimant's social phobia did not make him 'infirm by nature of disability' (within the meaning of PSI 31/2006) for the purpose of deciding whether or not to release on Home Detention Curfew. 2011‑03‑25 20:45:35 , , Miscellaneous,

The claimant, who suffered from gender identity disorder, unsuccessfully challenged the decisions to refuse funding for breast augmentation surgery and the underlying policies. 2011‑03‑18 19:40:33 , , Miscellaneous,

Nurse was struck off for misconduct. The following charges were proved: 'That you, on or around 19 December 2005, whilst working as a Staff Nurse on Vincent Ward at the Gordon Hospital, Bloomberg Street, London SW1V 2RH: (1) Purchased crack cocaine in the company of Patient A, a patient on the ward; (2) Took crack cocaine with Patient A; (3) Had sexual intercourse with an unknown female when Patient A was also present in your flat; AND in light of the above, your fitness to practise is impaired by reason of your misconduct.' 2011‑02‑24 21:33:09 , , Miscellaneous,

The Court of Appeal issued a reminder of the following: (a) that the bundle of authorities should be agreed; (b) that it should be filed at least seven days before the hearing; (c) that it should not contain more than ten authorities unless the scale of the appeal warrants more extensive citation; (d) that the relevant authorities should be copied from the official law reports, and only if not should reports from the All England Law Reports (All ER) or a specialist law report series be included. In addition, if a case is reported in volume 1 of the Weekly Law Reports that report should be used in preference to the report in the All ER. BAILII judgments (with neutral citation numbers) should only be used if no other recognised reports were available and the case really needs to be cited; and (e) that the passages in the authorities which were relevant and on which counsel sought to rely must be marked. 2011‑01‑24 20:35:26 , , , Miscellaneous,

The GSCC had refused to register Francis as a social worker under s58 because (a) he had from 2005 to 2006 failed to register as a social worker but continued to act as such, (b) during the same period he had continued to act as an AMHP; (c) he had failed to inform his employer of his personal difficulties, (d) there was no adequate endorsement of his application. His appeal under s68 was dismissed. 2011‑01‑22 19:53:27 , , Miscellaneous,

Social worker suspended for misconduct for 12 months. Two of the proven allegations were: '(4) Without authority, on or around 18th July 2008, you requested service user Mrs Z to sign financial papers after she had been diagnosed by a consultant psychiatrist as having a lack of mental capacity. (5) Between 20th May 2008 and 30th October 2009, you failed to ensure that an application for a Court of Protection order in respect of a service user Mr Z, was made expeditiously, or at all.' 2011‑01‑22 19:38:34 , , Miscellaneous,

The Applicant was guilty of misconduct within the meaning of Section 86(7)(a) (convicted of ill-treatment under MHA 1983) but was not unsuitable to work with vulnerable adults and children under s86(7)(b). 2011‑01‑22 19:26:19 , , Miscellaneous,

(1) Where a local authority makes an unlawful application to a hospital for the detention of a patient under the MHA, it can be held liable in damages for false imprisonment when its unlawful act directly causes the detention; (2) although the hospital may act lawfully in detaining such a patient under (3) (if the application appeared to be duly made) that does not prevent the detention being held to be unlawful from the outset as against the local authority; (3) an application for detention that is made contrary to (4) (in the face of the Nearest Relative's objection) is in breach of (1); (4) (5) entitles a person detained in breach of Article 5(1) to compensation, and (1) (no liability unless bad faith or lack of reasonable care) can be read down so as to allow such a claim to proceed; (5) the word 'practicable' in (2) (requiring a recommendation from a doctor with previous acquaintance of the patient if practicable) should be broadly construed; (6) (obiter) a breach of s12(2) does not go to jurisdiction, but is one made in the exercise of that jurisdiction, and as such is less likely to make detention unlawful; (7) on the facts, the local authority was liable in false imprisonment and breach of Article 5 because of the s11(4) breach, and permission was granted under s139(2) for a compensation claim to be pursued, but there was no s12(2) breach because it had been reasonable to obtain two independent opinions from doctors not acquainted with the patient, given the divergence of views between the treating doctors who were. 2011‑01‑14 12:03:45 , , , , Miscellaneous, ,

