Inherent jurisdiction cases
Note that this is a relatively new category and older inherent jurisdiction cases can still be found in Category:Other capacity cases.
|Case and summary||Date added||Categories|
|A Local Authority v BF  EWCA Civ 2962 — An interim order made on 10/12/18 required BF to reside at a care home, over Christmas, and not at his own or his son's home, despite BF's having capacity to make decisions about his residence and wanting to return home. The order was expressed to last until a further hearing to take place no later than 31/1/19 (later fixed for 16/1/19) when the judge could hear full argument on what relief could be granted pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction. The local authority appealed on the basis that the order infringed Article 5. The appeal was dismissed: (1) BF is a vulnerable adult (old, blind, infirm, in a squalid and dangerous home, with undue influence present in relationship with son) who needs protection despite not lacking capacity. (2) The test of "unsound mind" is different from the test of capacity, and there is prima facie evidence that he may be of unsound mind. (3) In an emergency situation, someone may be deprived of their liberty in the absence of evidence of mental disorder without infringing Article 5 (Winterwerp); even if BF is found not to be of unsound mind, his vulnerability is such that he could not be returned home without careful planning, which is a crucial component of the protection afforded by the inherent jurisdiction. [This is a surprising decision on both the "unsoundness of mind" and "emergency situation" fronts. This permission judgment of 21/12/18 was published on 21/1/19; presumably the full judgment from the 10/12/18 and 16/1/19 hearings will be published soon.]||2019‑01‑22 23:50:19||2018 cases, Brief summary, Cases, Inherent jurisdiction cases, Transcript
|Re AB (Inherent Jurisdiction: Deprivation of Liberty)  EWHC 3103 (Fam) — AB had capacity to consent to the care, support and accommodation arrangements which were provided as part of his conditional discharge but, following the MM case, there was an unlawful deprivation of liberty. The High Court extended the inherent jurisdiction to regularise the position of a capacitous detained mental health patient subject to restrictions as part of his conditional discharge which satisfied the objective elements of a deprivation of liberty (firstly, it was clear that there was no legislative provision governing this situation in that the Mental Health Act provided no remedy; secondly, it was in the interests of justice; and, thirdly, there were sound and strong public policy justifications). The court order: authorised the deprivation of liberty for 12 months; required the applicant to apply to court if the restrictions increase, and no less than one month before the expiry of the authorisation; and provided for a review on the papers unless a party requests or the court requires an oral hearing.||2018‑12‑19 01:55:42||2018 cases, Brief summary, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, ICLR summary, Inherent jurisdiction cases, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|Mazhar v Lord Chancellor  EWHC 2536 (Fam) — "This is a claim brought under sections 6, 7(1)(a), 8(1) and 9(1)(c) of the Human Rights Act 1998 against the Lord Chancellor in respect of a judicial act. The act in question is an order made by a High Court judge, Mr Justice Mostyn, who was the Family Division out of hours applications judge on the late evening of Friday, 22 April 2016. The order was made on the application of Birmingham Community Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust. It was an urgent, without notice, out of hours application made in respect of the claimant, Mr Aamir Mazhar. ... Mr Mazhar seeks to argue that the inherent jurisdiction cannot be used to detain a person who is not of unsound mind for the purposes of article 5(1)(e) of the Convention and that a vulnerable person's alleged incapacity as a result of duress or undue influence is not a basis to make orders in that jurisdiction that are other than facilitative of the person recovering, retaining or exercising his capacity. His removal and detention were accordingly unlawful and in breach of article 5. He also seeks to argue that his article 6 rights were engaged such that the absence of any challenge by the judge to his capacity and/or the evidence of the NHS Trust and the absence of any opportunity to challenge those matters himself or though his family or representatives before the order was executed was an unfair process. He says that his article 8 right to respect for family and private life was engaged and that the order was neither necessary nor in accordance with the law. ... The consequence is that I have come to the conclusion that there is nothing in the HRA (taken together with either the CPR or the FPR) that provides a power in a court or tribunal to make a declaration against the Crown in respect of a judicial act. Furthermore, the HRA has not modified the constitutional principle of judicial immunity. Likewise, the Crown is not to be held to vicariously liable for the acts of the judiciary with the consequence that the claim for a declaration is not justiciable in the Courts of England and Wales. A claim for damages against the Crown is available to Mr Mazhar for the limited purpose of compensating him for an article 5(5) breach but the forum for such a claim where the judicial act is that of a judge of the High Court cannot be a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction. On the facts of this case, the only court that can consider a damages claim is the Court of Appeal. If Mr Mazhar wants to pursue his challenge to the order of Mostyn J he must do so on appeal."||2018‑05‑22 20:51:22||2017 cases, Inherent jurisdiction cases, No summary, Transcript