(1) The verification process following the LSC's public law and mental health tendering process fell short of what was required by the Public Contract Regulations 2006. No objection was taken, nor could it be, to self-certification. But the self-certification supervisor forms did not require supervisors to confirm specifically the nature of the employment arrangements between them and the organisation or whether they had complied with the supervision standards set out in the contract, in particular the supervision experience or training course requirement (clause 2.28) and the 1:6 supervisor ratio requirement (clause 2.35). There may therefore be a number of firms with contracts who did not meet the supervision criteria, for example who have an external non-employed supervisor, or a part-time supervisor who is not employed for sufficient hours. The LSC must ensure, within a limited period, that all firms currently comply with the supervision standards; those who do not must have their contracts removed and the matter starts redistributed pro rata. (2) The disability equality duty challenge to the HSH contract under s49A Disability Discrimination Act 1995, as originally raised, was essentially a challenge to the consultation and the formulation of the tender proposals; as it was brought eight months after the proposals were available, it was out of time. However, the outcome of the of the tender exercise was only recently known: in particular, senior psychiatrists had given evidence of the distress changing solicitors would cause to a considerable number of patients in the light of the reduction in number of solicitors with contracts (of 98 existing providers, 43 did not bid; of those who bid, six firms were successful at Ashworth, and five at each of Broadmoor and Rampton). The outcome engaged the s49A duty so the LSC must gather information, consult with interested stakeholders, and have due regard to whether they need to take steps to ameliorate the result of the contracting exercise. (3) The public law tender, and the reduction in matter starts, met the LSC’s legal obligations under s4 Access to Justice Act 1999. 2010‑12‑16 22:24:48 , , Miscellaneous,

The claimant issued his claim on the eve of the limitation period without seeking leave under ; the House of Lords had found that his claim was therefore a nullity. (1) No breach of was found because (a) the six-year limitation period pursued a legitimate aim, (b) s139 was to restrict access to the court only where the claim was manifestly unmeritorious, and its general aim of protecting those who exercise powers under that Act, including the police, pursued a legitimate aim, (c) the decision to strike out did not impair the very essence of the applicant's right of access to court and was not disproportionate: he had not explained his delay or failure to seek leave, and should bear the consequences of his own decisions, and in any event could continue his non-MHA claims (2) No breach of Article 6 taken with was found because he did not argue it in any substance and, by not having argued it previously, had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. 2010‑12‑09 21:34:34 , , , Miscellaneous,

(1) A settlement offer which is time-limited (in this case it was open for acceptance for 21 days) is not capable of being a Part 36 offer; (2) on the facts, the offer had expired after 21 days and was not capable of acceptance. [Caution: partly overturned on appeal.] 2010‑11‑18 18:56:45 , , , Miscellaneous,

Previous scheme established under the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 which automatically prohibited those placed on lists established under the scheme from working with children and/or vulnerable adults was unlawful: the absence of a right to make representations breached their right to a fair trial. 2010‑11‑11 23:28:46 , , Miscellaneous,

The blanket restriction on voting, which applies to all convicted prisoners in prison irrespective of the length of their sentence, the nature or gravity of their offence, or their individual circumstances, is unlawful. 2010‑11‑03 07:40:34 , , Miscellaneous,

— Family law tendering process declared unlawful because of the LSC's approach to accreditation. [Summary required.] 2010‑10‑18 23:30:17 , Miscellaneous, ,

— Omagh bombing civil judgment, including consideration of damages for psychiatric injury. [Summary required.] 2010‑09‑27 22:03:56 , Miscellaneous, ,

— [Summary required.] 2010‑09‑27 21:50:56 , Miscellaneous, ,

(1) The function being discharged by the LSC in attempting to obtain files for peer review in accordance with contractual obligations did not have any public law dimension, so the decisions were not amenable to judicial review. (2) In any event: there were alternative contractual remedies; there was no realistic prospect of showing that the LSC acted unlawfully; there was no longer any live issue between the parties as the files had been delivered up. (3) Consideration would be given to the making of a civil restraint order. 2010‑07‑08 22:37:13 , , Miscellaneous,

(1) There was a division of opinion in the treating team so it was considered ‘impracticable’ to obtain two medical recommendations from doctors with previous acquaintance of the patient: this was lawful as a reasonable and proper exercise of judgment of what was in the patient’s best interests. (2) The hospital were entitled to rely on the s6(3) protection (that any application which appears to be duly made etc may be acted upon without further proof) because the managers were entitled to rely on the AMHP’s confirmation that there had been no objection from the NR and because there had been no breach of s12(2). (3) As an AMHP is treated as acting on behalf of the LSSA the relevant council is vicariously liable for any lack of care or bad faith on the part of an AMHP: the council was therefore the correct defendant. (4) The proposed claim was based on the AMHP’s mistaken belief that the NR had not objected. A duty of care existed but there was no reasonable prospect of success in any negligence claim: therefore leave under s139(2) was not given. (5) Provided that there has been no fault by anyone involved in the decision making process which could lead to civil proceedings (namely negligence or bad faith), detention is to be regarded as lawful until, if a defect is identified, the court so declares or decides that release must follow. The claimant’s detention was lawful until prospectively declared unlawful in the habeas corpus proceedings. It followed that the detention was not unlawful in domestic law so that there was no breach of Article 5, and so no claim for compensation under Article 5(5). (6) In the circumstances there is no Convention incompatibility in either s139 or s6(3). [Caution.] 2010‑06‑12 20:31:05 , , , Miscellaneous,

The claimant, who suffered from gender identity disorder, unsuccessfully challenged the decisions to refuse funding for breast augmentation surgery and the underlying policies. 2010‑05‑26 23:10:52 , , Miscellaneous,

(1) The Trust had breached as (a) they had the requisite knowledge, actual or constructive, of a real and immediate risk to the patient's life from self harm, and (b) failed to do all that could reasonably have been expected of it to avoid or prevent that risk. (2) The patient's daugher was eligible to bring the claim as a victim under s7 . (3) Compensation of £10,000 was awarded. 2010‑05‑01 23:51:14 , , Miscellaneous,

(1) The defendant to these possession proceedings was "a person in actual occupation" for the purpose of entitlement to an overriding interest within the meaning of the despite her involuntary residence in hospital under s3 MHA, as there was a sufficient degree of continuity and permanence of occupation and a persistent intention to return home when possible. (2) There is no single test but relevant factors from case law are: the degree of permanence and continuity of presence of the person concerned, the intentions and wishes of that person, the length of absence from the property and the reason for it, and the nature of the property and personal circumstances of the person. 2010‑05‑01 23:20:03 , , , Miscellaneous,

Dr Mezey had admitted a conditionally-discharged patient informally to a secure ward without informing the Home Office, and granted him unescorted leave that day without personally assessing him; the patient went AWOL and killed a stranger. The Trust's formal investigation, although it found her conduct inappropriate and not in accordance with the standards of good practice, did not call into account her capability to practise. The Trust were therefore not entitled to convene a capability panel under the Maintaining High Professional Standards in the modern NHS (MHPS) framework. 2010‑03‑30 20:19:03 , , Miscellaneous,

The claimant brought proceedings, by the Official Solicitor as his litigation friend, against the Archdiocese for damages for sexual abuse in 1975/6 by Father Clonan: (1) the priest's sexual abuse of the claimant was so closely connected with his employment that it would be fair and just to hold the Archdiocese vicariously liable; (2) obiter, the Archdiocese owed a duty of care to the claimant and was negligent. 2010‑03‑26 22:29:39 , , Miscellaneous,

As a Tribunal order for discharge had not been challenged, it had to be given effect, despite the local authority’s view that it was invalid: the purported renewal was therefore of no effect. [MHLR.] 2010‑02‑26 22:21:02 , , , Miscellaneous,

A desire to return to an inadequate home is not “seriously irresponsible” and so cannot found a conclusion that there is mental impairment. [MHLR.] 2010‑02‑26 22:11:18 , , , Miscellaneous,