|Re L: K v LBX  EWHC 2607 (Fam),  MHLO 47 — "In essence, K says that this court should intervene because his son lacks capacity to be able to decide contact. More recently he has made an application to remove Miss O'Connell as a litigation friend for L. ... By the order I made on 15 November 2013, I found that L had capacity to decide about residence and care and I made orders under the inherent jurisdiction regulating what contact there should be between L and his father, as I considered him to be a vulnerable adult, he needed orders being made to ensure he retained his capacity... There is no evidence that L's capacity has changed."||2016‑11‑19 20:35:03||2016 cases, Inherent jurisdiction cases, No summary, Transcript
|Re FD (Inherent Jurisdiction: Power of Arrest)  EWHC 2358 (Fam),  MHLO 37 — "FD is an 18 year old young woman. In July 2016 a local authority issued proceedings seeking an injunction under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to prevent AD (her father) and GH (a male friend) from having contact with FD and from going to her home. So far as concerns the application for an injunction against GH, the local authority also seeks a power of arrest. The issue before the court is whether a power of arrest may be attached to an injunction granted by the High Court under its inherent jurisdiction in the case of a vulnerable adult who has capacity. ... It is clear that under its inherent jurisdiction the High Court has a wide and largely unfettered discretion to grant injunctive relief to protect vulnerable adults. That discretionary power is at least as wide as its powers in wardship. In Re G the Court of Appeal was in no doubt that under its inherent jurisdiction in wardship the High Court has no power to attach a power of arrest to an injunction. I am in no doubt that the position is exactly the same so far as concerns the inherent jurisdiction to protect vulnerable adults. ... [I]t appears that FD will again be unrepresented at the next hearing, on 17th October, at which the court will determine whether she is a vulnerable person in respect of whom the court should exercise its inherent protective jurisdiction. FD does not accept that she is a vulnerable adult. Neither does she support the local authority's application for injunctions against AD and GH. If she is not, in fact, a vulnerable adult then the orders sought by the local authority would, if made, be in breach of FD's Article 8 right to respect for her private and family life. I make that point simply to highlight the importance and significance for FD of the decisions the court is being invited to make. At the hearing on 17th October FD will be a litigant in person defending an application by a local authority represented by leading counsel. There will be no equality of arms. However hard the court tries to ensure that there is a level playing field, the reality is that FD will be significantly disadvantaged. I can do no more than to invite the Legal Aid Agency to reconsider its decision as a matter of urgency."||2016‑10‑01 23:03:14||2016 cases, ICLR summary, Inherent jurisdiction cases, Transcript
|Al-Jeffery v Al-Jeffery (Vulnerable adult, British citizen)  EWHC 2151 (Fam),  MHLO 25 — "There are two applications before the court. One asks the court to make a statutory forced marriage protection order. The other asks the court to make orders, including mandatory orders, in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to make orders protective of vulnerable adults. ... She now claims that she is being seriously ill-treated by her father and being kept under constraint by him in his flat; and that she is being prevented by him from leaving Saudi Arabia and travelling to Wales or England, which she wishes to do, and is, in the eyes of the law of Wales and England, fully entitled freely to do. ... The father, against whom I [am] asked to make an order, is not a British citizen and owes no allegiance to our Sovereign or this state. Neither of them are present here. Neither of them have lived here for several years. Both of them are citizens of Saudi Arabia and both of them currently live there. There have, indeed, already been recent legal proceedings between them there. Should I, nevertheless, attempt to help her by making the essential order which she seeks for her return here; or should I appreciate that that would be exorbitant and, in my judicial discretion, decline to do so? That is the essential issue and dilemma in this case."||2016‑08‑27 09:09:22||2016 cases, Capacity to consent to sexual relations, Inherent jurisdiction cases, No summary, Transcript
The following 6 pages are in this category.
- A Local Authority v BF (2018) EWCA Civ 2962
- Al-Jeffery v Al-Jeffery (Vulnerable adult, British citizen) (2016) EWHC 2151 (Fam), (2016) MHLO 25