— Challenge to lawfulness of detention under Southern Irish law. [Summary required.] 2009‑12‑09 23:14:06 , Miscellaneous, , ,

— Challenge to lawfulness of detention under Southern Irish law. [Summary required.] 2009‑12‑09 23:10:44 , Miscellaneous, , ,

In these appeals, arising from allegations of historic sexual abuse at children's homes, guidance was given on the correct approach to the application of s33 in the light of A v Hoare">[2008] UKHL 6. 2009‑12‑07 22:01:06 , , Miscellaneous,

Statement of facts and question lodged with court. Case concerns the procedure under MHA 1983. 2009‑12‑04 21:35:51 , , , Miscellaneous,

Statement of facts and question lodged with the court. The case relates to detention under beyond the permitted 72-hour period and a subsequent civil claim against the Trust for negligence, for breaches of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, and for misfeasance in public office. 2009‑12‑04 21:18:52 , , Miscellaneous,

The applicant mental health social worker successfully appealed against a decision made by the respondent's Preliminary Proceedings Committee to impose an six-month Interim Suspension Order. 2009‑12‑04 20:40:38 , , Miscellaneous,

(1) A court faced with an application for permission under (2) must (a) balance the applicant's interest to be allowed to seek the adjudication of the courts upon any claim which is not frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process, and the equally legitimate interest of the respondent not to be subjected to the risk of being harassed by baseless claims, and (b) consider whether the proposed claim has a real prospect of success. (2) On the facts, permission was granted. (3) Under the relevant test under the Limitation Act 1980 (which was explained) the 3-year limitation period on the assault claim was dis-applied. 2009‑11‑20 21:14:16 , , Miscellaneous,

— Unsuccessful challenge relating to effectiveness of Scottish "conditions of excessive security" legislation. [Summary required.] 2009‑11‑01 22:01:39 , Miscellaneous, , ,

— Seclusion. [Summary required.] 2009‑10‑31 18:42:29 , Miscellaneous, ,

— Departure from Code of Practice. [Summary required.] 2009‑10‑31 18:37:54 , Miscellaneous, ,

— Renewal of section while on long-term s17 leave. [Summary required.] 2009‑10‑31 18:04:06 , Miscellaneous, ,

— [Summary required.] 2009‑10‑30 23:07:03 , Miscellaneous, ,

— Negligence case. [Summary required.] 2009‑10‑30 23:01:34 , Miscellaneous, ,

Unsuccessful challenge to Ashworth policy not to issue condoms. 2009‑10‑30 22:35:03 , , Miscellaneous,

Judicial review was an inappropriate means of challenging the closure of the psychiatric hospital. 2009‑10‑30 22:28:09 , , Miscellaneous,

The decision to make C subject to polygraph testing as a condition of his licence did not breach the his rights given the seriousness of his offences and his attitude to them; that the scheme was a pilot in his geographical area did not amount to discrimination under . 2009‑10‑24 10:05:40 , , Miscellaneous,

If the LSC decide fund a successful litigant, that decision must ordinarily be seen to carry with it something close to an assurance that the Commission will continue to support him in any subsequent appeal by the unsuccessful party; the LSC's decision not to continue funding without a protective costs order against the appellent was unlawful and public funding was therefore to continue. 2009‑10‑24 09:35:01 , , , Miscellaneous,

The GMC's decision that it was necessary for the protection of patients and in the public interest for the appellant consultant psychiatrist's name to be erased from the Medical Register was lawful. 2009‑10‑08 19:13:28 , , Miscellaneous,

The 2004 guidance "Best Practice Guidance for Doctors and other Health Professionals on the provision of Advice and Treatment to Young People under 16 on Contraception, Sexual and Reproductive Health" was not unlawful. A medical professional can provide such advice and treatment if: (1) the young person understands all aspects of the advice; (2) the young person cannot be persuaded to have his parents informed; (3) (re contraception/STIs) the young person is very likely to have sexual intercourse; (4) without advice/treatment his physical/mental health is likely to suffer; (5) it is in the young person's best interests. 2009‑08‑01 18:55:04 , , Miscellaneous,

The right or freedom to smoke does not engage (1); could not therefore be relied upon either. In any event, the SSH's smoke-free regulations and the Trust's smoke-free policy would be justified under Article 8(2), and the different treatment under the regulations for mental health units compared with prisons, care homes and hospices would be justified under Article 14. 2009‑07‑26 14:07:15 , , , Miscellaneous, ,

The principle of ex turpi causa prevented the claimant from recovering for damage which was the consequence of his committing the offence of manslaughter. 2009‑06‑21 22:24:07 , , , Miscellaneous,

The GMC fitness to practise panel in suspending Dr Compton for a year had exercised a fair procedure (in light of the doctor's decision not to attend) and were justified in their conclusion (that he had been dishonest in not disclosing previous unsuccessful applications for s12 approval). 2009‑06‑15 20:11:40 , , Miscellaneous, ,

— The justice of the case did not require the forfeiture rule to be modified. [Summary required.] 2009‑06‑14 20:44:23 , Miscellaneous, ,

— Clinical negligence - hourly observations were reasonable. [Summary required.] 2009‑06‑14 20:40:16 , Miscellaneous, ,

— Unsuccessful challenge to the decision of the decision of the Secretary of State to permit the claimants to be interviewed by journalists but only if the interviews were conducted within earshot of officials and were tape recorded. [Summary required.] 2009‑06‑14 20:26:28 , Miscellaneous, ,

— Unsuccessful challenge to lawfulness of s4 detention and Tribunal's decision to adjourn. [Summary required.] 2009‑06‑14 20:20:06 , Miscellaneous, ,

Unsuccessful challenge to which introduced a discretionary power on special hospitals to record and subsequently to listen to a random ten per cent of the outgoing and incoming telephone calls of patients at the hospitals. 2009‑04‑19 15:58:01 , , Miscellaneous,

Refusal to make extra contractual referral for transfer from Broadmoor to medium secure unit was lawful. 2009‑04‑19 15:39:19 , , Miscellaneous,

The restrictions placed on the male claimant's freedom to dress as, and to assume the appearance of, a woman were lawful. 2009‑04‑19 15:33:18 , , Miscellaneous,

— Unsuccessful application for permission to appeal against refusal of leave under to bring proceedings. 2009‑04‑19 15:26:01 , Miscellaneous, , ,

Unsuccessful appeal on liability (Original decision: Unauthorised transmission of medico-legal report; unsuccessful defamation claim; damages awarded for injury to feelings caused by breach of confidence). 2009‑04‑19 15:16:52 , , Miscellaneous,

The twelve-week requirement under Mental Health Act does not apply to s48(1) Family Law Act 1996 (both sections relate to remand for medical examination and report). 2009‑04‑19 15:09:25 , , Miscellaneous,

— MGN ordered to disclose identity of intermediary, as a means of identifying the source of the leaked information. 2009‑04‑12 23:40:52 , Miscellaneous, ,

Detention of "pre-operative male-to-female transsexual" on male ward did not violate or 2009‑04‑12 23:00:29 , , Miscellaneous,

Claims struck out for having no prospect of success; in any event, no permission had been obtained under so the proceedings were a nullity. 2009‑04‑12 22:53:16 , , Miscellaneous,

Where a person dies as a result of what is arguably medical negligence in an NHS hospital, the state must have a system which provides for the practical and effective investigation of the facts and for the determination of civil liability. Unlike in the cases of death in custody, the system does not have to provide for an investigation initiated by the state but may include such an investigation. The present system complied with . Inquest verdict quashed and new inquest ordered. 2009‑04‑12 22:13:23 , , , Miscellaneous,

— Coroner's decision not to call jury or adjourn for expert evidence, and inquest verdict, were lawful. [Overturned on appeal.] 2009‑04‑12 22:13:22 , , Miscellaneous, ,

The fact that a judicial review claimant is legally aided and his solicitor would therefore benefit from an inter partes costs order is not relevant to the decision as to whether to make a costs order. 2009‑04‑12 21:25:50 , , Miscellaneous,

— Habeas corpus - no breach by ASW of (4) (consultation with NR) or (2) (interview with patient). 2009‑04‑12 00:12:14 , , Miscellaneous, ,

The were lawful and did not violate . 2009‑04‑11 23:31:42 , , Miscellaneous,

The Ashworth seclusion policy, which departed from the Code of Practice, was unlawful. [Caution] 2009‑04‑11 23:23:44 , , Miscellaneous,

— Decision to close Orchard Hill (a long stay hospital for people with learning disabilities) quashed. 2009‑04‑11 22:32:54 , Miscellaneous, ,

A deferred conditional discharge had proved impossible to implement, no psychiatrist being willing to supervise the patient; on a subsequent Tribunal application the medical evidence was that an absolute discharge would be appropriate, but the panel adjourned the hearing; in the circumstances habeas corpus was not the appropriate remedy as the failure of the Tribunal to make the decision (as it should have) did not make the detention unlawful. 2009‑04‑11 21:24:30 , , Miscellaneous,

Unauthorised transmission of medico-legal report; unsuccessful defamation claim; damages awarded for injury to feelings caused by breach of confidence. 2009‑04‑11 21:04:18 , , Miscellaneous,

— MGN ordered to disclose identity of intermediary, as a means of identifying the source of the leaked information. 2009‑04‑11 20:56:01 , Miscellaneous, ,

The proximity required for a duty of care as between a hospital and the victim of a patient only arises if the victim is a member of an identifiable at risk group. [MHLR.] 2009‑04‑11 19:30:46 , , , Miscellaneous,

A High Secure hospital has a duty to treat patients, maintain security and provide a therapeutic environment; and implicit rights and powers to secure these objectives, including seeking to control events outside the hospital that might impact upon its duties. [MHLR.] (No injunction to prevent patient publishing book about index offence.) 2009‑04‑11 17:44:01 , , , Miscellaneous,

Section 82(4)(b) of the , which provides for the provisional inclusion in the POVA list of a care worker (thus depriving him of employment) immediately after concerns are raised but before any judicial hearing, is incompatible with Articles and . 2009‑02‑22 15:20:54 , , , Miscellaneous,

Failure to apply for permission under s329(2) Criminal Justice Act 2003 before bringing proceedings did not render the proceedings a nullity, but rather amounted to a procedural irregularity that could be cured by subsequent application at the discretion of the court. 2009‑01‑28 22:00:30 , , , Miscellaneous,

— The requirements of Article 2 concerning an investigation into the treatment of the claimant while she was serving a sentence of detention in a young offender institution. 2009‑01‑21 21:28:10 , , Miscellaneous, ,

The claimant nurses had been assaulted by a patient and sued the Trust in negligence. The standard of reasonable care is that which is reasonably to be demanded in the circumstances: one of the circumstances was the duty of care owed by the defendant to the patient; another was the failure, contrary to the , to have a policy for assessing high risk patients for being locked up at night, a policy which would have led to the patient being locked up and prevented the assault. Appeal dismissed. 2009‑01‑17 13:54:45 , , Miscellaneous,

The principle of ex turpa causa did not prevent the claimant from recovering damages after the commission of manslaughter. [Overturned on appeal.] 2008‑12‑28 20:31:09 , , , Miscellaneous,

The principle of ex turpi causa prevented the claimant from recovering damages after the commission of manslaughter. 2008‑12‑28 20:31:09 , , Miscellaneous,

Unsuccessful challenge to decision of the Health Service Commission (i) to refuse to provide Mr Kay with copies of documents provided by the NHS Trust, which are not deemed to be relevant to a determination of a complaint before the ombudsman by virtue of section 15(1)(a) of the Health Service Commissions Act 1993, and (ii) for requiring an undertaking from Mr Kay to use such documents as may be released only for the purpose of the complaints. 2008‑12‑28 19:42:35 , , Miscellaneous,

Article 2 imposes, in addition to general obligations, a further "operational" obligation on health authorities and their hospital staff: if members of staff know or ought to know that a particular patient presents a real and immediate risk of suicide, they must do all that can reasonably be expected to prevent the patient from committing suicide. 2008‑12‑10 22:08:58 , , Miscellaneous,

(1) The ability to disclose material to the representative on condition that it was not revealed to the patient was compatible with the Convention (obiter, since no decision had been taken on this yet). (2) The medical member's role is to form a provisional view on the patient's mental condition, rather than on the statutory criteria, and he discloses his conclusion during the hearing; if this approach is taken then there is no violation of (4), distinguished. 2008‑11‑27 17:32:08 , , , Miscellaneous, ,

— Habeas corpus - challenge to lawfulness of medical recommendation and ASW application. 2008‑10‑30 18:02:45 , Miscellaneous, ,

Under s17(1)(d) PACE 1984 a constable may enter and search any premises for the purpose of recapturing a person who is unlawfully at large and whom he is pursuing: (1) a detained patient who absconds is "unlawfully at large"; (2) the pursuit must be almost contemporaneous with the entry into he premises. 2008‑10‑22 12:46:23 , , Miscellaneous,

— Broadmoor's random and routine search policy was lawful. 2008‑10‑15 20:17:39 , Miscellaneous, ,

— Permission granted to appeal (challenge to Broadmoor search policy). 2008‑10‑15 20:17:12 , Miscellaneous, ,

— Broadmoor's random and routine search policy was lawful. 2008‑10‑15 20:15:23 , Miscellaneous, ,

— Unsuccessful judicial review and habeas corpus applications challenging renewal of detention while patient was spending most of week on leave. 2008‑10‑15 19:46:52 , Miscellaneous, ,

— Habeas corpus - challenge to lawfulness of medical recommendation and ASW application. 2008‑09‑15 17:40:28 , , Miscellaneous,

— Negligence. 2008‑09‑13 07:49:58 , Miscellaneous, ,

Failure to apply for permission under s329(2) Criminal Justice Act 2003 before bringing proceedings did not render the proceedings a nullity, but rather amounted to a procedural irregularity that could be cured by subsequent application at the discretion of the court; distinguished because of differences from s139 MHA 1983; permission now granted.' 2008‑09‑13 07:49:15 , , Miscellaneous,

HUMAN RIGHTS — Right to respect for private and family life — Smoking ban — Claimants detainees at high security psychiatric hospital — Regulation providing mental health units temporary exemption from smoking ban — Whether regulation to be read as providing mental health units with permanent exemption — Whether interference with claimants’ Convention rights — Human Rights Act 1998, s 3(1), Sch 1, Pt 1, arts 8, 14 — Smoke-free (Exemption & Vehicles) Regulations 2007 (SI 2007/765), reg 10(3). A provision which had the effect of prohibiting smoking in a high security psychiatric hospital was not incompatible with the human rights of detained mental patients and was not unlawful. 2008‑09‑13 07:48:22 , , , Miscellaneous, ,

— Data Protection Act case. 2008‑09‑13 07:26:36 , Miscellaneous, ,

— Litigation between Law Society and LSC over Unified Contract. 2008‑09‑13 07:21:06 , Miscellaneous, ,

— Unsuccessful challenge to s19 transfer from Rampton to Broadmoor. 2008‑09‑12 16:57:24 , , Miscellaneous,

— No public interest justification for disclosure of journalist's source. 2008‑02‑23 00:13:49 , Miscellaneous, ,

— No public interest justification for disclosure of journalist's source. 2008‑02‑23 00:12:32 , Miscellaneous, ,

Appeal against the removal of entitlement to Severe Disablement Allowance by Social Security (Hospital In-Patients) Regulations 2005 was unsuccessful 2008‑02‑22 23:10:31 , , Miscellaneous,

Appeal allowed: it was not necessary to show gross negligence. "In order to establish a breach of article 2, on the assumed facts the appellant must show that at the material time the Trust knew or ought to have known of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of Mrs Savage from self-harm and that it failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk." 2007‑12‑27 18:04:11 , , Miscellaneous,

For allegations of clinical negligence, the legal test applicable to a breach of Art 2, in respect of a patient detained under s3, is that of at least gross negligence of a kind sufficient to sustain a charge of manslaughter 2007‑12‑27 17:52:33 , , Miscellaneous,


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